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Abstract 
This practical study is concerned with flows of attention and distraction 
that are associated with experiences of the internet. Taking the term ‘internet’ to 
stand for a range of networked social, media-consumption, and data practices 
carried out on devices such as smartphones, this study sets out to explore how 
distraction might arise, how it might be conceptualised, and the potential 
consequences for agency of the conditions of its emergence. The study is led 
by the production and analysis of artworks, using practical approaches that 
engage critically with aspects of the experience of the internet.  
This thesis begins by exploring conceptions of the ‘attention economy’ 
articulated by Goldhaber (1997), Beller (2006), and Citton (2017), developing an 
understanding that counters mainstream deterministic positions regarding the 
impact of digital technologies on the capacity for focused attention. Distraction 
is considered as an experience that may be sought out by individuals but can 
be captured and extended by third parties such as social media platforms. The 
importance of the data generated by habitual or compulsive engagement with 
internet-enabled devices and services (Zuboff, 2015) is considered against a 
backdrop of quantification and managerialism that extends beyond experiences 
of the internet.  
The study reviews existing artworks made in response to these 
concerns, focusing on expressions of the ‘attention economy’ prevalent in ‘post-
internet’ art. Works by Vierkant (2010), Roth (2015) and others that interrogate 
infrastructure, data-gathering, or networked methods of distribution are 
identified as relevant, and a position is developed from which the consequences 
of metricised display platforms for an artistic ‘attention economy’ can be 
explored. Prototype artworks made during the study are appraised using an 
artistic research methodology that foregrounds the role of the researcher as 
both producer and reader of the artwork. Works that actively create distraction, 
that gather and visualise data, and that emphasise calm self-interrogation, are 
discussed and evaluated. The practical aspects of the research contribute to 
knowledge by extending understanding of the spatial, infrastructural, and 
algorithmic dimensions of the relationship between distraction and agency.    
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1 
1: Introduction 
Rationale 
My application to the Ph.D. programme was motivated by a desire to re-
evaluate and reconfigure the critical space in which my art practice had been 
operating. Prior to the Ph.D., I had been using computers as an artistic 
production tool for many years, and had developed an art practice that entered 
into a broad critical dialogue about the role of digital technology in contemporary 
life. My Masters research project explored the phenomenon of boredom. The 
experience of boredom, at once politically charged in opposition to work and 
frustratingly unpleasant as an embodied temporal experience, stood counter to 
the prevailing ideology of entertainment that seemed central to the mediatised 
world. Post-MA, my practice drew in and utilised restorative visual tropes such 
as landscape, and by joining this with the moving image, began to connect 
these with the field of slow cinema.  
This durational approach to the depiction of landscape did not take into 
account rapid changes that were occurring alongside the widespread adoption 
of devices that offered mobile internet connectivity as a feature. Mobile 
connectivity presented a challenge to the critical position my work occupied: the 
relevance of the trope of remote wilderness that I was using as a knowingly 
conservative indicator of disconnected solitude was brought into question by the 
fact that everyone in this notional wilderness was likely to be tapping away on a 
smartphone. In a collaborative project with a performance artist, I found myself 
researching military-grade laptops with internet connections, and discovered 
that it was possible to make a reliable connection to the web from the summit of 
Mount Everest.1 As it seemed that one of the most inaccessible locations on the 
planet now had Wi-Fi, the idea of remote wilderness as a critical counterpoint to 
technological acceleration no longer existed in the way that I had been 
deploying it, leaving my practice with some fundamental questions to address. 
 
1 Human Edge Tech, ‘Mount Everest Wi-Fi Network’ <http://humanedgetech.com/> [accessed 
29 November 2017]. 
  
 
 
 
2 
Research Question 
In the early stages of this study, my focus was on establishing a context 
for the research, initially by extrapolating a research domain from questions to 
do with being permanently connected that had emerged from practical work 
done prior to this study. One way of reading the problem was to consider the 
experience of becoming distracted from a view of landscape (or from an artwork 
that depicted a landscape) by an internet-enabled device. One of the 
consequences of being continually connected to the internet is the capability to 
instantly escape open-ended, durational, or boring experiences through the 
pursuit of distraction. Distraction can also occur when it is not actively pursued: 
Thomas Friedman coined the phrase ‘the age of interruption’ to describe a 
contemporary context in which focused attention is seemingly under threat from 
the notifications, updates, and other digital distractions that accompany 
continuous internet connectivity.2 The assertion that continuous connectivity 
causes distraction is commonplace in mainstream discourse, and unpacking the 
assumptions behind this assertion led to the emergence of a more nuanced set 
of research questions. Agency is understood in a sociological sense here, 
referring to the capacity to act independently and with free choice within limiting 
structures.  
During my early background research, I encountered an archetypal 
tableau that seemed common in mainstream discourse: the mobile device user 
giving close attention to their smartphone in favour of their first-hand experience 
of the social or natural world. Examples of this include commentators such as 
Sherry Turkle, who describe teenagers sending text messages to each other 
instead of engaging in face to face conversation, or national parks such as the 
New Forest offering lockers, described as a ‘Tech Crèche’, in which visitors 
could stow their mobile devices so that they could roam undistracted in 
 
2 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘The Age of Interruption’, The New York Times, 5 July 2006, section 
Opinion <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/05/opinion/05friedman.html> [accessed 25 
June 2018]. 
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nature.3,4 While this second example could be seen as a merely a marketing 
opportunity for the New Forest, it also re-inscribes an assumed opposition 
between technology and nature, as well as infantilising any distraction from the 
unquestioned moral wholesomeness of landscape. 
While further reading placed Turkle’s particular analyses into an 
appropriate critical context, the more relevant and important points in her 
widely-read book Alone Together seemed to be concerned with how 
attentiveness and distraction are experienced and managed by smartphone or 
internet users. My focus shifted toward the way attention can be captured by 
connected devices and the communicative services they carry. I wondered why 
these devices were so distracting to their users, and how this distraction might 
be experienced and negotiated by those users. How is distraction produced by 
internet-connected services and devices, and how might agency be enacted 
through capitulation or resistance to it, or through actively pursuing it? What 
might the consequences of distraction be for the agency of the internet user, or 
for the services that stand to gain from harnessing the user’s attention? How 
can artistic research develop understanding of the relationship between 
distraction, agency and the internet? From the perspective of a producer of 
aesthetic experiences that invite a certain quality of attention, I wanted to find 
out more about this oscillation between attentive and distracted states, and 
what implications it might have for the work that I was making.  
Methodology & Scope 
This research terrain is navigated with the intention to explore what an 
appropriate and satisfactory critical art practice that explores these ebbs and 
flows of attention and distraction might be. While the boundaries of this 
research terrain have been kneaded and stretched in ways that variously 
 
3 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less From Each 
Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011), p. 178.  
4 Katie Collins, ‘New Forest Tech Crèche Takes Phones so You Can Embrace Nature (Wired 
UK)’, Wired UK, 2014 <http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-08/04/new-forest-tech-
creche> [accessed 26 November 2015]. 
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focused and expanded the project’s scope, the necessity for the research to 
inform my art practice made it essential that I adopt artistic research as my 
primary methodology. Both the study of attention and distraction and my wider 
concern with the internet and its social implications are formulated as highly 
interdisciplinary fields, and in this thesis I make the case for art to be among the 
fields that can contribute to the understanding of these research questions. 
Structure of Thesis 
The first chapter of this thesis gives an overview of theoretical 
approaches to the study of attention and distraction, looking most closely at 
those areas that address the emergence of distraction and how it can be 
understood in relation to digital communication. The conceptualisation of the 
internet as an ‘attention economy’ and its connection with expressions of human 
capital are explored here, and this chapter gives particular consideration to the 
way that the ‘attention economy’ has foregrounded certain approaches to user 
engagement over others. The interrelation of an economy of attention and 
approaches to the design of device interfaces has led to an increased interest in 
‘internet addiction’ or compulsive usage of devices with internet access, which 
this chapter explores. Compulsive distraction is considered here in terms of 
user agency.  
The next chapter provides an overview of existing artistic approaches 
that are relevant to my own practical research and to the research terrain 
introduced above. Many artists have worked with and through digital 
technology, but recently certain types of work have been described using the 
contested term ‘post-internet’ art. My interest in the experience of being 
distracted by the internet suggests that art made in response to the internet will 
provide clues to the key issues at stake in the relationship between the internet 
and attention. Part of the narrative that emerges positions ideas of infrastructure 
as key in relation to attentiveness, the digital, and art that responds to these 
concerns. This chapter will critically examine some of the characteristics of 
‘post-internet’ art and the compromises it might involve, as a way of establishing 
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the context for my own research and positioning my artistic practice in the wider 
field of contemporary digital art.  
The next chapter of this thesis looks at ways of conceptualising artistic 
research and outlines my own position as an artistic researcher. This chapter 
summarises the ways in which artistic research can address questions of 
knowledge and insight, and discusses the epistemological concerns appropriate 
to the way that I conduct my own artistic research. 
I then discuss the progression of my practical research, detailing the 
practical experiments that have taken place during my study, and exploring the 
insights emerging from them. In line with a methodological stance that positions 
the researcher as both author and reader of the work, this section of the thesis 
both documents and analyses the practical research activity taken place as part 
of the study. The thesis concludes with a discussion of areas of contribution and 
potential future work.  
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2: Understandings of Attention and Distraction 
Mainstream discourse seems awash with claims that internet-connected 
devices are having a negative effect on cognitive capacities such as attention. 
The concern might be that Google is making us stupid, or that fifty per cent of 
year ten students feel addicted to the internet, or that contemporary attention 
spans are now shorter than that of a goldfish. 5,6,7 Two main threads of this type 
of writing are firstly, that smartphones, the internet, social media and so on have 
an ability to create distraction, and secondly, that these technologies and 
systems make their users feel bad in some way. These two threads are often 
entangled and have large areas of overlap. Distraction is a tricky thing to 
conceptualise and analyse: being distracted by an interruption seems like a 
phenomenon, whereas feeling distracted, or feeling something about being 
distracted, appears more like an affective state. Both these readings have an 
impact on how people value themselves. I intend first to look at some of the 
theoretical understandings of attention and distraction as phenomena, and then 
continue by exploring a more affective understanding of distraction.  
Attention and Distraction as Phenomena 
If there is concern about the capacity of new technologies such as 
smartphones to distract, then this concern seems to manifest itself in a number 
of distinct ways. Some people are concerned that they are too easily distracted 
by the entertainments and interruptions that mobile communications such as 
social media provide, and that this is making them less productive, happy or 
 
5 Nicholas Carr, ‘Is Google Making Us Stupid?’, The Atlantic, August 2008 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-
stupid/306868/?single_page=true> [accessed 6 November 2015]. 
6 Peter Walker, ‘Poll: Nearly 50% of Year 10 Students Feel Addicted to the Internet’, The 
Guardian, 9 May 2014, section Technology 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/09/half-of-students-feel-addicted-to-
the-internet> [accessed 6 November 2015]. 
7 Microsoft Canada, ‘Attention Spans’ (Consumer Insights, Microsoft Canada, 2015) 
<http://advertising.microsoft.com/en/cl/31966/how-does-digital-affect-canadian-attention-
spans>. 
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fulfilled.8,9,10 Others find themselves overwhelmed by the demands of email or 
work-related communication carried out on mobile connected devices.11,12 Still 
others are concerned with ‘information overload’, loosely described as the 
sense that there is simply too much information on the internet, and that it is 
impossible for it to ever be effectively assimilated.13,14 Each of these 
overlapping areas can be critically examined by considering them in terms of 
the capture of attention.  
The literature on attention is divided across a number of disciplinary 
perspectives. While there is a huge body of literature that covers the functioning 
of attention in cognitive psychology, these accounts will not form a major part of 
my study, for the following reasons. Most cognitive psychology studies employ 
objective methodologies, and seek generalised answers that explain the 
phenomenon under investigation. Artistic research operates within a more 
relational epistemological frame that foregrounds subjective or constructionist 
approaches, making cognitive psychology seem at odds with practical artistic 
research. While recognising the potentially fertile interaction between these 
approaches, my inquiry is more in alignment with cultural understandings of the 
phenomenon of attention than objective psychological understandings. 
 
8 Friedman. 
9 Maggie Jackson, ‘MAY WE HAVE YOUR ATTENTION, PLEASE?: With the Workplace Ever 
More Full of Distractions, Researchers Are Developing Tools to Keep Us on Task’, 
Business Week, 2008. 
10 Andrew Sullivan, ‘Andrew Sullivan: My Distraction Sickness — and Yours’, Select All, 2016 
<http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/09/andrew-sullivan-technology-almost-killed-me.html> 
[accessed 25 June 2018]. 
11 Ian Bogost, ‘Hyperemployment, or the Exhausting Work of the Technology User’, The 
Atlantic, 8 November 2013 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/hyperemployment-or-the-
exhausting-work-of-the-technology-user/281149/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
12 Maggie Jackson, ‘Turn Off That Cellphone. It’s Meeting Time’, New York Times, 2003. 
13 Mark Andrejevic, Infoglut: How Too Much Information Is Changing The Way We Think And 
Know (London: Routledge, 2013). 
14 Franco Bifo Berardi and others, After the Future (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011). 
  
 
 
 
8 
Art Criticism’s Approach to Attention and Distraction 
The literature on attention and distraction in art criticism seems to 
engage with contemporary technological questions in very specific and quite 
limited ways. That viewers attend to artworks closely during the aesthetic 
encounter is typically taken as a given, and relatively few art critics discuss 
distraction on a level other than seeing it as a failure of the artwork. Many 
approaches can be traced back to the Frankfurt School, with Walter Benjamin’s 
‘reception in distraction’ operating as a significant touchstone for the 
discussion.15 Writing in the 1930s, Benjamin theorised ‘reception in distraction’ 
as a way of articulating what he identified as a new visuality emerging alongside 
the new medium of cinema, considering it a consequence of mechanically 
reproduced mass media. Benjamin suggested that in comparison to the medium 
of painting, film’s editing processes (specifically montage, Eiland suggests) had 
the capacity to break the viewer’s concentration, preventing them becoming 
absorbed in the work as they might do a painting.16 Rather than engaging in an 
extended, contemplative interaction with the artwork, the viewer receives the 
work of film in a distracted state: ‘The spectator’s process of association in view 
of these images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden change.’17 The 
word ‘distraction’ in the English translation of Benjamin’s text corresponds to the 
German ‘Zerstreuung’, and while this word covers some senses of its English 
equivalent, it also carries a sense of dispersal, etymologically descending from 
the root ‘streuen’, similar to the English ‘strewn’. ‘Zerstreuung’ therefore carries 
with it something of a spatial connotation: distraction to Benjamin is attention 
dispersed across space.18 Benjamin likens this dispersal of attention to the 
mode of a spectator’s interaction with architecture: while architecture can be 
viewed at a distance and contemplated, it is more usually interacted with in an 
 
15 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in Illuminations, 
ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 211–44. 
16 Howard Eiland, ‘Reception in Distraction’, Boundary 2, 30.1, Benjamin Now: Critical 
Encounters with The Arcades Project (2003), 51–66. 
17 Benjamin, p. 231. 
18 R. L. Rutsky, ‘Pop-up Theory: Distraction and Consumption in the Age of Meta-Information’, 
Journal of Visual Culture, 1.3 (2002), 279–94. 
  
 
 
 
9 
embodied, tactile way, with viewers experiencing multiple partial views of the 
fragmented whole as they navigate it. Habits of usage soon emerge through 
daily contact with architecture. Benjamin sees the potential for film to teach the 
masses not through their direct contemplation of single images, but through 
training them in the kind of habituated dispersed reception that would soon be 
coming to all areas of contemporary art.  
Drawing on Benjamin’s definition, Peter Osborne states that ‘art distracts 
and is received in distraction’, by which he means that ‘we go to the gallery, in 
part, to be distracted from the cares and worries of the world.’19 But in order to 
be distracted from the world, we need to be attentive to the artworks in the 
gallery. This paradox proposes that when directed outwards to the world, 
attention and distraction are in essence the same phenomenon. The difference 
between attention and distraction is the positive valuation that is placed upon 
the former, and the negative valuation on the latter: distraction is simply 
attention directed toward the wrong things. Much of the writing on attention and 
distraction explores the way that this valuation is arrived at – how the ‘wrong 
things’ come to be regarded as such – and how the observing subject is 
constructed through adherence to this valuation.   
Jonathan Crary’s extensive scholarship covers the production of attentive 
norms in detail.20 He argues that the nineteenth century saw a reconfiguration 
of attention and distraction, and of the relation between a subject and the visual 
field. As reorganisations of capitalism brought new information sources, 
stimulations, and distractions into being, models of discipline were developed 
that formed normative standards of attention. Failures of attention were 
considered to be a danger in the industrialised settings of the factory floor, and 
inattentiveness was pathologised as sociopathic behaviour by writers of the 
time. These and other developments formed the model of an ideal attentive 
 
19 Peter Osborne, ‘Distracted Reception: Time, Art, and Technology’, in Time Zones: Recent 
Film and Video, ed. by Gregor Muir and Jessica Morgan (London: Tate Publishing(UK), 
2004), pp. 66–75. 
20 Jonathan Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture, 1st 
edn (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001). 
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subject along lines that were compatible with the sorts of factory labour that 
nineteenth century mass industrialisation required. Crary contends that the 
emergence of distraction as a problem in the late nineteenth century is an effect 
that is inseparable from attempts to construct an attentive subject. In fact, 
Crary’s position is that the disciplinary nature of these attempts is what 
produces the distracted subject. Osborne succinctly summarises this position: 
‘attention is a norm produced by the fear of distraction, while distraction is a 
side-effect of attempts to produce attentiveness.’21  
Osborne argues that Benjamin’s approach applies to art in the gallery as 
much as it does to cinema, and that the institutional context of the gallery 
makes disciplinary demands on the attention of its visitors, producing anxiety if 
they are unable to observe its imperatives. Distraction from the artwork arises 
as boredom, if the artwork can’t sustain the contemplative attention the context 
demands, or as revolt against the imperatives of institutional discipline. There is, 
after all, plenty to be distracted by in a gallery, despite its conventional white-
box configuration: other viewers, the surrounding architecture, attendants, other 
artworks and so on. Osborne continues, somewhat confusingly, by asking ‘if 
what art must distract its viewers from – in order to function critically as art – is 
not just the cares and worries of the world, but increasingly, distraction 
(entertainment) itself, how to distract from distraction without simply reproducing 
it?’22 His answer is to consider attention and distraction as a particular modality 
of temporalisation, producing interrupted and syncopated time for the viewer 
instead of continuous uninterrupted duration.23  
Viewing the dialectic between attention and distraction in terms of a 
philosophy of time locates Osborne’s approach in a theoretical lineage that sees 
attention as conflated with time. He goes on to explore Bergsonian thought and 
its rediscovery by Deleuze, concluding that philosophies of time offer a key 
 
21 Osborne, p. 68. 
22 Osborne, p. 69. 
23 This syncopation chimes with experiences of art in the web browser, where it may be in 
competition with multiple browser tabs, or on mobile devices where the rhythms of the 
non-art world intercede on the art experience. 
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analytical tool to understand art received with dispersed attention. He may be 
correct, but even if so, the conflation of attention with time also conflates it with 
metaphorical understandings of time: time that can be wasted or spent wisely, 
and ultimately, time as a scarce commodity.  
In a partial reiteration of Osborne’s position, Anne Ring Petersen 
attempts to challenge the assumption that if the viewer is distracted from an 
artwork, this is generally taken to mean that the artwork is not a very good 
artwork, as it has failed to attract the focused, directed attention that is usually 
applied to the appreciation of art.24 Ring Petersen’s view of distracted reception 
retains Benjamin’s hope that new modes of apperception might be able to be 
developed through the viewing of video installations. As multi-screen video 
works show images and sequences that slip in and out of synchronisation, the 
viewer enters into a state of permanent low-level attentiveness rather than the 
concentrated absorption of aesthetic contemplation. Ring Petersen infers that 
this might invite the viewer to develop a mode of apperception appropriate to 
understanding ‘how (perceptible and imperceptible) data is generated and 
exchanged between technical devices that are spread out in an environment.’25 
Ring Petersen sees video installation art as ‘exercise for an emergent type of 
spectatorship where focused concentration is smoothly alternating and merging 
with distraction’.26 While her examples go some way to supporting Osborne’s 
position, she refrains from explicitly positioning her analysis within a philosophy 
of time.  
Before moving on, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term 
‘aesthetic encounter’. Since the term ‘aesthetic’ has been theorised from a 
range of disciplinary positions such as sociology, psychology, anthropology and 
marketing as well as philosophy and art criticism, it will be impossible to make a 
full account of the term’s multiple and often conflicting meanings here. In the 
 
24 Anne Ring Petersen, ‘Anne Ring Petersen, Attention and Distraction: On the Aesthetic 
Experience of Video Installation Art’, 2010 <http://www.riha-journal.org/articles/2010/ring-
petersen-attention-and-distraction> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
25 Ring Petersen (para. 33 of 35). 
26 Ring Petersen (para 35 of 35). 
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simplest possible sense, I use the term ‘aesthetic encounter’ to refer to the point 
at which a work of art engages its audience. When referring to an aesthetic 
encounter with a work of art, I lean toward Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson’s way 
of understanding what happens when this occurs. They describe four 
dimensions of the aesthetic encounter. The perceptual dimension refers to the 
experience of sensing the physical aspects of the work, such as scale, texture, 
visual appearance, and so on. The emotional dimension refers to the work’s 
ability to create an emotional response in the viewer, which needn’t necessarily 
be positive: surprise, frustration or anger are equally valid responses. The 
intellectual dimension alludes to the way artworks invite questioning, and that 
viewers find that ‘cracking the code’ of a work forms a part of their engagement 
with it. This needn’t imply closure, as the thinking involved in this dimension of 
engagement often raises more questions than it answers about the work. The 
key point is that the intellectual dimension involves the contextualising of the 
work in some way, by relating it to historical, biographical or other knowledge 
about the work. Communication is the final major dimension of the aesthetic 
encounter, although this does not mean that the work is considered to directly 
communicate with the viewer. Communication with the work is seen as a 
multidimensional experience that takes in the perceptual, emotional and 
intellectual aspects of the encounter to produce an exchange of thoughts 
through repeated encounters with the work. The communication takes place in 
the mind of the viewer, and denotes the extraction of meaning from a work.27  
Attention Economy  
The term ‘attention economy’ is used quite broadly to refer to various 
ways of understanding the flow and exchange of attention using models inferred 
from economics, itself considered as a system for the exchange of scarce 
resources. Osborne’s conflation of attention with time invites a reading of 
attention as a finite resource that might be exchanged in a kind of economic 
 
27 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Rick E Robinson, ‘The Major Dimensions of the Aesthetic 
Experience’, in The Art Of Seeing: An Interpretation of the Aesthetic Encounter (Los 
Angeles, CA: J Paul Getty Trust, 1990), pp. 27–71. 
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transaction. The term also invites speculation about broader questions involving 
the commodification of human cognitive functions: if attention is understood as 
a resource, what are the forces that seek to capitalise on it, capture it, and 
exploit it? If attention is understood as labour, how is value extracted from it? 
In their introduction to an edition of Culture Machine devoted to critique 
of the attention economy, Crogan & Kinsley provide a helpful overview of the 
territory, which it will be useful to summarise here. They identify four ways in 
which the commodification and training of attention has been theorised. Firstly, 
the attention economy has been considered to be ‘an inversion of the 
“information economy”, in which information is plentiful and attention the scarce 
commodity’.28 The second paradigm is drawn from post-Marxist theory, 
considering attention as labour rather than as a commodity, and framing 
attention as immaterial labour in a system of cognitive capitalism. The third 
approach considers the neural, cerebral or embodied aspects of attention as 
having relevance. The fourth approach, taken by ‘popular commentators’, sees 
the internet as having a significant role in the devaluation of our attentive 
capacities. My artistic interest and practical research circulates among these 
categories and their overlapping edges. 
Attention as Scarce Resource 
Two of the more notable writers to approach the consideration of 
attention as a scarce resource are Georg Franck and Michael Goldhaber. 
Franck’s analysis carefully details how the exchange and accumulation of 
attention can be considered as analogous to an economic materialist model of 
the monetary economy.29 It takes something of a leap of faith to consider 
attention as a material resource, but if this leap is made, Franck’s analysis of 
 
28 Patrick Crogan and Samuel Kinsley, ‘Paying Attention: Toward a Critique of the Attention 
Economy’, Culture Machine, 13 (2012), 1–29 (p. 3). 
29 Georg Franck, ‘The Economy of Attention’, Telepolis, 1999 
<https://www.heise.de/tp/features/The-Economy-of-Attention-3444929.html> [accessed 
25 June 2018]. 
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how the mass media produce and disseminate attention does follow a fairly 
persuasive logic.  
Franck begins with the assertion that being attended to is pleasurable 
and necessary. Having people listen to you, be nice to you, and attend to you 
closely, is in fact, ‘an irresistible drug’. Franck proposes that wealth is 
overshadowed by prominence, and that in advanced capitalist societies, 
material need is almost completely satisfied. (This assumption is obviously 
deeply problematic, but this does not negate his argument overall.) Once 
material needs are taken care of, attention becomes a more desirable thing to 
accrue, and the mass media are to Franck (writing before the advent of social 
media) the most significant way for an individual to acquire huge amounts of 
attention. If a prominent individual – a star or celebrity – attracts attention to a 
media channel, the media channel can sell advertising space, which in itself is a 
promise to attract attention. This leads to a self-propagating loop of attention 
being generated in order to sell advertising in order to attract attention. The 
consequences are that things that attract attention get foregrounded and 
pursued, and things that don’t are not pursued. It might be inferred that this 
leads to an escalation of content, as more shocking or extreme material 
generates more attention than the bland or uninteresting. The proceeds are 
split: the media channel gets the money while the individual, the celebrity, gets 
the attention. 
Franck sees the business model of media channels as the offering of 
information in return for attention. Media channels produce information of some 
sort, and audiences pay attention to this content. Media channels find out what 
audiences like, and produce information that will increase audience numbers, 
which are the measure of the amount of attention that is being paid. This is an 
asymmetric transaction: media channels merely produce technical 
reproductions of information, while audiences pay live, embodied attention to 
each copy in return. Franck goes on to explore a notional accounting system for 
attentional transactions, how the media can be a speculative attention market 
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for people seeking prominence, and, importantly, how attention can be 
accumulated as esteem.  
Goldhaber’s contribution situates the attention economy firmly in the 
online world.30 Attention flows in the opposite direction to information, from 
viewer to ‘content’, and is accrued by the producers of that content. This 
positions attention as a commodity, accumulating as property, in Goldhaber’s 
thinking. Among the consequences of this is a shift from the ethos of the ‘old 
economy’, which regards attention-seeking as being in bad taste, to one where 
seeking attention has become the norm.  
Goldhaber uses the example of a conference presentation, noting that 
the transaction of attention between speaker and audience is asymmetric. The 
speaker pays attention to the audience as a group, dividing her attention among 
them, whereas each audience member pays full individual attention to the 
speaker. (This is an idealised example, in which audience members are not 
live-tweeting or checking the news on their smartphones during the 
presentation.) This results in audience members feeling like they may know the 
speaker closely from what has been said, despite the speaker not having the 
same sense of this inferred proximity of their relationship. Goldhaber calls the 
speaker’s attention to the viewer ‘illusory attention’, since it feels to the viewer 
like full attention but is actually only a subdivision of that. These asymmetric 
relationships that audience members might form to a speaker are sometimes 
described as parasocial relationships. Theorised by Horton & Wohl in the 
nineteen fifties, parasocial relationships refer to the sense that one has a close 
relationship with a figure’s persona as it appears in the mass media, which to 
Horton & Wohl primarily meant radio or television.31 Parasociality is similar in 
quality to the type of ‘ambient intimacy’ Kate Crawford reports from the early 
days of Twitter, where a listening or ‘tuning in’ metaphor was proposed to 
describe how users maintained often one-sided levels of awareness of the 
 
30 Michael H. Goldhaber, ‘The Attention Economy and the Net’, First Monday, 2.4 (1997) 
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/519> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
31 Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl, ‘Mass Communication and Para-Social Interaction: 
Observations on Intimacy at a Distance’, Psychiatry, 19, 1956, 215–229. 
  
 
 
 
16 
activity of other users in a constantly updating Twitter feed.32 It has since been 
argued that this parasociality forms the basis of a ‘new intimacy economy’, 
where the attention economy has morphed into one where the pretence of 
intimacy is a prerequisite to financial success on the internet:  
[…] watch as organizations pretend, with increasing intensity, that 
they are individuals. Start counting how many times platforms, 
services and websites entreat you in human voices, with awkward 
humour, for money. Watch as the things we expect to be invisible, 
utilitarian, start oozing emojis and winky-smileys.33  
Here, Franck’s understanding of attention as ‘care-giving’ is recast and 
its illusory qualities papered over, before being exploited as more or less 
sincere friendship and deployed by platforms as much as it is by those who use 
them.    
Attention as Labour 
Much of the work done to explore the idea of attention as a form of 
labour has proceeded from Marxist or post-Marxist thought. Crogan & Kinsley 
alight upon Christian Marazzi as a key starting point for the theorisation of post-
Fordism, and his approach to the ‘New Economy’ helps prepare the ground for 
an economy of attention. In particular, the post-Fordists’ account of the 
expansion of the economy into leisure time is useful, identifying the crisis in the 
‘New Economy’ as an excess of information.34  
However, the idea of being attentive as a form of labour is more fully 
articulated by Jonathan Beller. He identifies that the giving of attention produces 
value, and this valorising function of attention is a type of work on the part of the 
 
32 Kate Crawford, ‘Following You: Disciplines of Listening in Social Media’, Continuum, 23.4 
(2009), 525–35. 
33 Leigh Alexander, ‘The New Intimacy Economy’, Medium, 2015 
<https://medium.com/@leighalexander/the-new-intimacy-economy-51c87dc4a4d6> 
[accessed 25 June 2018]. 
34 Christian Marazzi, Capital and Language: From the New Economy to the War Economy, 
Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series (Los Angeles, CA!: Cambridge, Mass: Semiotext(e)!; 
Distributed by the MIT Press, 2008). 
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observer. To Beller, looking at an object (or, since he writes initially from the 
discipline of film theory, a media object) represents labour that increases the 
object’s value.35 He argues that a spectator connecting a montage of images 
into meaning has a structural similarity to a worker in a factory assembling 
components on a production line. However, the term ‘cinema’ is extended 
beyond merely film and its architecture of presentation:  
“Cinema” means the production of instrumental images through the 
organization of animated materials. These materials include 
everything from actors to landscapes, to populations, to widgets, to 
fighter-planes, to electrons. “Cinema” is a material practice of global 
scope, the movement of capital in, through, and as image. 
“Cinema” marks the changeover to a mode of production in which 
images, working in concert, form the organizational principles for 
the production of reality.36 
Beller sees an understanding of the cinematic mode of production as 
essential to resist and destabilise a hegemonic order of visuality, and indeed, 
much of his writing proceeds from a strongly Marxist position of struggle against 
hegemony.  
His argument reiterates the asymmetry found in Franck’s argument, 
claiming that in ‘both labour and attention, sensuous activity produces value for 
capital through dissymmetrical exchange.’37 With wage labour, workers put in 
more labour to the production of commodities than they take out through wages, 
and in the case of giving attention ‘spectators do more to valorise and legitimate 
images, media platforms and the status quo, than they receive in pleasure or 
social currency’.38 So for Beller, the value expropriated from a spectator is 
 
35 Jonathan Beller, Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy & the Society of the 
Spectacle (University Press of New England, 2006). 
36 Beller, Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy & the Society of the Spectacle, p. 
14. 
37 Jonathan Beller, ‘Informatic Labor in the Age of Computational Capital’, Lateral, 5.1 (2016) 
<http://csalateral.org/issue/5-1/informatic-labor-computational-capital-beller/> [accessed 
13 July 2017]. 
38 Beller, ‘Informatic Labor in the Age of Computational Capital’. 
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always greater than the value received by one in return. This forms the basis of 
the attentional transaction: ‘The separation and expropriation of labour from the 
labourer, the alienation of labour, is a precursor to the separation and 
expropriation of vision from the spectator.’39  
In more recent writing, Beller extends this theorisation to the 
contemporary digital world, developing his theory from a cinematic to a 
‘computational mode of production’.40 He argues that commodities need not be 
objects, and, in fact, that the object was only ever a transitional status of the 
commodity form. Commodities in the attention economy are constituted and 
operate more like financial derivatives than objects. Financial derivatives are 
contracts that allow purchasers to bet on ‘options’ to buy, assessing risk and 
determining price based on their guess of how future markets will fluctuate. 
McKenzie Wark describes the derivative as the means by which ‘each of the 
component flows in commodification can be subdivided, valued, combined and 
sold again and again in the form of a financial instrument. On top of the 
quantitative abstraction of the energetics of production is a quantitative 
abstraction of the information about all of the possible future states of that 
system. Each of which can be separately priced and sold.’41  
As comparatively few non-specialists are able to adequately 
conceptualise the motions of automated finance capital, it’s difficult for a new 
system of financial relations to emerge. Beller argues that it might be possible to 
‘harness the financial operations within the image and make them non-
exploitative’ and that this control of valuation might produce steps toward a 
more equitable economy.42  
 
39 Beller, Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy & the Society of the Spectacle, p. 
8. 
40 Jonathan Beller, ‘The Programmable Image of Capital: M-I-C-I’-M’ and the World Computer’, 
Postmodern Culture, 26.2 (2016). 
41 McKenzie Wark, ‘After Capitalism, the Derivative’, Public Seminar, 2017 
<http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/04/derivative/> [accessed 7 March 2018]. 
42 Jonathan Beller, ‘Photography, Computation, Radical Finance? - Still Searching - 
Fotomuseum Winterthur’ <http://www.fotomuseum.ch/en/explore/still-
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Since these commodity forms are based on communicative labour, ‘the 
expropriation of labour is also an expropriation of communication and hence an 
expropriation of individual consciousness, semiotic capacity, and democracy.’43 
This is why, for Beller, attention is a key component in the struggle against 
capitalism. As attention becomes expropriated, stolen, or captured, 
consciousness goes with it, and is subsumed by the hegemonic order that is 
capital.  
Attention as Embodied 
A consequence of a wider ‘neurological turn’ in the humanities is that 
some theorists consider attention as located in the materiality of the brain.44,45 
An early theorist in this area of study is Katherine Hayles. Writing in 2007 and 
from a digital humanities perspective, she identifies a shift in attentive modes in 
the students she works with, noticing that their capacity to pay close attention 
seems to be in decline. She categorises two prevalent attentional modes as 
‘hyper’ and ‘deep’ attention.46 Deep attention is the typical mode of study in the 
humanities, often required for extended periods of focus on a text, while hyper-
attention is a mode that uses multiple simultaneous sources of information, 
rapidly switching between these, and exhibiting a low tolerance for boredom. 
These could be seen to have a correlation with the type of ‘new apperception’ 
Benjamin and Osborne observe above: hyper-attention and ‘reception in 
distraction’ may have some degree of overlap and similarity. Invoking 
evolutionary explanations, as neuroscientific discussions of attention often (and 
questionably) seem to do, Hayles suggests that the capacity for hyper-attention 
probably developed first, to protect early humans from predators, with deep 
 
searching/articles/30951_photography_computation_radical_finance> [accessed 25 June 
2018]. 
43 Beller, ‘The Programmable Image of Capital’. 
44 Crogan and Kinsley, p. 13. 
45 Anna Munster, ‘Nerves of Data: The Neurological Turn in/against Networked Media!: 
Computational Culture’, 2011 <http://computationalculture.net/nerves-of-data/> [accessed 
13 July 2017]. 
46 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive 
Modes’, Profession, 2007, 187–199. 
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attention coming later as a comparative luxury. In a more deterministic passage, 
she notes a correlation between the rise of digital technology and increased 
prevalence of attention deficit disorder, arguing that ‘children growing up in 
media-rich environments literally have brains wired differently from those of 
people who did not come to maturity under that condition’.47 The intimation is 
that exposure to digital devices brings about a heightened level of hyper-
attention. Hayles’ term ‘hyper-attention’ refers to a condition that extends Linda 
Stone’s ‘continuous partial attention’, in which multitasking between multiple 
media sources becomes a normal yet anxiety-inducing condition for screen 
users.48 In discussion of Stone’s ideas, Ellen Rose raises a question that 
Hayles does not with regard to pedagogy: is the development of hyper-attention 
a benefit or a deficit?49 While it might make the sustained level of focus 
normally reserved for reading extended texts difficult, isn’t an ability to 
simultaneously absorb multiple information channels an important skill for the 
twenty-first century workplace? This echoes the question of how attention and 
distraction can be seen as the same except for their value, and in this case, the 
development of hyper-attention is seen as a potential accrual of human capital.  
Neuroscientist Daniel Levitin offers a summary of contemporary 
neuroscientific understandings of the human attentional network. For him, the 
human attentional system has four components: mind-wandering mode; central 
executive mode; the attentional filter; and the attentional switch.50 Mind-
wandering mode is the way that neural networks behave when they are not in 
receipt of external stimulus. He calls this ‘daydreaming mode’, describing it as 
relaxing and conducive to creativity and wellbeing. Importantly, this mode is 
often described as ‘default mode’, because it has a powerful tendency to take 
 
47 Hayles, ‘Hyper and Deep Attention’, p. 192. 
48 Linda Stone, ‘When Distraction Is Good - O’Reilly Radar’, 2008 
<http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/07/when-distraction-is-good.html> [accessed 25 June 
2018]. 
49 Ellen Rose, ‘Continuous Partial Attention Teaching and Learning in the Age of Interruption’, 
Antistasis, 1.2 (2011) <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/antistasis/article/view/18524> 
[accessed 25 June 2018]. 
50 Daniel J. Levitin, The Organized Mind (London: Penguin Random House UK, 2014), pp. 37–
45. 
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over the brain: ‘this network exerts a pull on consciousness […]; it hijacks your 
consciousness if the task you’re doing gets boring’.51 Default mode is often 
directed inward, towards ‘goals, desires, feelings’, as well as being active when 
we are feeling empathy for other people. Central executive mode, by contrast, is 
the absolute opposite of daydreaming, and represents the type of focused 
engagement involved when carrying out tasks that require alertness. It can only 
become active when default mode is inactive, and since default mode is where 
consciousness wants to go, it often takes effort to stay in executive mode and 
not to drift off into daydreaming. The attentional filter is continuously operating 
subconsciously in the background, monitoring sensory input for anything that 
might turn out to be important and might require action. This ‘vigilance mode’, 
according to Levitin, is what kept early humans alert to predators even while 
focusing their attention on the hunt. The attentional switch is a physically 
locatable part of the brain that controls the allocation of ‘neural and metabolic 
resources’ to each of the other networks.52 Levitin states that this operates 
better in some people than in others, but that it does require actual effort to use: 
‘if it is called upon to switch too much or too often, we feel tired or a bit dizzy’.53 
Levitin’s research can offer a helpful nomenclature for the subsections of 
the attentional network that are being targeted in certain forms of attention 
capture. However, by way of caution, Anna Munster demonstrates that the 
foundational images of neuroscience – fMRI scans – are algorithmic 
constructions and are not by any means indexical representations of neurons or 
changes in the structure in the brain.54,55 As a result, humanities scholars who 
reach for verification by calling on these images risk inferring in them an 
 
51 Levitin, p. 38. 
52 Levitin, p. 45. 
53 Levitin, p. 43. 
54 Munster. 
55 The algorithmic construction of the image is a point also made about smartphone 
photography by Hito Steyerl. See David Toro and others, ‘Hito Steyerl | Politics of Post-
Representation | in Conversation with Marvin Jordan’, DIS Magazine 
<http://dismagazine.com/disillusioned-2/62143/hito-steyerl-politics-of-post-
representation/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
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evidential claim that is incorrectly reproduced from earlier visual techniques 
such as photography.  
Mark Andrejevic offers an analysis of this move toward neural imaging 
from within a wide-ranging discussion about the role of representation in a world 
characterised by a glut of information. He sees automated strategies such as 
neural imaging, lie-detection, and other attempts at accessing pre-conscious 
decision making as attempts to sidestep what he sees as a ‘demise of symbolic 
efficiency’.56 Making direct measurements of physical bodies, he argues, 
provides ‘an allegedly extra-discursive, material guarantee of “immediation”: 
direct access to feelings, thoughts and desires as yet undistorted by their 
translation into language.’57 He outlines how the ‘“science” of neuromarketing’ in 
which brain scans reveal the ‘affective response to advertising campaigns’ is 
replacing the use of focus groups in the process of developing consumer 
products, and how this claims to give access to the unmediated desires of 
consumers. He quotes Clive Thompson: 
MRI scanning offers the promise of concrete facts – an unbiased 
glimpse at a consumer’s mind in action. To an MRI machine, you 
cannot misrepresent your responses. Your medial prefrontal cortex 
will start firing when you see something you adore, even if you 
claim not to like it.58  
A broader consequence of this shift is a movement of the truth standard 
‘in the direction of “affective” truths and the ways in which these can be read off 
the body’, leading to a post-truth endpoint where gut instinct trumps empirical 
evidence.59  
 
56 Andrejevic, pp. 12–15. 
57 Andrejevic, p. 78. 
58 Clive Thompson, ‘There’s a Sucker Born in Every Medial Prefrontal Cortex - The New York 
Times’, The New York Times Magazine, 2003 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/there-s-a-sucker-born-in-every-medial-
prefrontal-cortex.html> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
59 Andrejevic, p. 85. 
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Munster offers another direction for the trajectory of the ‘neurological 
turn’, bringing the development of computerised systems that are based on the 
architecture of the brain into her analysis. The deployment of algorithmic ‘neural 
networks’ as part of machine learning systems forms a concerted move by 
major computing companies to develop tools for the prediction of behaviour. 
Often targeting this prediction towards consumer buying decisions, machine 
learning is the computing backbone of the type of automated recommendations 
offered by companies such as Amazon, or, as in Munster’s analysis, Google. 
Munster claims that  
[Google] expressly ties the development of such software to its 
desire to become the information architecture which functions 
before we consciously think, search, act. This […] is not so much 
the space of cognition but rather the territory of the pre-cognitive: 
that grey area of the ‘just before’ of consciousness and 
intentionality, where networked corporations increasingly want to 
insinuate themselves. All those ‘we recommend’ emails, those ‘like’ 
icons and those privacy settings we forget to activate are 
harbingers of a ‘neuro-perceptual’ soft apparatus that will soon 
claim to know what we want to think, where we want to go, what we 
want to purchase before we do.60 
The automated attention provided by neural networks is being used by 
advertisers to pre-empt the behaviour of consumers, attempting to make 
decisions about what they will direct their attention to before they do so 
themselves.  
Shoshana Zuboff describes the collection, aggregation and use of data of 
behavioural data as ‘surveillance capitalism’.61 The exemplar of surveillance 
capitalism for her is Google, and she argues that ‘data extraction’ by the 
60 Munster. 
61 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization’, Journal of Information Technology, 30.1 (2015), 75–89 
<https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5>. 
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company is carried out by its grabbing of undefended data up to the point that it 
meets resistance, either through legislation or through consumer outrage.62 This 
method was first seen through the acquisition of its Street View image 
database, for which no permission to photograph individual’s houses was 
sought or granted. Any later objections were simply challenged to exhaustion in 
court. The company’s most important data are those produced through 
‘subjectivities of self-determination’, or the type of social production that takes 
place on digital platforms as a by-product of their everyday usage.63 Once 
labelled ‘data exhaust’, these data are recast as ‘behavioural surplus’ that can 
be capitalised upon through aggregation, packaging and reselling.64 The 
consequences for user agency are significant: ‘The extractive processes that 
make big data possible typically occur in the absence of dialogue or consent, 
despite the fact that they signal both facts and subjectivities of individual lives.’65 
The data extracted passively are argued to be ‘“stolen goods” or “contraband” 
as they were taken, not given, and do not produce […] appropriate 
reciprocities.’66 If this ongoing extraction of personal data can be considered as 
a monitoring exercise, Zuboff argues that it has the potential to reconfigure 
structures of power that are based on the idea of contractual obligation, 
replacing them with power enacted through permanent, all-pervasive 
monitoring. The agency present in ‘anticipatory conformity’, in which certain 
actions are avoided in order to avoid sanctions, is ‘gradually subsumed into a 
new kind of automaticity.’67 Coupled with this is an asymmetrical relationship 
between producers and extractors of data: users of Google’s services really 
don’t know what Google are doing with the data that they extract from their 
activities. Zuboff argues that through using these data for monitoring and 
behavioural prediction, Google undermine the need for trust by reducing future 
 
62 Zuboff, p. 78. 
63 Zuboff, p. 79. 
64 Zuboff, p. 79. 
65 Zuboff, p. 79. 
66 Zuboff, p. 81. 
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uncertainty. However, reducing the uncertainty of the future also risks 
predetermining it.  
Before becoming too secure in a conception of the brain as a set of 
networks, I want to pause to consider an observation by Robert Epstein.68 
Arguing against the idea that the brain can be likened to a computer, he offers 
six different metaphors that have been used to understand human intelligence, 
ranging from a hydraulic metaphor involving the flow of humours, to a 
mechanical one of springs and gears, or a telegraphic metaphor involving the 
exchange of electrical impulses. Each metaphor for understanding the brain co-
opts the most advanced technologies of the day to account for the brain’s 
functioning. Catherine Malabou, cited in Hayles, notes that the model of the 
brain (and therefore attention) as a series of adaptable, flexible networks, 
corresponds to understandings of global capitalism.69 Her question, then, 
becomes ‘what should we do so that consciousness of the brain does not purely 
and simply coincide with the spirit of capitalism?’70  
An influential outlier in the debate is Bernard Stiegler, who develops a 
theory of attention that initially draws on Hayles’ first steps, but then builds on a 
diverse range of theoretical sources including Foucault, Simondon, and Husserl. 
The crux of his argument is that ‘attention has two inseparable faces, psychic 
and social’, and it’s this social aspect of attention that marks his approach out 
as significant.71 The following abbreviated account takes a trajectory outlined by 
Crogan.72 For Stiegler, attention consists of an interaction between interior and 
exterior ‘retentions’, to use terminology developed from Husserl. Primary and 
 
68 Robert Epstein, ‘Your Brain Does Not Process Information and It Is Not a Computer – Robert 
Epstein | Aeon Essays’, Aeon <https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-
information-and-it-is-not-a-computer> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
69 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 101. 
70 Hayles, How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis, p. 101. 
71 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Relational Ecology and the Digital Pharmakon’, Culture Machine, 13 
(2012), p. 1. 
72 Patrick Crogan, ‘Stiegler, Technicity and Attention’, Digital Cultures Research Centre, 2011 
<http://www.dcrc.org.uk/2011/11/01/stiegler-technicity-and-attention/> [accessed 3 
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secondary retentions are interior to the subject, and tertiary retentions are 
exterior. Technology is central to these tertiary retentions, since recording 
things allows them to be recalled beyond the capacity of the mind alone to 
retain them. Therefore, from the development of language onwards, ‘the human 
and the technical are co-constituted’.73 Human behaviour is grammatised into 
letters, pictures, words, code and so on, so that it can be reproduced and 
passed on to future generations, and these grammatisation processes are 
described by Stiegler as a kind of pharmakon. Following Derrida, a pharmakon 
is understood as a remedy that acts as both a poison and a cure, and Stiegler 
sees the pharmakon of the mechanical storage of grammatisations as an 
industrialisation of memory. Because attention for Stiegler consists of the 
interplay of interior and exterior retentions, the industrialisation of tertiary 
retentions is problematic. It short-circuits the long loops of attentional practice 
that are understood through education, which, from his reading of Simondon, he 
describes as transindividuation: an understanding of the world and ourselves 
arrived at through other people and things, and therefore a collective 
experience. Stiegler’s complex argument suggests that the biopolitical 
dimension of the attention economy is interiorised, operating on the brain as 
‘psychopower’ as well as on the body. For him, the exteriorisation of memory 
and its capture by technologies such as the social web is ‘a direct attempt to 
(re)condition the technics of attention’.74 
Attention Ecology 
Yves Citton’s contribution to the debate around the attention economy 
questions the usefulness of the ‘economy’ metaphor itself.75 He argues that 
attention would be better considered using an ecological metaphor. This would 
separate the conception of attention from an economic linguistic and 
metaphorical paradigm, and instead allow the context within which attention 
occurs to be considered as constitutive of its characteristics. In doing this, the 
 
73 Crogan. 
74 Crogan. 
75 Yves Citton, The Ecology of Attention, English Edition (London: Polity Press, 2017). 
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term ‘paying attention’ would be replaced with ‘being attentive’, removing the 
transactional understanding of attentiveness with a conception of attention as 
something more intrinsically valuable in itself.  
Citton sees attention as ‘vector’, meaning that attention is always 
directed toward something. His use of the term recalls McKenzie Wark’s 
analysis of ‘vectorial capitalism’ in A Hacker Manifesto.76,77 ‘Vectorialist power’, 
Citton writes, is ‘the power to move information from one place to another.’78 
Citton describes vectorialist power as ‘based firmly on an ontology of visibility’, 
and where capitalist power reduces being to having, vectorialist power reduces 
having to appearing.79 The conditions of this appearing are found in the 
processes of grammatisation (building on Stiegler) that are pre-configured by 
the vectors of communication. An example of this might be a reduction in audio 
sampling rates: the vectorialist decides what quality of audio is acceptable, and 
which level of the removal of nuance might best balance cost and user 
experience. Citton additionally sees processes of automated recommendation 
as having similar characteristics to the joint attention at play when a child’s gaze 
is directed by observing the gaze of a parent. These examples form the kind of 
manipulation of attention that Stiegler identifies as emerging through the 
industrialisation of tertiary retentions.  
Citton considers that the capitalisation of the vectors of communication 
has become increasingly digitised, proposing that this digitisation attempts to 
reduce attention’s vectoral nature into a scalar. This ‘operation that translates 
arrows into numbers’ can be seen in the realisation that ‘everything must be 
reduced to figures’80. 
 
76 McKenzie Wark, ‘A Hacker Manifesto [Version 4.0]’, Subsol 
<http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/warktext.html> [accessed 13 July 2017]. 
77 Citton, p. 77. 
78 Citton, p. 65. 
79 Citton, p. 66. 
80 Citton, p. 77. 
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Unlike many of the other theorists previously discussed in this chapter, 
Citton offers not only analysis, but also some possible ways to address the 
problems he uncovers. Attempting to develop an ‘ecosophy’ of attention, he 
outlines twelve maxims following from the argument he develops in his book. 
These form a series of mini-proposals for various approaches to ‘attentional 
hygiene’. They include understanding how individuals function as filtering 
operators for ‘the flows that pass through us’ and taking responsibility for that; 
being strategic about what individual and collective attention is directed 
towards; extracting the self from the ‘assaults of communication’; or ‘modulating 
[…] attention between hyper-focusing, open vigilance, and free-floating 
attention’.81 The last of his twelve is to ‘learn to value background properties’, by 
which he means developing the ability to identify the scope from which objects 
of attentional focus are drawn, a scope he suggests might be referred to as ‘the 
commons’. He proposes that ‘it is by blinding itself to the imperceptible 
(because ubiquitous) role played by the commons in the continuation of our 
societies that individualist ideology has been able to undermine the very 
foundations of our existence’.82,83 There is a sense in Citton’s writing that giving 
attention to areas such as water, air or climate can produce a less exploitative 
method of valorisation through attention, and a further sense that the invisible 
infrastructures of capital and technology contribute to the continuation of this 
exploitation. But in order to do this, the relationship between individuals and 
their immediate environment need to be thought about carefully. He argues for 
co-constitution, suggesting that each of us has some control over our attentional 
environment: we can move objects close to us, turn down the radio and so on. 
Citton concludes that ‘modifying the environment that will condition […] future 
perceptions’ is how attentional hygiene can be maintained, and that ‘it is at the 
precise level of this knotting together of reflexive attention and environmental 
 
81 Citton, pp. 177–181. 
82 Citton, p. 181. 
83 The idea of an ‘attentional commons’ is also proposed in Matthew Crawford, The World 
Beyond Your Head: How to Flourish in an Age of Distraction (London: Penguin Random 
House UK, 2015), pp. 8–20. 
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intervention that the alpha and omega of what we mean by “liberty” is to be 
found’.84 
Attention and Distraction in Mainstream Discourse 
There is a strand of mainstream discourse that focuses on the way that 
technology might be affecting our capacity to remain undistracted. Much of the 
writing that covers distraction in this area is written, broadly speaking, to 
improve wellbeing, and it’s here that the overlap between distraction as 
phenomena and distraction as negative affect becomes most difficult to 
disentangle. Some of the questions raised here should be positioned within a 
wider debate about the rise of a ‘wellbeing agenda’ in the last twenty years. As 
William Davies outlines, the context for the adoption of wellbeing strategies by 
managers and policy-makers is formed by an interest in passing the 
responsibility for maintaining human capital to the workforce: if the duty to carry 
out this maintenance resides in the individual, then the social or economic 
context that contributes to any depreciation of human capital can be 
conveniently ignored.85 In other words, if being overrun by email notifications 
makes you anxious, it’s your responsibility to manage your stress levels, rather 
than your employer’s responsibility to send you fewer urgent emails. 
There is a significant body of literature concerned with dealing with work-
related distraction of this kind, offering a range of methods to cut down on info-
glut, manage email, and improve productivity. Maggie Jackson, for example, is 
a prolific writer in this area.86 There is rarely any consideration of whether the 
level of attentiveness demanded by the work is realistic, or appropriate, or 
ethical: this literature typically sees maximum productivity as an unquestioned 
goal, and distraction as an impediment to this.   
Nicholas Carr is a well-known voice in this debate, claiming that the 
internet presents challenges both to our attention spans and to our 
 
84 Citton, p. 176. 
85 William Davies, The Happiness Industry (London: Verso Books, 2015), p. 6. 
86 Maggie Jackson, ‘Distracted!» Maggie Jackson’ <http://maggie-
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intelligence.87 In his widely read and cited book The Shallows, Carr argues that 
humans are biologically predisposed to notice subtle changes in their 
surroundings, in case such changes might indicate a new risk or aid to survival, 
such as a predator or source of food (invoking evolutionary narratives once 
again). The practice of deep reading, and the ability to ‘lose oneself’ in a text, 
required training the brain to ignore many of the stimuli that might distract from 
such absorption. To read deeply was to think deeply, to disengage from the flow 
of the outer world and focus on an internal mental state of emotions and ideas.  
Carr’s argument is that the technology of the book was central to the 
consolidation and democratisation of these capacities over the following 
centuries. He also raises the possibility that the increase in silent reading 
brought about a shift in the way that knowledge was brought into being:  
The development of knowledge became an increasingly private act, 
with each reader creating, in his own mind, a personal synthesis of 
the ideas and information passed down through the writings of 
other thinkers. The sense of individualism strengthened. […] Quiet, 
solitary research became a prerequisite for intellectual 
achievement. Originality of thought and creativity of expression 
became the hallmarks of the model mind.88 
Leading on from this, he suggests that neuroplasticity—the ability of the 
brain to adapt its structure and function in response to external stimuli—is 
evidence enough that our brains are susceptible to change from the 
technologies we use. He claims that we now ‘train our brains to be distracted’ 
through our use of the internet and digital devices, and that this has 
consequences for memory, cognition, and empathy.89  
 
87 Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: How the Internet Is Changing The Way We Think, Read and 
Remember (London: Atlantic Books, 2011), p. 132. 
88 Carr, The Shallows: How the Internet Is Changing The Way We Think, Read and Remember, 
p. 67. 
89 Carr, The Shallows: How the Internet Is Changing The Way We Think, Read and Remember, 
p. 194. 
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Carr’s use of the phrase ‘model mind’ warrants examination. A model 
mind is by definition a constructed one. It can only be identified by measuring it 
against criteria that have been constructed by a range of social forces and 
influences. A model mind at this historical moment might not share 
characteristics with model minds of the past or the future, as the social, 
economic, and technological relations that produce the norm against which the 
model is judged shift. A model mind can only be considered to be an exemplar 
in relation to normative practices of its production. 
Despite gaining traction in the popular imagination, Carr’s argument has 
been roundly criticised. It has been described as ‘hyperbolic determinism’, in 
that it ignores, for example, that other more distracted forms of reading existed 
at the same time as the development of deep reading.90 Munster’s analysis of 
the evidence on which Carr bases his assertions goes back to the original 
neuroscientific studies and questions the veracity of his conclusions. Hayles 
recounts how devices such as ‘book wheels’ were in use during the 
renaissance, allowing for multiple books to be browsed simultaneously, 
undermining Carr’s claims about focused interaction with books.91 Despite the 
breadth of criticism levelled against it, Carr’s book The Shallows won the 
Pulitzer Prize for non-fiction in 2011, demonstrating the purchase that 
determinist discourse has in popular thinking about technology. 
Technological determinism—that is, the claim that technologies affect our 
lives yet are separate and external to them—can seem compelling when looking 
at technological change in retrospect because it allows the nuances of everyday 
usage to be glossed over. Determinism downplays the social and historical 
context of the technology, and assumes that technologies act upon their users 
in ways that bypass agency. Bypassing agency permits the question of 
distraction to be set up in ways that construct a narrative of inner conflict in the 
 
90 Chad Wellmon, ‘IASC: The Hedgehog Review - Volume 14, No. 1 (Spring 2012) - Why 
Google Isn’t Making Us Stupid…or Smart - Chad Wellmon’ <http://www.iasc-
culture.org/THR/THR_article_2012_Spring_Wellmon.php> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
91 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘How We Read: Close, Hyper, Machine’, ADE Bulletin, 2010, 62–79 (p. 
66). 
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users of a technology: why can’t I control how distracted I am? Why do I let 
myself become so distracted when I know it’s against my interests? Or, to frame 
it differently, why are rational subjects drawn to irrational behaviour that isn’t 
necessarily in their self-interest?  
This dilemma is exemplified by the issue of compulsive usage of digital 
devices. Very often, this is described using a metaphor of addiction, and various 
models of ‘digital detox’ are encouraged in order to overcome it. From one 
perspective, ‘internet addiction’ (as it is often broadly described) might be 
considered as a weakness of will on the part of the addict. From another 
perspective, it could be seen as a consequence of the digital experience that 
they are addicted to – an almost weaponised level of attention capture on the 
part of the smartphone, game, or social media system. I would suggest that the 
reality is somewhere in the middle: the experience of addiction is co-produced 
by both the user and the digital experience itself. Users might seek out 
distraction, but the way that digital devices and interfaces are designed might 
extend this for longer than the users might have intended. 
In her detailed study of Las Vegas electronic gambling machines, 
Natasha Dow Schüll makes several pertinent observations about behavioural 
addiction that have a bearing on compulsive internet usage.92 Her findings 
outline a picture of a gambling industry that exists within a thin margin: on the 
one hand profiting from compulsive usage in its customers while on the other, 
ensuring that customers don’t become so addicted that they lose all of their 
money and cease to be profitable. Her work outlines the sometimes harrowing 
levels of compulsion that screen-based gambling systems engender in their 
users. The compulsion to play is revealed not as a weakness of will as in 
common sense or gambling-industry-sanctioned understandings of addiction, 
but, counter-intuitively, as enactive of user agency and a desire for control. The 
relative certainty of the win or lose game dialectic contrasts with the complexity, 
precarity and uncertainty many players encounter in their lives outside the 
92 Natasha Dow Schüll, Addicted by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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game. Entering the ‘machine zone’, where players seem to absorb themselves 
in the game to the extent that they unmoor themselves from the passage of 
time, becomes a palliative response to the negative affect created by often 
extremely challenging economic or social conditions. 
While the desire to play excessively is seen as an attempt to modulate 
negative affectual or emotional states, keeping players hooked is often 
achieved by designing interfaces with specific affordances and that function in 
specific ways. Drawing from gambling industry sources, Dow Schüll tells of how 
interfaces to computer-based gambling games have been influenced by 
psychological approaches such as Skinner’s operant conditioning experiments, 
which proposed that a variable frequency of reward generates compulsive 
responses. In Skinner’s experiments, rats or pigeons are housed in closed 
boxes and provided with a lever that when pushed rewards them with food. 
Skinner discovered that by making the frequency of the reward unpredictable, 
the animals pressed the lever compulsively.93,94  
Techniques developed from Skinner’s experiments have been adopted in 
some parts of the digital sector, with writers such as Tristan Harris and Nir Eyal 
describing how websites and apps can be designed to maximise compulsive 
engagement. According to an article by Simone Stolzoff, many of the future tech 
entrepreneurs responsible for producing addictive interfaces were attendees of 
a specific class at Stanford University, run by the psychologist B. J. Fogg.95 
Both Eyal and Harris are reported to have attended, as well as the founders of 
Instagram. The class covered Fogg’s psychological approaches to behavioural 
change (‘Fogg’s Behavior Model’ or FBM) which enables designers to  
93 Nir Eyal, ‘Variable Rewards: Want To Hook Users? Drive Them Crazy’, Nir and Far, 2012 
<http://www.nirandfar.com/2012/03/want-to-hook-your-users-drive-them-crazy.html> 
[accessed 25 June 2018]. 
94 Michael Schulson, ‘If the Internet Is Addictive, Why Don’t We Regulate It? — Michael 
Schulson — Aeon Essays’, Aeon <https://aeon.co/essays/if-the-internet-is-addictive-why-
don-t-we-regulate-it> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
95 Simone Stolzoff, ‘Addicted to Your Smartphone? This Formula Is Why’, WIRED, 2018 
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34 
identify what stops people from performing behaviours that 
designers seek. For example, if users are not performing a target 
behaviour, such as rating hotels on a travel web site, the FBM 
helps designers see what psychological element is lacking.96 
Fogg claims that when the ten-week term was completed, the applications 
developed by his students had engaged sixteen million users on Facebook. A 
few weeks later, when he checked again, the count was twenty-four million.97  
In Harris’s account, the ‘variable reward frequency’ model is applied in 
the thumb-pull to refresh a web page on a smartphone, or the swipe-right to 
match a potential Tinder date. Harris likens these activities to pulling the lever 
on a one-arm bandit, describing the susceptibility to addictive design as 
‘psychological vulnerability’.98 Harris left Google to set up the Time Well Spent 
project which advocates for responsible design and user awareness of how 
apps capture attention.99 Eyal has developed a design method for producing 
addictive apps based in part on variable reward frequency, a system he 
promotes through books, conferences such as the Habit Summit, and talks.100 
He has in recent years started to mitigate his contribution to the production of 
addictive products by making blog posts about how to manage and reduce their 
impact.101 Harris and Eyal are not the only app producers who now claim to 
work against addictive design: in a recent workshop about ‘gamification’ and 
addictive design, one app developer explained similar techniques to Eyal’s for 
 
96 B. J. Fogg, ‘BJ Fogg’s Behavior Model’, BJ Fogg’s Behaviour Model, 2016 
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producing an addictive app, before outlining his company’s new product: a 
mindfulness app to mollify just such an addiction.102 As Joe Edelman notes, 
questions around whether to produce addictive designs or not are not answered 
by psychology. They are ethical questions, and as such require philosophy 
instead: questions such as ‘is this a good use of the users time?’ or ‘is the 
service we are engaging the user with meaningful to them?’ are to do with 
agency and perhaps even dignity.103 Furthermore, the reduction of compulsive 
device usage to a design problem ignores other factors at play. 
It would seem that a rational response to compulsively designed 
technologies that covertly gather data and produce profiles of our online 
behaviour would be to disconnect completely from social media platforms. The 
recent #DeleteFacebook campaign is a call to boycott the platform in the 
manner of consumer activism. While this might be desirable for some, there are 
obvious disadvantages to this when so much of contemporary sociality is 
conducted online. Ben Light has written about how users exercise agency in 
their engagement with social media in ways that permit varying levels of 
disconnection. He argues that the affordances that digital devices and software 
systems offer are being used in ways that weren’t intended by the designers of 
these systems, outlining a taxonomy of ‘shades of disconnection’ that are 
enacted by users that fall short of fully deleting the service in question.104 Users 
can engage in a range of ‘disconnective practices’ that allow them to enjoy 
different levels of distance from the distractions of social media at different 
times. These practices sometimes involve simple steps such as setting devices 
to silent, and extend to more sophisticated approaches such as reading 
messages in their notification pop-up rather than opening messaging apps to 
avoid letting the sender know the message has been received, thereby delaying 
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further communication. His description of how users negotiate affordances is a 
reminder of the limitations of behaviourist understandings of compulsive usage. 
Jenny Davis and James Chouinard argue for a theorisation of affordances that 
also takes into account how they operate. They suggest that affordances 
request, demand, allow, encourage, discourage or refuse particular types of 
interaction, and that these are modulated by external conditions as well as by 
the capabilities of the person carrying out the interaction.105 While design does 
contribute to compulsive usage, user agency can also steer unexpected paths 
through rigidly designed affordances. 
Referring back to Dow Schüll, it can be seen that determinism is avoided 
in her analysis through the adoption of a ‘materialist phenomenology’ approach 
that emphasises that the experience of compulsion is co-produced, and is 
shared between the user and the system.106 Despite this co-production, the 
practical responsibility for preventing behavioural addiction is often allocated to 
one or other party. In Sutcliffe and Sutton’s account, there are two ways of 
‘fixing’ problems that are seen to be caused by new technologies.107 These are 
either technical fixes, such as redesigning apps so they become less engaging 
or technically limiting access to them, or there are normative fixes, where an 
individual chooses to use the internet less or legislation offers the ‘right to 
disconnect’. Dow Schüll describes how responsibility for behavioural addiction 
has been shuttled between producers of the gambling machines and the users 
of those machines, mirroring Sutton’s analysis. In Las Vegas, small, incremental 
changes to legislation have moved back-and-forth in favour of each party. 
Whether such legislation will be called for, enacted, or could be enforceable in 
the digital communications arena remains to be seen.  
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Summary and Discussion 
A wide range of approaches and disciplinary standpoints address the 
question of attention, and as this chapter has made clear, very few of these 
regard digital technologies as an unquestioningly positive influence. Stiegler’s 
notion of the digital as pharmakon, as both poison and cure, looms as a 
backdrop to the discussion. 
 The metaphor of an attention economy is helpful in that it allows an 
exploration of the transactional nature of being attentive and becoming 
distracted. Despite the question of whether the social web can be seen as a 
mass medium in the same way as television or radio, Franck and Goldhaber’s 
framing of attention as a resource seems a dominant view in the advertising and 
media industries, with website visits often being described as ‘eyeballs’, and 
advertisers seeming to become increasingly preoccupied with the virality of their 
ads. Moreover, the adoption of an advertising business model by social media 
providers and news outlets has coincided with the recent growth of ‘fake-news’. 
If acquiring attention is the primary goal, then a rolling news cycle, bottomless 
feeds, and viral content take precedence over factual accuracy or provenance. 
The granularity of the user profiling that platforms such as Facebook can offer 
enables them to function as a highly targeted site for advertising. The potential 
exists for the metrics to be gamed, by artificially inflating likes or retweets, which 
leads to the platform’s algorithms misinterpreting the popularity of a particular 
post and disseminating it widely. As danah boyd has suggested, these 
strategies have also been taken up by various groups with different motivations, 
including those such as the hacker group Anonymous, who aim to dominate the 
media narrative or simply play the news media for the ‘lulz’.108 That this model 
of attention economy can be hacked for political reasons has led to ongoing and 
contested theorisations of the consequences for democracy of widespread 
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social media access and algorithmic feeds, and the impact of behavioural or 
psychometric profiling on user agency.  
However, the consumption and sharing of fake-news can also be seen 
as a practice that leads to an acquisition of human capital.109 As Hannah Barton 
outlines,  
on public social media sites, news consumption can become 
performative. Along with our status updates, Twitter threads, 
hashtags, gifs, and photos, the news stories we share online signal 
our identities and affinities, assert status or social capital, or more 
plaintively, mark out our very presence. Aware of such practices, 
news producers with an eye on circulation targets (and fake-news 
makers as well) will publish stories and articles that serve this 
need.110  
This seems to exemplify the financialisation argument, allowing an acquisition of 
attention gained by the labour of sharing fake-news. By connecting metrics, 
identity-signalling activity and the accrual of esteem, the apparatus of social 
media can be seen to operate in ways that affirm Franck’s or Goldhaber’s 
conception of an economy of attention.  
In Beller’s analysis though, the primacy of the image as a method of 
communication, and the granular measurement of attention to images in both 
overt and covert ways, leads to an asymmetric relationship where value is 
expropriated from spectators, both through the labour involved in their 
consumption of images and the ‘dataveillance’ carried out as this takes place. I 
would argue that this is not incompatible with the position where attention is 
understood as a scarce resource. The key similarity is that value is produced 
through attention, leaving only the question of how the proceeds are divided. In 
the example above, the fake-news producer extracts labour from the reader of it 
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as they interpret or share it; through responding to it, the reader accrues 
positive or negative esteem.  
The valorising aspect of attention is a recurring theme in this discussion. 
Giving attention is seen as valorisation, but being distracted from something 
constructs the thing being distracted from as important, and as such the 
‘machine zone’ of computerised gambling or casual gaming reiterates the 
importance of the economic precarity it displaces.  
The next chapter offers an overview of contemporary artistic approaches 
that engage with this notional ‘attention economy’ and with debates surrounding 
online contexts, exploring specific modes of practice where the flow of attention 
and distraction is modulated by engagement with the internet. 
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3: Review of Existing Artistic Practice 
Over the last few decades, digital methods have been gradually moving 
into the mainstream of artistic practice. Since the release of the iPhone and the 
uptake of mobile internet services and social media, what were once considered 
highly specialised digital practices have become so prevalent that they now 
seem almost unremarkable. In recent years, there have been a series of major 
exhibitions that address these themes: Electronic Superhighway at the 
Whitechapel, London; Big Bang Data at Somerset House, London, and touring 
internationally; New Realities at the Mobile World Centre, Barcelona; Right Here 
Right Now, at the Lowry, Salford; Surround Audience at the New Museum, NY; 
and the 9th Berlin Biennale: The Future In Drag each had curatorial agendas 
which appraised the impact of the internet on the current cultural moment. 
There are specific themes and approaches that emerge in contemporary digital 
practices that provide a relevant context for my own artistic research, and here I 
will attempt to review this territory by locating these concerns firstly within the 
set of debates that have emerged around ‘post-internet art’, and then among 
the digitally-inflected artistic practices that have followed this turn. 
In his presentation to the Digital Utopias conference in 2015, the curator 
and critic Morgan Quaintance proposed three ‘waves’ of art that have been 
concerned with the internet, and while the historiography of this branch of 
artistic practice is still in progress, his thinking will provide a useful overview of 
this area of practice for the purposes of this thesis.111 In his analysis, the first 
wave, the net.art of the 1990s, was Situationist or Dadaist in tone, offering a 
critique of the assumed neutrality of internet software interfaces, protocols, and 
underlying infrastructure. Visually, much of this work used the unrefined 
materials available to digital artists at that time, such as plain text or low-
resolution GIF or JPEG images, to produce a particular utilitarian aesthetic. 
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Artists who rose to prominence in this wave included JODI, Olia Lialina, Vuk 
!osi", and Alexei Shulgin.112 
The second wave emerged during the early 2000s, when as Quaintance 
notes, the dotcom crash coincided with galleries closing their new media 
programmes. This wave of artists tended to bring popular culture references 
and ‘multimedia’, as it was called then, into their practices. Perhaps the best-
known artist of this wave is Cory Arcangel, who is known for bringing the 
technological components of gaming experiences into his work as well as 
making artwork from the material that can be found online.113 These early 
waves of internet art are well documented and written about.114,115,116 From 
around 2008, shortly after the iPhone was first launched, Quaintance identifies 
the emergence of a third wave of internet art which he describes as different to 
the internet art that preceded it.  
Third wave internet artists embraced the new power relations of the 
social web, setting up their own curatorial platforms and self-organising their 
practices around their own interest groups. Quaintance claims that artists 
moved from having an interest in the internet to an interest in the web, with 
many artists embracing the new social media platforms as sites or contexts for 
their work. This provided them with a type of autonomy not available in the 
mainstream gallery sector. Artists in this wave developed an ironic, knowing 
approach to their own artistic identity, earning a type of attention that allowed 
them to maintain their niche credibility while also drifting closer to the 
mainstream of the art world. Artists like this have been grouped under the term 
‘post-internet’, although the meaning of this term and its usefulness as an 
 
112 This wave of internet art practice is mapped in Rachel Greene, Internet Art (World of Art) 
(London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 2004). 
113 Cory Arcangel, ‘Cory Arcangel’s Official Portfolio Website and Portal’, Cory Arcangel’s 
Official Portfolio Website and Portal <http://coryarcangel.com> [accessed 1 March 2018]. 
114 Greene. 
115 Julian Stallabrass, Internet Art: The Online Clash of Culture and Commerce (London: Tate 
Publishing (UK), 2003). 
116 Jolene Blais and Jon Ippolito, At The Edge of Art (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 2006). 
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identifier of any particular mode of practice are both highly contested.117 In fact, 
the heat of argument about the origins, composition, intentions and approaches 
of the artists associated with the term indicates the complexity of its genealogy 
and how heterogeneous it seems to be. The debate surrounding its composition 
will allow this thesis to explore some of the main contextual issues facing 
contemporary artists who engage with online contexts, and will help illuminate 
the context from which my own practical approaches emerge. 
Categories of Post-internet Practice 
As curator Karen Archey observed at the #FOMO conference at the ICA 
in May 2015, there is no universally agreed definition of what the term ‘post-
internet’ actually means.118 There are however some broad characteristics of 
post-internet practices that prominent commentators have noted. Quaintance’s 
view is that post-internet art can be broadly categorised as concerning itself with 
the display context of art and how this might be modulated online. In his slightly 
deterministic analysis, post-internet practices take as a given that the internet 
has profoundly affected culture, and the primary discourse of post-internet art 
can be traced back to the relationship between ‘online’ and ‘real’ culture. Brian 
Droitcour credits Marisa Olson, Artie Vierkant and Gene McHugh for their early 
attempts to identify changes in artistic production, rather than display contexts, 
that coincided with the broadening reach of the web.119 
The earliest examples of the term ‘post-internet’ refer, in a literal sense, 
to art work that has been made after using the internet, perhaps at the end of a 
session of web surfing. Michael Connor quotes artist Marisa Olson as saying 
‘what I make is less art “on” the internet than it is art “after” the internet. It’s the 
 
117 The term is variously written as ‘Post-internet’, ‘postinternet’, or ‘post-internet’; here I use the 
latter formatting throughout. 
118 Karen Archey, ‘FOMO: Judy Wajcman, Olia Lialina and Karen Archey, FOMO Panel 
Chaired by Hito Steyerl’ (presented at the FOMO, ICA, 2015) <https://www.ica.art/whats-
on/fomo-judy-wajcman-olia-lialina-and-karen-archey-fomo-panel-chaired-hito-steyerl> 
[accessed 25 June 2018]. 
119 Brian Droitcour, ‘The Perils of Post-Internet Art - Magazine - Art in America’, 2014 
<https://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/magazines/the-perils-of-post-
internet-art/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
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yield of my compulsive surfing and downloading.’120 This broad definition 
doesn’t offer a clear indication of the types of practice that might emerge after 
spending time on the internet, or how specifically they might diverge from art 
made after doing other activities.   
In an attempt to map the territory, Archey organises her commentary on 
the works in her co-curated Art Post-Internet exhibition around seven sub-
themes: distribution, language, the posthuman body, radical identification, 
branding and corporate aesthetics, painting and gesture, and infrastructure.121 
These categories are neither exclusive nor conclusive but do provide a 
framework to identify some of the recurring characteristics of post-internet art 
practices. Distribution is an umbrella category that concerns changes in the way 
that production, reception and dissemination of art has been reimagined on the 
internet. As the web has begun to supplant art magazines or exhibition 
catalogues as the first encounter with a work, artists have begun to explore 
potential changes to the status of an artwork in comparison to its 
documentation. This category also includes participatory work, or work that 
explores, visualises, or exists within the network. Language primarily concerns 
the way that the web generates new languages or abbreviates more traditional 
ones, but also how language online is as much comprised of images as of text. 
The posthuman body refers to a set of ideas that propose the extension of the 
body with technological prostheses. This covers everything from grandiose 
propositions of the ‘singularity’, which speculates that human consciousness will 
merge with technology, to considerations of animal consciousness or the post-
anthropocene. Radical identification refers to the various ways in which artists 
respond to changes in the articulation of identity or subjectivity on the social 
web. Branding and corporate aesthetics covers work that refers to or embraces 
the disruptive ‘start-up’ ideologies that are common in the tech development 
 
120 Michael Connor, ‘Post-Internet: What It Is and What It Was’, in You Are Here: Art After the 
Internet, ed. by Omar Kholeif (United Kingdom: Cornerhouse Publications, 2013), p. 58. 
121 ‘Art Post-Internet: Information/Data’, ed. by Karen Archey and Robin Peckham (Ullens 
Center for Contemporary Art, 2014). 
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sector. A common visual trope in this type of work is the stock photograph. 
Painting and gesture seems the least developed or persuasively argued of the 
categories in Archey’s text, and while there are clearly artists who are 
concerned with the articulation of painterly concerns in this field, their 
approaches seem disparate and less cohesive than those in the other 
categories. The final category, infrastructure, is concerned with the tangible and 
physical evidence of the internet that is often ignored when viewing screens: the 
cables, server farms, cellular transmission masts, and so on. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I treat post-internet art as a thematic 
terrain rather than a coherent artistic movement. By doing so, it becomes 
possible to plot a path through the relevant issues in order to establish a context 
for my own concerns, which overlap with two of Archey’s categories in 
particular. Concerns about what happens to art, or to aesthetic experiences, 
‘after the internet’ can be explored by thinking critically about how artworks are 
disseminated in post-internet contexts, and her distribution category will be 
examined to help with this. I will argue that the platforms often used for online 
distribution of artworks also construct a stage upon which distraction can play 
out, as well as producing a model of artistic production and reception. I will then 
go on to consider the material significance of the smartphone as the interface 
between users and internet-related aesthetic experiences by exploring Archey’s 
infrastructure category, thereby contextualising my own approach.  
Exploring these categories will also help reveal some of the internal 
inconsistencies that make the term ‘post-internet’ so antagonistic to those 
labelled by it. I suggest that it’s these inconsistencies that have led 
commentators such as Droitcour to claim that the critical positions of those 
initial writers that coined the term have now been obscured by its use to refer to 
a visual style whose main aim is to make work that looks good online.122 
Droitcour claims that as post-internet art simulates the environment of the white 
walled gallery (or white empty browser page) it reproduces the existing power 
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relations of the art world, using social media platforms to position artists as 
entrepreneurial brands. It’s perhaps the term’s failure to effectively encompass 
the heterogeneity of the practices represented by it that leads even noted 
practitioners such as Constant Dullaart to describe post-internet art as 
‘conservative’, and critics such as Droitcour to argue persuasively that the label 
has become merely ‘a term to market art’.123,124 
Post-internet Art: Production and Distribution 
I want to open this discussion by returning to Morgan Quaintance’s broad 
generalisation that post-internet art is concerned with the relationship between 
‘online’ and ‘offline’ culture. At the beginning of my study, I considered the 
border between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ experiences to be the threshold over which 
viewer attention shifted when becoming distracted from a landscape or artwork 
by their smartphone. The distinction between offline and online experience, and 
the assertion that online experiences are somehow less real than offline ones, 
can be seen as an extension of theorisation about computer games that took 
place in the nineteen eighties and nineties. At that time, there was a 
considerable amount of study directed towards ideas of immersion in 
‘cyberspace’, and concentrated engagement in multi-user domains/dungeons 
(MUDs). Much of this research assumed that the user accessing the computer 
was physically immobile, having taken a seat at a desktop computer (or arcade 
game) to engage with the digital world. Sherry Turkle’s recent work examines 
the perceived impact of mobile device usage on face-to-face sociality, but relies 
heavily on an assumption that being ‘online’ means absenting oneself from the 
‘real’ world. In her book Alone Together, she often reads online experiences as 
inferior to offline ones, and raises notes of caution about the social development 
of ‘digital native’ teenagers.125 
 
123 Lauren Cornell, ‘Frieze Magazine | Archive | Beginnings + Ends’, 2013 
<http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/beginnings-ends/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
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Sociologists Nathan Jurgenson and Jenny Davis persuasively critique 
Turkle, concerning themselves with how her framing of online experiences as 
different and opposite to offline experiences romanticises the ‘real’.126,127 Turkle 
fails to acknowledge that our everyday interactions occur both online and 
offline, and that the fabric of our everyday communicative landscape comprises 
both these modalities. Jurgenson coined the term ‘digital dualism’ to refer to the 
assertion of a solid distinction between online and offline.128 If connected and 
online communications are considered to be qualitatively lacking in reality, then 
for Jurgenson this leads to a fetishisation and romanticisation of offline life, 
described evocatively by Jamie Lauren Keiles: 
The man with the IRL fetish rubs himself up against the exposed 
brick wall of a loft in order to feel something. At 5 PM he makes a 
show of ‘logging off’, heads out into the world where he aims to cop 
a feel of the authentic.129  
‘Copping a feel of the authentic’ presupposes that there is a clear distinction 
between authentic offline and inauthentic online experience, rather than 
considering the possibility that the two have an interrelated, entangled 
existence. It’s now more widely accepted in academic circles that online and 
offline experiences are not mutually exclusive, although the assumption that the 
reverse is true and that offline communication methods are more favourable 
than online ones is still widespread in popular discourse.130 
 
126 Nathan Jurgenson, ‘The IRL Fetish’, The New Inquiry, 2012 
<http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-irl-fetish/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
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In his essay The Image Object Post-Internet, artist Artie Vierkant 
addresses this issue from the perspective of the production and dissemination 
of art.131 Taking the ‘post-medium condition’ proposed by Rosalind Krauss as a 
starting point, he suggests that ‘everything is everything else’ – meaning that 
any instantiation of an artwork can be transcoded into another form.132 
Concurrent with the writing of the essay, he had been working on Styrofoam 
sculptures that were made from an aggregation of profile models of the image 
histograms of the individual frames of a video file.  
 
Figure 1: Artie Vierkant, Fluorescent On Fluorescent Off, 2010, styrofoam, histogram curves 
from video stills, colour digital fingerprint. 
 
131 Arthur Benjamin Vierkant, ‘The Image Object Post-Internet’, 2010 
<http://jstchillin.org/artie/vierkant.html> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
132 Rosalind E. Krauss, ‘Reinventing the Medium’, Critical Inquiry, 25.2 (1999), 289–305. 
  
 
 
 
48 
Stacked together, these individual histograms offer a sense of the 
progression and change in the video. If a video file is ultimately comprised of 
brightness and contrast data, then that data can be reinterpreted and presented 
in potentially infinite ways. This approach is also a common strategy among 
‘glitch’ artists.133 These works could perhaps be identified as data visualisations, 
but Vierkant denies this reading. Firstly, he rejects the possibility that art 
communicates empirical truths or knowledge in the same way a data 
visualisation might. He also draws Joseph Kosuth into his argument, invoking 
Kosuth’s own disavowal of the visual in favour of a more tautological ontological 
status for art. To quote Donald Judd, who paraphrases Kosuth’s argument, ‘if 
someone calls it art, it’s art’.134  
Vierkant then applies this logic of transcoding to question the status of 
material artworks and their documentation. If every type of media can be 
transformed in this way, and video can be reconfigured as sculpture, then 
where is the ‘art’ situated? Is there an original ‘source’ that is being transformed 
through these material changes? Vierkant thinks not:  
In the Post-Internet climate, it is assumed that the work of art lies 
equally in the version of the object one would encounter at a gallery 
or museum, the images and other representations disseminated 
through the internet and print publications, bootleg images of the 
object or its representations, and variations on any of these as 
edited and recontextualized by any other author.135  
For Vierkant then, ‘online’ documentation of physical works becomes 
indistinguishable from the ‘offline’ tangible artefact, and in his series of works 
entitled Image Objects, this theory is put into practice. These works consist of 
printed digital images of geometric shapes and gradient fills originated in 
 
133 Nick Briz, ‘Thoughts On Glitch[Art]v2.0’, Nick Briz, 2015 
<http://nickbriz.com/thoughtsonglitchart/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
134 Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art After Philosophy’, in Art After Philosophy And After: Collected Writings, 
1966–1990 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 17. 
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Photoshop, which are displayed in galleries and then photographically 
documented. The documentation images are then further modified in image 
editing software before dissemination on the web. 
 
Figure 2: Artie Vierkant, Installation view, Image Objects at Untitled, New York, 2015 
The consequences of this are significant. As there is no definitive original 
artwork, the work resists commodification based on scarcity in a similar fashion 
to the way many conceptual works of the 1960s attempted to, in their case by 
virtue of the art existing only as an idea rather than an artefact. (Of course, in 
practice, the secondary documentary materials that this type of conceptual art 
generated, such as photographs and writings, were exhibited and sold as art 
market commodities.) However, Vierkant considers his work to be operating 
outside of traditional systems of commodification, preferring to consider his 
work as instead functioning within an economy of attention. It therefore follows 
that in order to generate the maximum value for an artwork in an attention 
economy, the largest possible audience should attend to the artwork.  
Vierkant’s work proliferates across the internet, and through that 
proliferation the artist freely cedes authorship and loosens control over the form 
of the work. Every version of the work stands as the work as a whole, as does 
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every modification or ‘remix’ of it. This means that the work, existing as a 
distributed network of documentation images, circulates more freely than an 
authorial original object could. This dispersal also indicates a collapse of the 
traditional value hierarchy applied to artworks: Vierkant writes about how the 
mythological status of the original artefact and the quotidian, everyday nature of 
its reproduction collapse into each other in his practice.  
Hito Steyerl expands on this idea with her coinage of the term 
‘circulationism’.136 This term refers to an opposite to twentieth-century Soviet 
avant-garde productivism, which posited that art should have a socially 
productive function and be integrated into industrial production. For Steyerl, the 
production of images has been replaced by post-production: ‘The world is 
imbued with the shrapnel of former images, as well as images edited, 
photoshopped, cobbled together from spam and scrap. Reality itself is post-
produced and scripted […]’ 137 Steyerl implies that the ‘suavely vacuous’ 
conditions of circulationism could be exploited as a methodology for social 
change, asking questions such as ‘if copyright can be dodged and called into 
question, why can’t private property?’138 Therefore, by blurring the distinction 
between artefact and documentation, as in the work of Artie Vierkant, post-
internet art proposes that the real and the digital are very much part of the same 
continuous reality, and that each is a modifiable version of the other.  
The Merging of ‘Online’ and ‘Offline’  
The blurry edge between online and offline, or between the digital and 
the physical, appears repeatedly in my analysis of other artists’ work and in my 
own artistic research. There are a number of ways this can be considered 
critically. One way is explored by Miya Tokumitsu in a short article about the 
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broadening scope of the practice of curation.139 According to Tokumitsu, 
audiences seek out ‘hand-curated’ recommendations because hand-curation 
offers a sense of personal authenticity that is in contrast to the automation of 
algorithmic recommendations. The physicality implied in the prefix ‘hand-’ 
allows a sense of offline craft to conjoin with largely dematerialised online 
cultural forms. This preference for the hand-made is described as an articulation 
of control: the self-determination of curating a Pinterest board for example sits 
in contrast to the external forces that govern economic or political life over 
which audiences have little or no control. I would argue that this control is better 
described as agency.  
Another way of considering this transition is articulated by Paul Soulellis 
with reference to his project the Library of the Printed Web.140 Soulellis uses 
Marcel Duchamp’s concept of the infrathin to describe the condition of works 
that consist of matter from the web that has been printed out and formed into 
published books. Like the difference between two casts of the same mould, the 
‘web-to-print’ space creates a difference and a sameness that these works 
oscillate between. Soulellis argues that ‘we recognize both without collapsing 
into either; we hover in a state between states.’ 141  
This straddling of the online and offline is exemplified by Michael 
Manning’s recent work 100 Paintings, which combines ‘a selection of 100 
paintings in five layers’ to create unique compositions, claiming up to nine billion 
possible combinations.142 The source paintings themselves mix pastel gradients 
common to much post-internet visual styling with gestural mark making. As 
 
139 Miya Tokumitsu, ‘The Politics of the Curation Craze’, New Republic, 2015 
<https://newrepublic.com/article/122589/when-did-we-all-become-curators> [accessed 25 
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Manning describes it on the Cura website, ‘It’s like coconut bath wash, sandy 
hair, palm tree sunset vaped out pelican art lol’.143 Generatively produced 
images are nothing new in visual art, but if there is innovation here it’s in the 
way that gestural mark making, often read as an indicator of the authorial 
presence of the genius artist, is mediated and redeployed as almost infinitely 
reproducible automated art making. It seems evident that 100 Paintings leads to 
nine billion artistic commodities rather than nine billion aesthetic propositions, 
and the fact that a selection of images from the project have been published as 
a 183-page limited edition monograph underlines this fact. It seems that the 
production of online attentional commodities isn’t quite enough: the production 
of offline physical art world commodities needs to happen too.  
I consider the indistinct boundary between online and offline experience 
as central to the premise of this study. The point at which everyday sociality 
transits between these two registers is the focal point where distraction takes 
place. As people become engaged by online modes of communication, their 
focus shifts from their physical environment and towards the mediated 
environment of the screen. The sociality that takes place there is no less real. 
This permeable borderline, across which a project like The Library of the Printed 
Web sits, allows a two-way traffic of social practices. Terms from the online 
world find their way into everyday spoken language (such as ‘hashtag’) as much 
as the practices of managerialism find their way into the media ecology of the 
online world. 
Social Media and Metricised Display Contexts 
If, as Olson suggests, the term ‘post-internet’ referred to the art that was 
made after surfing the web and perhaps submitting interesting links to the ‘surf 
clubs’ of the early- and mid-noughties, then the introduction of the social 
blogging service Tumblr in 2007 modified the context for this practice.144 Tumblr 
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allowed user-produced content to be straightforwardly displayed alongside and 
amongst appropriated content in a rolling blog-like format, and many artists 
used it to display their own work in close proximity to work from other genres or 
periods. Noting that almost every undergraduate art student has a Tumblr on 
which they show their own work alongside artists they are influenced by, artist 
Brad Troemel characterises this phenomenon as producers ‘inserting 
themselves in a historical discourse’, where documentation of historical work is 
wrenched from its context and read wherever and however it is found.145 
Affirming a postmodern emphasis on pluralism, he claims that as a result of this, 
art has lost its ‘home base’, and that ‘there is no building or context that 
contains and describes art in a way that uniformly attributes meaning for all’.146 
Others corroborate this, claiming that decontextualising artworks in this way 
undermines the ‘quality and status’ of art by detaching it from its grounding in 
history.147 The process of ‘reblogging’, in which a Tumblr post can be reposted 
on a different blog, often without attribution or indication of its original context, 
has the potential to further exacerbate this decontextualisation. Furthermore, 
artworks can be juxtaposed with other material, potentially recontextualising this 
material as having artistic value. The blog owner’s artworks can be placed 
alongside works by artists with international credibility, as both producers and 
consumers of art curate their Tumblrs to accurately reflect their taste.148 
Troemel’s account of the transition from the ‘surf club’ to Tumblr is worth 
scrutinising more closely.149 He describes the ‘surf club’ as the archetypal 
organisational structure for art online in the mid-2000s, describing such clubs as 
 
145 Brad Troemel, ‘Art After Social Media’, ed. by Omar Kholeif, You Are Here: Art After the 
Internet (Manchester: Cornerhouse, 2014), pp. 36–43. 
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comprising between fifteen and thirty members who contributed to an ongoing 
blog, privately hosted on their own server. The social dynamic on these sites 
was often conversational, with image posts being responded to with images 
rather than texts, and works being remixed and combined with found elements. 
Importantly, these clubs had a closed membership but could be viewed by any 
web user, leading to Troemel making contestable claims about their influence 
on other artists.150 He suggests that Tumblr and Blogger had the scope to 
operate similarly to ‘surf clubs’ but with a more open membership, since these 
platforms lowered the barrier to participation by allowing users to post content 
without knowledge of web programming. Of course, ‘surf clubs’ generally had 
open membership to begin with: Nasty Nets, as an example, was formed by a 
group of people who had already identified common visual interests on the 
social bookmarking platform del.icio.us.151 Troemel claims that the next step for 
art online should involve a wider adoption of private platforms such as Tumblr 
and an increase in the decontextualisation and anonymisation of content that 
the platform provides. This claim was criticised by some as a blatant plug for his 
own Tumblr project (The Jogging) that misrepresented and generalised the 
concerns of the ‘surf clubs’, and a minor flame war erupted in the comments 
section of Troemel’s now deleted article.152, 153, 154, 155, 156  
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Despite the disagreement surrounding it, Troemel’s account of the move 
to blogging platforms such as Blogger and Tumblr does highlight a shift in focus 
from the more communal production process of contributing to a ‘surf club’ site 
to the aggregation of artistic content around an individual personal profile on a 
hosted service such as Tumblr. To paraphrase him, linking out to another 
artist’s website on a ‘surf club’ blog says ‘I like this’, while placing appropriated 
Tumblr content alongside one’s own work says ‘I am this’.157 Rather than the 
public conversation between individuals taking place on a ‘surf club’ blog, 
Tumblr and other social platforms emphasise the generation of a personal 
profile, and an aggregation of content that arguably forms an expression of 
self.158,159 To view this in terms of an economy of attention, I would argue that 
this practice is about gathering attention from the posted artworks to acquire it 
as attentional capital for the self. Artists described as post-internet sometimes 
mirror this approach to the gathering of attentional capital on other social media 
platforms, both performing and critiquing notions of authenticity that accompany 
the production of a curated personal profile.160  
Perhaps more importantly, the shift to Tumblr, a privately-owned social 
platform, allowed audience feedback to operate in a more direct way than the 
‘surf club’ structure. In a typical ‘surf club’, only the other members could 
respond to a post, whereas on Tumblr, responses could come from any other 
user of the site and might be articulated as likes, comments, or re-blogs. In its 
early incarnations, a Tumblr user’s popularity, or ‘Tumblarity’ as it was named, 
could be measured using a data dashboard that displayed the quantity of re-
blogs, likes and so on, forming an early iteration of the more common analytics 
and metrics found in today’s social media platforms.161 Here, engagement is 
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measured and popularity quantified, offering a seemingly objective indication of 
how much attention a post, or a work of art, has generated. The members of 
‘surf clubs’ didn’t always claim what they were doing was art, and it’s likely that 
Tumblr users also make posts with a range of differing intentions and intended 
audiences.162 As Baym & boyd argue, users of social media platforms work 
within and around the affordances of the platform, and ‘struggle with both the 
visibility and obscurity of their mediated acts’, carefully navigating different 
audiences and contexts.163 The shift in display context for this art-like activity 
from public blog to privatised, metricised platform shunts the attention economy 
to the centre of these types of artistic practices. 
This turn to quantification is critiqued in Benjamin Grosser’s Facebook 
Demetricator, an artwork in the form of a web-browser plug-in that removes all 
of the numbers from Facebook pages.164 Instead of revealing the number of 
people who like a post, or the time since it was posted, the ‘de-metricated’ 
Facebook page simply states that ‘people like this’, or that a post was made 
‘recently’. Quantification of social capital in social media conforms to the 
neoliberal imperative to measure, and Grosser claims that this is propelled by 
capitalism’s logic of accumulation.165 By enumerating likes and friends, Grosser 
suggests, Facebook creates a desire for more likes and friends. 
A different approach to the removal of metrics is to redesign the social 
media service in its entirety. Harman Van Den Dorpel’s Deli Near Info is an 
artist-designed social platform produced with the intention of circumnavigating 
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the timeline-based visual metaphor of most other social media services.166 
Designed to operate without the pre-made page templates common to social 
platforms, Deli Near Info permits posts to be visually arranged and organised 
freely on screen. Posts are associated with a user, and users can connect to 
each other, but metrics such as the familiar ‘likes’ or ‘retweets’ are absent. 
While a work such as this provides a more playful alternative to the formality of 
the mainstream platforms, in my view, it is constrained by its affordances in the 
same way that mainstream platforms are. Foregrounding the linking of 
dissociated visual elements does bypass the enumerated metrics common to 
social media platforms, but the imperative to connect with others and to ‘share’ 
material remains, as does the accrual of esteem into a personal profile.  
While designed to invoke responses that are characterised by self-
expression, social media platforms (Van Den Dorpel’s included) also offer a 
paradigm of expression that is limited by the potentialities of the site interface 
and the ideological or commercial backdrop to its design. I suggest that as the 
web itself has become more insular, with large providers such as Google and 
Facebook taking an ever more centralised role in the delivery of web 
experiences, it should not be surprising that art work becomes less critical of 
these platforms as their apprehensibility recedes into the background.  
These, then, are some of the ways that the relationship between artistic 
production and dissemination and notions of an economy of attention have 
been articulated in post-internet art. The role of metrics will be explored more 
thoroughly shortly, but for now, it should be borne in mind that the viewers of art 
on these platforms are also bound up with a similar investment in their own 
profiles as articulations of their social capital as the artists who produce work on 
these platforms. The attention users give to these metrics might be seen as 
contributing to the distraction from ‘real life’ experiences that commentators 
such as Turkle observe. 
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Post-internet Art: Infrastructure 
I now want to return to Archey’s taxonomy and explore a second relevant 
category of post-internet practice: artworks that are concerned with 
infrastructure. The physical matter that comprises the internet has become an 
interest for many artists, and it’s a particularly nuanced interest in the materiality 
of internet infrastructure that sets post-internet work apart from its net.art 
ancestry. Broadly speaking, the tendency in net.art was to consider the network 
as the focus for critique in the artwork. The network was a conceptual 
proposition: a notional set of interconnected entities that could share 
communication over distance using technology. Influential early work by Roy 
Ascott, predating net.art, explored the potential of fax machines and the early 
internet to foster communication, proposing that the art was somewhere in the 
network. In works such as Planetary Network, the content of the communication 
shared across the network appeared to be secondary to the fact that it could be 
shared at all.167 The ontology of the assemblages through which the 
communication took place was not the primary focus of works such as these. 
MTAA’s widely shared GIF artwork Simple Net Art Diagram from 1997 reiterates 
this view that the art happens somewhere in the network, the network itself 
radically simplified as a single connecting line between two computers.168 
Works such as I/O/D 4: The Web Stalker began to reveal some of the 
underlying messaging infrastructure of the experience of browsing the web, but 
principally critiqued the emerging consensus around interfaces and structures of 
interaction.169 Even in works such as this, much of the internet’s physical 
presence in the world remained abstracted, the work instead visualising 
websites as diagrams of links whose physical locations remained obscured 
behind opaque IP addresses.  
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The counter-tendency in post-internet art aligns with a critique of the 
digital dualist position of the early conceptualisers of the internet. Post-internet 
art’s approach to infrastructure rejects considerations of the internet as a 
dematerialised ‘cyberspace’, instead focusing critique on the very material 
aspects of data transmission, such as cables, transmission towers, and server 
farms. As P. J. Rey argues, the idea of ‘cyberspace’ emerged in response to a 
desire to make sense of what happens when people communicate over long 
distances.170 Where, for example, does a long distance phone conversation 
take place? Rey, citing Sterling, argues that the idea of a shared digital space 
between the two ends of the phone conversation is a way of squaring the 
cognitive dissonance invoked by remote presence:  
How can the other person on the line be so far and yet seem so 
near? To overcome this disconnect, we create for ourselves a little 
expository travel narrative. We begin to imagine information as 
occupying space and then imagine this space as something that 
can be traversed and experienced, an alternate geography that 
provides a new path to reach the other person on the line. 171 
What is handy about this idea of cyberspace is that it allows an avoidance of 
any detailed consideration of the complexity of the physical infrastructure that 
converts and carries our electrically encoded voice from one physical location to 
another.  
Archey’s analysis, and perhaps post-internet art’s approach more 
generally, takes as its basis a fairly narrow definition of the term ‘infrastructure’, 
primarily concerning itself with the internet’s normally ignored physical 
manifestation in the world.172 A more complete understanding of infrastructure 
can be arrived at from a number of different directions in the wider theoretical 
realm, opening up a range of potential methodological and ontological stances 
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on the topic. While there will not be room to cover this ground fully here, there 
are some key considerations emerging from this territory that will be helpful 
when analysing my own work later on. 
Focusing on the physical aspects of infrastructure produces only a partial 
analysis of the infrastructure’s significance. Scholarship in science and 
technology studies (STS) and more recently in media studies describes 
infrastructures as not just technical, but also cultural, social and economic 
entities.173, 174 Rather than considering infrastructure as a set of wires or pipes 
that are ‘stripped of use’, Susan Leigh Star for example describes infrastructure 
as ‘fundamentally relational’, only becoming real when coupled with organised 
practices or cultural contexts.175 Infrastructures need to be seen as complex 
heterogeneous socio-technological assemblages.  
Star observes several properties or dimensions of infrastructure. Of 
these, embeddedness (where infrastructures interlock with other infrastructures, 
technologies or social systems) and transparency (where infrastructures 
invisibly support the tasks they are supposed to support) form typical target 
areas for artistic critique. In many cases, the assumption seems to be that by 
making the physical aspects of the infrastructure visible, the relational social 
systems in which they are embedded will also be revealed, uncovering the 
implicit ideological biases in those social systems. I find this to be a problematic 
assumption: to some artists, making the physical component of the 
infrastructure visible seems to be critique enough, without going further and 
identifying or questioning its underlying ideologies.  
In this spirit, works such as Internet Machine by Timo Arnall or Farm 
(Pryor Creek, Oklahoma) by John Gerrard offer moving-image representations 
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of server farms.176,177 Gerrard’s Farm presents a live 3D-rendered simulation of 
the exterior of a Google data server building, constructed from a photographic 
survey conducted by helicopter. Sited in a virtual environment that experiences 
real-time environmental changes, the virtual camera slowly pans around the 
exterior of the model server buildings, with the daylight hours synchronised with 
the server farm’s physical location.178 Arnall’s Internet Machine uses video 
compositing techniques to stitch together still photographs taken from inside a 
data centre in Spain owned by the telecommunications company Telefónica.179 
While Gerrard was denied access to Google’s infrastructure (hence the 
helicopter) and Arnall was invited in to Telefónica’s, neither of the works take 
their analysis very far into the complexity of the non-material aspects of the 
infrastructure. Converting the infrastructure into an aesthetic proposition, in 
simulated or composited form, is seen as adequate critique, as if absorption into 
the ambit of art and presentation as an object for contemplation unlocks the 
complexity of the system under scrutiny.  
Evan Roth’s Web Portals makes a different proposition.180 The works 
consist of life-size embossed rubbings of manhole covers in Cornwall, near the 
landing points of the transatlantic fibre-optic cable over which most European 
internet traffic is transmitted. When exhibited in London in 2015, the gallery’s 
notes claimed that ‘these manhole covers may well be the closest points within 
public access to the actual laser light that is the Internet’.181 The process of 
taking a rubbing is commonly carried out on gravestones, an association that 
perhaps proposes an inference about how the more democratic internet of the 
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1990s might have ‘died’ after the rise to prominence of the ‘big five’ internet 
companies (Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon).182 
 
Figure 3: Web Portals, Carroll / Fletcher Gallery, March 2015 
Seeing these works as material objects in the gallery does allow a kind of 
speculation about how proximity to the material internet might feel. However, 
during a conversation with the owner of the gallery staging Roth’s solo show, I 
discovered that the process of the production of these works was more complex 
than might be inferred from their visual appearance. Because the manholes 
were in remote and fairly inaccessible locations, the artist digitally photographed 
them in sections at high resolution, and these sections were then recombined 
into single images in the artist’s New York studio. From these composite 
images, laser-cut plastic relief models of the manhole covers were made, from 
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which the rubbings were then produced.183 While this knowledge self-evidently 
undermines the claims to proximity made by the work, I would argue that it 
actually makes the work’s critique of infrastructure more viable. Even if 
audiences are unable to physically touch the rubbing in the gallery, they still get 
the sense from its visual appearance that it is an indexical impression of an 
original object. However, after filtering the manhole covers through a series of 
mediations, any potential claim to veracity that might be proposed by its 
indexical status and verified through touch is undermined. What is lost is the 
singularity of the source site, replaced by the idea of photographic 
decomposition, re-composition and manufacture – authenticity replaced by 
reproducibility. The original objects these works are indexes of are themselves 
reproductions. This ‘versioning’ of objects that are supposed to have a kind of 
singular aura about them is exactly the game played by Vierkant above, but in 
this case, it’s an appropriated yet indexical element of the physical world that is 
being rendered unstable and implausible. Infrastructurally then, the complex 
relations that led to the production of the work become exposed and integrated 
into its critique. The internet isn’t the laser light, the cable, or the manhole, but 
this work does begin to highlight the lengths we might go to in order to hold on 
to the idea that it could be.  
A different method of making infrastructure visible is the infrastructural 
tour, an approach that involves following the path of an action from start to finish 
along its infrastructural corridor. Jussi Parikka was amongst the first to have 
explored this method, applying it to the route a book takes when requested from 
the British Library archive.184 Artist Ingrid Burrington has developed a tour of 
New York City’s surveillance infrastructure, and published this as a book, 
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Networks of New York.185 Andrew Blum’s book Tubes covers similar ground.186 
As Parikka claims these approaches as critical spatial practices, there is again a 
nuanced question to be raised about their effectiveness: simply making an 
infrastructure visible may not critique the power discourses it enacts, although 
it’s possible that mapping an infrastructure might. The New Cloud Atlas is just 
such a map, attempting to produce an online open-source resource showing 
‘each data place that makes up the cloud, in an open and accountable way’.187 
While designed as a resource and not explicitly intentioned as an artwork, this 
project’s focus on accountability and unpicking the implied neutrality of the 
ambiguous term ‘the cloud’ goes beyond mere visibility and asks more complex 
questions of the social, economic and geopolitical forces that are expressed in 
internet infrastructure.  
The focus on physical elements of infrastructure, or, in Roth’s case, the 
longing for them, diverts from the obvious fact that some elements of internet 
infrastructure are impossible to make visible without transcoding into another 
form. Timo Arnall has tackled this in his collaborative Immaterials research 
project.188 This project led to work that visualised the radio patterns produced by 
near-field radio chips (RFID, commonly found in Oyster cards and touch-
payment systems), Wi-Fi, and eventually GPS, culminating in the production of 
a number of what were titled Satellite Lamps. These mobile objects lit up more 
brightly when the GPS signal was at its strongest, typically when a GPS satellite 
was overhead. As the objects were portable, the patterns of interference 
produced by urban architecture could be explored by moving them around, thus 
producing a kind of map of a genuinely invisible infrastructural system.  
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If these approaches engage with an idea of infrastructure as formed by 
social and cultural factors as well as having a material dimension, then a 
question worth asking is what the non-physical infrastructural concerns that 
post-internet art investigates actually are. In part, this question involves asking 
who is doing the investigating: as Star notes, a stairway means one thing to an 
architect and something very different to a wheelchair user.189 Each artist will 
have their own set of concerns and will approach the subject with their own 
emphases. It’s also worth noting that many of the artistic questions directed 
toward infrastructure are themselves subordinate to a desire to analyse and 
resist apparatuses of subjectification. Here the term ‘apparatus’ refers to Michel 
Foucault’s way of describing the network between ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous 
set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral, and philanthropic positions’ that are ‘inscribed into a play of power’.190 
For now, I’ll restrict my commentary to an infrastructural frame of reference, but 
this crossover will be developed later in this section. 
Some prominent artists working in this area, most of whom would not 
consider or describe themselves as ‘post-internet’ artists, see internet 
infrastructure as an enactment of political power, with consequences for 
agency, privacy, and ultimately, for democracy. Even before Edward Snowden’s 
revelations of widespread intelligence agency monitoring of internet traffic, an 
activist turn within art practice was focused on communications infrastructure 
where it most pointedly becomes an apparatus of the state. Julian Oliver’s 
Border Bumping explores what happens when a person having crossed a 
border remains connected to a cellular network in the country they were 
previously in, mapping and recording these discrepancies.191 James Bridle’s 
Dronestagram auto-posted satellite images of the sites of drone strikes to the 
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Facebook-owned image-sharing service Instagram as they occurred, revealing 
both their temporal frequency and providing a visual reference to the location of 
the strike.192 Trevor Paglen’s Limit Telephotography is a body of work consisting 
of a series of photographs of classified military installations in the United States 
that have been taken using very high-powered telescopes.193 Such sites are 
typically surrounded by miles of inaccessible land designed to render the 
buildings and activities taking place there inscrutable to the naked eye. Paglen 
uses telescopes that are usually used for astronomical photography to capture 
images of these sites from distances of up to thirty miles. Perhaps more 
frivolously, Allison Burtch takes issue with the commonplace practice of 
commercial cellular network masts being disguised as trees. Her intervention 
Log Jammer consists of a cellular signal jammer disguised as a log, placed in a 
forest environment to block mobile communication and produce a disconnected 
space where solitude and uninterrupted thought can emerge.194  
Other artists target the surveillance infrastructure that has developed 
around the prevalence of CCTV and its combination with image processing 
algorithms. Adam Harvey’s work has been directed towards the reverse-
engineering of and resistance to automated face detection and recognition. 
Harvey’s CVDazzle is a good example of a body of research that frames itself in 
relation to the affordances of the system it critiques.195 The hairstyles and 
make-up designs that this piece consists of are produced with the intention of 
thwarting automated facial recognition technology as deployed from CCTV 
cameras. The fashion designs were developed with knowledge of the 
capabilities of the recognition algorithms, and permit a type of oppositional user 
agency when mobilised against those algorithms. More recently, his HyperFace 
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textile design is patterned with ‘maximally activated false faces’, which are 
geometric designs that look unlike faces to the human eye but have all the 
characteristics of a face as it might appear to automated face detection 
software.196 Zach Blas also approaches face detection as a site of dissent in his 
Facial Weaponisation Suite, which protests against biometric facial recognition 
through the production of masks made from the aggregated facial recognition 
data of a number of workshop participants.197  
To conclude the discussion of infrastructure for now, I want to consider 
the language that is being used to describe how perceivable or apprehensible 
infrastructure is. Sometimes infrastructure is described as ‘invisible’, sometimes 
‘out of awareness’, and sometimes ‘below the threshold of attention’ or ‘not 
noticed’. At times, it’s described as ‘obscure’ or ‘opaque’. Each of these terms 
for infrastructure’s non-appearance lends a particular framing to our 
understanding of it, and suggests the appropriateness of particular theoretical 
models to analyse it. I see an understanding of attention and distraction as 
having a bearing on the imperceptibility of infrastructure. Questions about what 
is apprehensible in comparison to what processes have material effects will 
keep returning throughout this thesis. 
Data Visualisation and Self-Tracking 
Departing from Archey’s post-internet framework and Quaintance’s 
analysis, I now want to look more closely at some modes of practice briefly 
introduced above. While Vierkant denies that his Histogram Sculptures are 
visualisations of data, it’s not uncommon for creative practitioners to work with 
data as a key element in their work. This type of ‘data art’ practice often seems 
to occupy a position on the border between visual art and information design, 
and as such it’s sometimes hard to clarify through which tradition a particular 
work should be interpreted. Attempting to iron this out, Viégas and Wattenberg 
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avoid the philosophical problem of defining what art is by claiming that ‘artistic 
visualizations are visualizations of data done by artists with the intent of making 
art’, a position not so far from Vierkant’s invocation of Kosuth above.198 I would 
perhaps go further by arguing that data visualisation is often but not always a 
critical practice, and it’s the level of criticality in evidence as well as intention 
that might identify a particular visualisation as a successful work. How 
effectively the data and the criticality can be communicated is an open 
discussion: one study revealed that non-expert audiences are not at all fluent in 
interpreting data visualisations and need a significant level of interpretative skill 
in order to do so.199 General audiences were seen to relate to data 
visualisations emotionally as much as cognitively, with the field requiring ‘softer, 
arts-based approaches’ to help bridge the visual literacy gap.200  
While it would be impractical to give an exhaustive overview of this very 
broad area of artistic practice, a few key works warrant mention. Live Wire, by 
Natalie Jeremijenko, is an early and significant example of a data visualisation 
artwork. The piece consists of a hanging wire that ‘wiggles proportionally to the 
amount of traffic on the net’ in its place of installation.201 This piece is often cited 
as a foundational example of ‘calm technology’, a type of information display 
that operates in an ambient way, and that has a different relationship to 
attention than is the norm in information visualisations.202 Radical Software 
Group’s RSG Carnivore is another milestone in the data visualisation field, 
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forming an example of an open access packet-sniffing or wiretapping tool made 
available to the artistic community.203  After being released as an add-on library 
for the creative coding development environment Processing, it facilitated the 
production of live visualisations of network traffic by any artist with basic coding 
skills.204 Unlike many other data artworks of the time, which visually interpreted 
data that had been previously gathered and entered into a database, both Live 
Wire and RSG Carnivore allowed the live flow of data to be perceived in real 
time. What both these works propose is that it is difficult to conduct networked 
activity without producing data, and that the production of this data is seemingly 
continual. As Jenny Davis argues, ‘we don’t have data, we are data […] We live 
in a mediated world, and cannot move through it without dropping our data as 
we go.’ 205 Melissa Gregg prefers a more visceral metaphor, exploring the idea 
of ‘data sweat’.206 She writes that ‘sweat literalizes porosity: it seeps out at 
times and in contexts that we may wish it did not’.207 
Writers such as Jurgenson and Boesel also see the generation of 
personal data as an unavoidable consequence of networked 
communications.208,209 In some of the cases they and others such as Brunton 
and Nissenbaum discuss, data about activity is gathered passively, such as 
when being sensed by networked cameras or tracked by beacons or cookies 
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while browsing the web.210 In other cases, data about an individual is produced 
outside of the autonomy and agency of the affected party. An example of this is 
when someone without a social media profile of their own is tagged in a photo 
by someone else: they become subject to the face-tracking algorithms and 
profiling that accompany online presence even if this data can’t immediately be 
connected with their name, location, or other characteristics.211 As artist Adam 
Harvey has outlined, the most popular image on the internet is the transparent 
GIF, as it forms a part of the mechanism whereby page visits are tracked using 
Google’s Site Analytics suite of tools.212 The image file itself is completely blank 
but the metadata that is sent along with the empty image allows for extremely 
detailed information about the user’s habits to be gathered and aggregated. 
More recently, the widespread use of ‘site replay’ scripts that can record and 
play back user interaction with a website or app has been revealed.213 
Whether engagement happens passively or actively, interaction with 
most digital systems generates a data trail that can be aggregated from multiple 
sources and combined into a unique data profile that is not always accessible to 
its producer. This leaves the individual open to targeted advertising or other 
methods of categorisation. If this data is produced passively by the user, the 
consequences of its leverage by marketers can be unsettling: the possibly 
apocryphal story of a retailer correctly inferring that a customer is pregnant from 
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their purchasing data before the customer had revealed this to their family is 
just one widely cited example of this.214,215  
Resistance to these data gathering practices is problematic, as many 
sites or services that are important facilitators of everyday sociality require the 
use of cookies or beacons (small snippets of code that can identify the user) in 
order to function. It’s impractical for many people to avoid the use of these 
services completely, but various browser plug-ins exist that permit the selective 
blocking of individual cookies and trackers, allowing users some degree of 
agency over their data trail. The consequence of this is that sites that are 
funded solely by advertising clicks lose revenue; some actively deny content to 
viewers who use ad-blockers. Brunton et al developed AdNauseum as an 
alternative approach based on their work on obfuscation as a mode of 
resistance to surveillance. AdNauseum is a browser plug-in that instead of 
inhibiting the display of adverts on a web page, automatically clicks on all of 
them. This results in the data that is produced becoming ‘dirty’, no longer 
representing a true record of the particular user’s interests or preferences, and 
rendering the generated data profile less valuable for marketing purposes 
without denying revenue to the site hosting the advert. AdNauseum for Google 
Chrome was banned from the Google Web Store at the end of 2016.216  
While web browsing data is gathered passively, some personal data 
production is conducted voluntarily. Analogue self-monitoring has been fairly 
widely used as an aspect of art practice, for example in the early work of Ellie 
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Harrison, or the data diaries of ‘data illustrator’ Stefanie Povasec.217,218 The 
increased availability of mobile devices in recent years, and the introduction of 
health monitoring hardware into recent smartphones, has led to digital self-
tracking becoming a commonplace activity. Specialist hardware devices such 
as fitness trackers, along with a wide range of mobile apps for tracking bodily 
functions such as sleep, menstruation, or mood, have created more 
opportunities to digitally gather quantitative data about oneself. The Quantified 
Self website, set up by Wired magazine editors Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, is 
premised on ‘self-knowledge through numbers’.219 It forms a focus for a 
community of individuals who use digital techniques to capture data about 
themselves with the objective of self-improvement. The Quantified Self 
movement implicitly proposes to users that data, the raw, quantified numbers, 
will reveal something that qualitative analysis of their activities will not. The 
narrative propelling this activity is one of individualism and control: by taking 
charge of their own data in this way, users can identify patterns of behaviour 
that enable them to optimise or improve themselves. However, as tech 
journalist Luke Dormehl outlines, measuring of any sort is reductive, as the 
things that can’t be measured by the instruments in question are often 
discarded.220 Another consequence of self-tracking can be anxiety: the self-
tracker might experience an impetus to avoid situations that are unpredictable 
or unknown in order to maintain the verifiability of the data, or might experience 
discomfort if the hardware or software malfunctions, producing ‘dirty’ data.221  
The agency enacted in self-tracking is complex. 
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Deborah Lupton’s analysis of self-tracking proposes a typology of modes 
of digital self-tracking, preferring the term ‘dataveillance’ to describe the 
practice.222 Lupton makes a useful distinction between dataveillance conducted 
in public, such as CCTV or car license plate recognition, and that conducted in 
private: typically, the private self-tracker has access to their data in a way that is 
not usually the case when under public dataveillance. By sharing the data and 
looking at other people’s data, self-trackers begin to move private, domestic 
surveillance into public locations, and vice versa. These shifts form the rationale 
for her typology, identifying five modes of self-tracking: private, pushed, 
communal, imposed and exploited.  
Lupton goes on to describe self-tracking as ‘active and purposeful’ data 
acquisition, leading to the production of ‘data assemblages’ that flatten out the 
heterogeneity in the data produced, detaching the numbers from their temporal 
and spatial context.223 Lupton hints at the complexity of the data assemblages 
under production, suggesting that they propose types of selfhood ‘that conform 
to cultural expectations concerning the importance of self-awareness, reflection 
and taking responsibility for managing, governing oneself and improving one’s 
life chances.’ 224 Locating these types of selfhood in relation to the prevalence 
of ‘audit culture’, Lupton’s analysis brings Foucault to bear on the problem of 
self-tracking. Kitchin and Lauriault’s construction of the concept of the ‘data 
assemblage’ describe it as similar to the Foulcauldian apparatus.225 The 
influence of these factors leads to the conclusion that data are not neutral or 
objective, and are in fact ‘never raw but always cooked to some recipe by chefs 
embedded within institutions that have certain aspirations and goals and 
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operate within wider frameworks.’226 In Lupton’s analysis of self-tracking, the 
cooking that is taking place is governed by a managerial culture of monitoring 
that proposes that the self is always in a state of lack, and that optimising the 
self will lead to personal efficiency gains in line with the imperatives of a self-
realising neoliberalised subject. Self-tracking is seen here as having a related 
objective to the construction of metricised social media profiles: an accrual of 
human capital. This can be understood through a specific reading of the 
contentious and complex term ‘neoliberalism’ as a cultural phenomenon rather 
than as an economic doctrine. I invoke the term here in the same specific sense 
as Wendy Brown elaborates:  
I treat neoliberalism as a governing rationality through which 
everything is ‘economized’ and in a very specific way: human 
beings become market actors and nothing but, every field of activity 
is seen as a market, and every entity (whether public or private, 
whether person, business, or state) is governed as a firm. […] 
Neoliberalism construes even non-wealth generating spheres—
such as learning, dating, or exercising—in market terms, submits 
them to market metrics, and governs them with market techniques 
and practices. Above all, it casts people as human capital who must 
constantly tend to their own present and future value.227 
The urge to quantify and optimise is the central proposition of pplkpr 
(‘people keeper’), a mobile app created by artists Kyle McDonald and Lauren 
McCarthy.228 It intervenes in the social interactions of the user by allowing them 
to associate fluctuations in their heart rate with their emotional responses to the 
people they are spending time with. It quantifies and measures the emotional 
states that particular social relationships bring about, auto-scheduling meetings 
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with people that make the user feel good, and cutting out those that don’t. This 
piece presents itself as an awkward version of many mindfulness apps that 
have the stated intention of improving the mood of the user, making the user 
feel calm and relaxed. Similarly to other self-tracking systems, the quantification 
of the self here is willingly carried out by the user, in return for a perceived 
service of self-improvement. But by employing a process of quantification to a 
phenomenon that is relational and qualitative, the logic of objectivist certainty is 
brought to bear on it, uncomfortably invoking Taylorist efficiency measures and 
misapplying them to friendships. The result is a tool that reinforces the 
neoliberal idea of a self-realising individual, and converts friendships into 
consumable commodities. Here, seemingly raw data is being used as 
ammunition to end friendships. Pplkpr beautifully stages the awkwardness at 
the centre of the debate over the quantification of social data, and in common 
with some post-internet approaches, is both critical and complicit at the same 
time. 
One further aspect of self-tracking and the rise of Big Data, as the 
phenomenon has been termed, is the assumption that through the algorithmic 
processing of data, knowledge can be uncovered that might not otherwise be 
discernible. I see this as an assumption related to the argument about 
infrastructure and visibility above, in that the uncovering of the ‘knowledge’ 
alone might not always permit the inference of its hidden non-neutrality. Key 
writings on the emergence of big data do indeed invoke infrastructural analysis 
as a starting point. An influential set of provocations made by boyd and 
Crawford begin to tackle assumptions about the capacity of algorithmic analysis 
to reveal truths in several ways.229 Firstly, they debunk claims to objectivity by 
highlighting the subjectivity involved in the design of the measuring system and 
in the selective process of discarding ‘dirty data’. But importantly, they question 
the validity of the correlations that emerge when certain algorithmic analyses 
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are applied to very wide data sets. ‘Too often’, they write, ‘Big Data enables the 
process of apophenia: seeing patterns where none actually exist’.230  
Interestingly for data artists, whose own practices of visualising data 
might also fall prey to apophenia, it could be argued that the introduction of 
more subjective modes of interpretation of data creates a space where critique 
might be allowed to emerge. If, as Davies argues, elites can be defined as 
those who control the narratives over data, then the explication of new 
narratives, regardless of their statistical veracity, might offer the potential for the 
type of critique of power that much work in this area seeks.231 A limiting factor is 
that artists often only get to handle the outputs of a complex set of data 
assemblages, visualising these in the hope that the social, political and 
economic parts of the assemblage will be inferred.  
‘Interruptive’ Artwork 
One further area of practice that is relevant to my approach is a type of 
work that seeks to intervene in the spatial or temporal norms of experience in 
an unannounced way, producing an interruption of some kind. This type of work 
doesn’t exist in its own neatly-defined category, operating more as a 
characteristic of approach rather than a genre of work. 
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Figure 4: Skrekkøgle, Durr, 2013–14. 
Skrekkøgle was a small Norwegian design studio that produced work for 
clients as well as conceptual projects. Their project Durr is a conceptual design 
for a wrist-wearable electronic device that vibrates every five minutes in the 
same way as a mobile phone notification might.232 The vibration is an 
encouragement for the wearer to be mindful of time passing, which in itself 
might form a distraction from processes of mindfulness, or of concentration or 
focused attention. All Durr does is distract – and the notification it provides is 
always the same.  
A broader seam of interruptive work has been the subject of a research 
project by Sam Mercer and Matthew de Kersaint Giraudeau. After developing 
their research through a series of events, they produced a work in collaboration 
with Field Broadcast that existed as a browser plug-in for the Chrome browser. 
This plug-in permitted the interruption of the viewer’s everyday browsing activity 
with occasional ‘unexpected moments of visual, aural and conceptual 
interruption dependent on the time of day, the websites you visit, and the 
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content you see’.233 Their project has its roots in Field Broadcast’s earlier work 
that took a similar formal approach, and in the Pala project curated by Laura 
Mansfield.234,235 Each of these projects uses a similar method to insert media 
artworks into the flow of everyday computer usage experience, either by 
providing custom client software to deliver the broadcasts, or by using a 
browser plug-in.  
Mercer and de Kersaint Giraudeau’s iteration of this project was 
accompanied by research materials that contextualised the work in a lineage of 
interruptions to screen media, beginning with David Hall’s TV Interruptions from 
1971.236,237 Their research moves on from these unannounced broadcasts to 
instead look at interventions and stage invasions (such as Jarvis Cocker’s gate-
crashing of Michael Jackson’s performance at the Brit Awards in 1996). I would 
argue that the interruption of a television broadcast in this way has a different 
quality to the beeps and vibrations that digital devices emit. A stage invasion is 
something out of the ordinary: updates and notifications are the everyday from 
which we might wish to be distracted by a remarkable artistic intervention. 
Furthermore, the argument for this work weakens when considering artistic 
interruptions in the browser window. In my view, the inconsistency in this work 
can be simply described as context collapse: the browser window is used for all 
sorts of activities, such as banking, email, becoming informed, entertained, and 
so on. Multiple tabs already subdivide many people’s normal browsing 
experience into a dispersed juggling of different information sources. It could be 
argued that broadcast television was a social space in which a range of 
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activities (entertainment, becoming informed etc.) happened too, but the 
difference is that in the case of broadcast television, at least in the pre-digital 
era, these activities are structured, scheduled and delivered by a broadcaster 
over which the viewer can enact only rudimentary levels of agency. The 
experience of the web browser differs in that each version of the web browser is 
organised and managed by the user. Even though the browser could be seen 
as a media space that is in part constructed by centralised platforms such as 
Google and Facebook, or by the affordances of the browser, each iteration of it 
is as singular as the user who has co-constructed their own customised view. 
As such, I would argue that the browser window should not be considered a 
'mass' medium in the same way as broadcast television might, and that what is 
disrupted by artistic browser interruptions might be the viewer’s own agency 
rather than a status quo imposed by the broadcaster. The artistic interruption 
becomes merely another interruption to be ignored or ‘snoozed’, and is more 
complicit with than antagonistic to the object of its critique. 
Summary and Discussion 
This chapter and the last have sought to establish some of the qualities 
of the attention/distraction dialectic that are prevalent in digital practices such as 
self-tracking, social networking, and in artistic practice that engages with the 
internet as a context. Perhaps the most important thread that runs through the 
discussion is the way that many of these artworks grapple with the distinction 
between online and offline experiences. At times this is expressed as a 
yearning for the veracity of the real, as in Evan Roth’s work, and elsewhere, it’s 
explored through the conversion of online content to printed books, or the 
translation of artefacts to images and their dispersal and circulation. 
In response to the dissolution of the boundary between online and offline, 
some artists have developed practices that engage with a notional ‘attention 
economy’. Visibility online can be measured, analysed and optimised through 
the use of detailed metrics. Some artists have embraced this and centred their 
practices on it, whereas others have been embraced by it. A consequence of 
engaging with an economy of attention, combined with the adoption of 
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metricised distribution platforms, is that questions concerning neoliberal 
rationality, and human capital in particular, become more significant to an 
analysis of these practices. As Ben Vickers has written, post-internet art ‘got 
drunk on followers and likes’, a metaphor of intoxication that expresses 
something of the trade-off between compulsion and pleasure that creative work 
in an attention economy exemplifies.238 It might be argued that an obsession 
with likes and followers can be attributed to how quantified a measure these are 
of one’s own human capital, whether the human in question is an artist or a 
viewer of art. The development, or perhaps curation, of a personal social media 
profile can be seen as an imperative of this governing rationality, and its 
requirement for constant maintenance a compellingly measurable distraction 
from everyday life.  
The unintended consequences of this are that through everyday 
engagement with connected technologies, data trails are produced that have a 
bearing on personal visibility, exposing activity to analysis and processing by 
commercial and state actors and agents. Importantly, the infrastructure over 
which this data-gathering takes place is kept out of the purview of the users of 
these platforms and systems. Some artistic practices seek to uncover the 
infrastructural aspects of the gathering and processing of personal data, with 
varying degrees of effectiveness. Artistic approaches that address the 
apprehensibility of infrastructure often foreground its spatial configurations: work 
such as Bridle’s, Oliver’s or Paglen’s described above have at their heart an 
acknowledgement of the spread of these infrastructures across traditional 
social, economic or geopolitical boundaries. This spatiality chimes with the way 
that distractions often draw a person’s focus away from their immediate physical 
surroundings and towards a message initiated from a remote location.  
Having established theoretical positions that are relevant to the research 
terrain and surveyed the scope of artistic practices that are being conducted in 
this field, I now want to argue for the relevance of artistic research as a way of 
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building on this to produce further insight. Firstly, I will appraise some relevant 
standpoints on the role of the artist as a researcher and the ways insight might 
emerge from artistic practice as a way of contextualising my own position as an 
artistic researcher.  
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4: Approaches to Artistic Research 
This chapter aims to identify key literature that assists with the 
positioning of my own artistic research practice in an appropriate 
epistemological, methodological, and theoretical framework. This discussion will 
loosely address Michael Crotty’s ‘four elements’ model for social research, 
which proposes a hierarchy of epistemology, theoretical perspective, 
methodology and methods as structuring elements in the preparation of a 
research design.239 Crotty’s ‘four elements’ are referenced in order to explore 
some of the tensions present in artistic research that are not experienced to the 
same degree by social research. While the first three elements (epistemology, 
theoretical perspective and methodology) tend to merge somewhat in 
discussions about art practice as research, the ‘methods’ element will be kept 
distinct and will be embedded in the analysis of individual works later in the 
thesis.  
Art as Research  
A good place to begin with a consideration of artistic practice as a 
research activity is to consider the criteria by which research is assessed and 
audited in the United Kingdom. The Higher Education Funding Council’s 
Research Excellence Framework defines research as ‘a process of 
investigation leading to new insights, effectively shared’.240 This succinct 
definition obscures the depth and complexity found in the composition of artistic 
research methodologies. These methodologies and approaches often differ for 
each practitioner and are not typically viewed as static unchanging frameworks. 
The mutability of artistic research methodology is perhaps the main reason that 
it attracts criticism from other areas of the academy over its expression of 
rigour. To begin to address this, I want to critically consider the ways in which 
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artistic research qualifies as a process of investigation, and how it might lead to 
new insights.  
 With regard to the first of these points, the initial scoping of the field 
conducted by Frayling helps situate artistic research as a process of 
investigation.241 Frayling’s formulations of different types of artistic research 
were influential on the formation of an initial structure for debate around artistic 
research in the post-1992 United Kingdom research landscape. He described 
research into art and design as primarily concerned with historical research or 
research into theoretical perspectives on art and design. Research through art 
and design included materials research or development work, and also action 
research, where the process of production is recorded and ‘the diary and report 
are there to communicate the results’.242  
He identified a third ‘thorny’ category, as research for art and design: 
‘Research where the end product is an artefact – where the thinking is, so to 
speak, embodied in the artefact […]’ 243 Research for art is the type of ongoing 
practical activity that informs the production of a body of artwork, and is claimed 
to be effectively shared through the exposure of the artwork itself to an 
audience. A common critique of this approach is to question whether the insight 
is accessible to that audience, or about the form that this insight might take. 
Some contest the argument that insight can be embodied in the artwork, instead 
suggesting that insight can be found more readily in the textual material that 
accompanies, precedes, or follows the artwork.  
Modes of Knowing: Where is the Insight? 
A question that arises when looking for the insight produced by artistic 
research is that of the epistemological paradigm through which this insight 
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might be understood. It has been argued that artworks are unable to embody 
knowledge that has been defined as such using objectivist epistemological 
paradigms. Stephen Scrivener’s initial definition of knowledge as ‘justified, true 
belief’ leans heavily on an objectivist epistemology that excludes modes of 
knowing that are outside of a narrow understanding of ‘propositional knowledge’ 
– knowledge that something is true.244 Others at a similar point in the debate on 
artistic research were already calling for arts practices to abandon objectivism 
and to develop more appropriate epistemological models.245 
Henk Borgdorff helps by expanding the epistemological frame to 
accommodate types of knowing that Scrivener overlooks.246 Borgdorff contrasts 
Scrivener’s propositional knowledge with two other types of knowledge: 
knowledge as skill, which might include knowing how to make something, or 
how to perform an act; and knowledge as acquaintance, such as knowing a 
situation or a person.247 He also adds ‘understanding’ as an extra category of 
knowledge where theoretical knowledge, know-how, and acquaintance can 
intersect. Importantly, he deploys the synonyms insight and comprehension with 
regard to artistic research, implying that research conducted with these as 
intentions seeks to enhance experience, by which he means ‘the knowledge 
and skills accumulated through action and practice, plus apprehension through 
the senses.’ 248 It’s unclear whether the experiencing subject he refers to at this 
point is the artist-researcher themselves or the audience for the research, but in 
either case, there is a clear shift here from Scrivener’s knowledge as a 
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graspable, communicable external element that is separate to the self, to a 
more embodied, situated knowing. 
Robin Nelson identifies broadly similar categories of knowing.249 He 
retains Borgdorff’s definition of propositional knowledge (know-that) but 
reframes skill as know-how (performative knowing or tacit knowledge) and 
acquaintance as know-what (which could be described as an acquaintance with 
methods or principles – knowing what works, for example). A large part of 
Nelson’s argument around practice-as-research (henceforth abbreviated to 
PaR) is to do with the relevance of know-what and the methods that bring about 
and monitor its emergence through critical reflection on practice.250 This is an 
important moment of assonance between these epistemological standpoints: 
‘insight’ in Borgdorff’s analysis and the ‘praxis’ that Nelson advocates both 
emerge from the researcher’s experiential handling of the movement between 
and recombination of these three different types of knowledge. Nelson and 
Borgdorff each explain the ways in which this can happen from their own 
perspectives.  
 
249 Robin Nelson, Practice as Research in the Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, 
Resistances (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 37. 
250 Nelson, p. 44. 
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Figure 5: Robin Nelson's multi-mode epistemological model for PaR, 2013. 
Republished with permission from Springer; permission conveyed through Copyright 
Clearance Center, Inc.
Nelson’s ‘multi-mode epistemological model for PaR’ revolves around an 
idea of research that allows for movement between the three modes of knowing 
mentioned above.251 He invokes an epistemological frame in which knowledge 
exists on a spectrum between fully tacit knowledge at one end (which might be 
identified as non-conceptual or pre-reflective in Borgdorff’s analysis), and fully 
explicit, communicable knowledge at the other end (Scrivener’s propositional 
knowledge). Crucially, he considers that most knowledge exists somewhere 
between these extremes, and permits the mobility of the practitioner and their 
practice around his epistemological model through what he describes as praxis. 
Praxis, for Nelson, is ‘intelligent practice’ that imbricates theory and 
reflection in the practice of making art.252 Highlighting the primacy of discovery 
through doing, Nelson asserts that the process of devising an artwork involves 
251 Nelson, p. 37. 
252 Nelson, p. 40. 
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the acquisition of know-that prior to the practice (through reading, for example) 
and critical reflection after the event, and that these two bracketing methods 
converge upon the practice itself, temporally nudging themselves into the 
present tense of the act of making. Taking performative practices as his main 
focus, he infers that the practice itself includes the acquisition of know-how 
(learning how to move in a certain way for example) that can be explicated later 
through writing. I would argue that the process of devising an artwork is the 
practice (and the research) as much as the material construction of an artwork 
might be. It is in the devising of a work that new connections between 
contextual elements that have been alighted upon through the acquisition of 
know-that are made apparent through the process of production. The insight 
can emerge in the devising of and the production of and reflection on an 
artwork. 
Borgdorff supports Nelson by supplying a more detailed overview of the 
epistemological lens through which the insight produced through artistic 
research might be identified. He looks at the problem using a broadly 
phenomenological perspective, foregrounding the situatedness of knowledge 
and the primacy of bodily interaction with the world as formative of our 
engagement with it. He argues that pre-reflective, non-conceptual knowledge is 
‘embodied in art practices and products’, and that if artistic research is only 
about explaining or extracting this non-verbal knowledge and explicating it 
through verbal means, research is reduced to a decoding exercise.253 Instead, 
Borgdorff proposes that the pre-conceptual content produced by artistic 
research can be accessed through at least two theoretical frameworks, outlining 
constructivism and hermeneutics as prime candidates.  
Constructivism, as distinct from constructionism, is defined by Crotty as 
social constructionism minus the emphasis on the role of the social in the 
constitution of reality, instead foregrounding the meaning-making potential of 
the individual mind.254 Through this perspective, Borgdorff claims, the product of 
 
253 Borgdorff, p. 59. 
254 Crotty, p. 58. 
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artistic research constitutes a new reality: ‘only in and through art do we see 
what landscapes, soundworlds, histories, emotions, relations, interests or 
movements really are or could be.’ 255 The hermeneutic perspective asserts that 
the artistic research discloses the world rather than actively constituting it, and 
this disclosure can be subjected to any number of hermeneutic interpretative 
methods to derive meaning from it. Borgdorff’s central assertion though is that 
this world-constituting or world-disclosing power is ‘fundamentally non-
conceptual’, and that the primary purpose of artistic research is to produce or 
disclose the not-known, or the not-yet-known. In both these cases, the artwork 
proposes something that is beyond the limits of current knowledge and 
therefore must be described as an extension of knowledge. Emma Cocker 
elucidates this beautifully:  
[…] within artistic practice, the possibility of producing something 
new is not always about the conversion of the not known towards 
new knowledge, but rather involves the aspiration to retain 
something of the unknown in what is produced. In these terms, the 
new is that which exceeds existing knowledge, not by extending its 
limits but by failing to be fully comprehended within its terms. 256 
Graeme Sullivan agrees with this, asserting that ‘artistic research creates new 
possibilities from what we do not know to challenge what we do know.’ 257 
The characteristics of this not-knowing are analysed more closely by 
Janneke Wesseling, who deploys Hannah Arendt’s comparison between 
‘reason’ and ‘intellect’ to do so.258 Reason and intellect each have a different 
function for Arendt. Intellect is a type of thinking that corresponds to 
 
255 Borgdorff, p. 61. 
256 Emma Cocker, ‘Tactics For Not Knowing’, in On Not Knowing: How Artists Think, by 
Elizabeth Fisher and Rebecca Fortnum (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2013), pp. 126–
36 (p. 127). 
257 Graeme Sullivan, ‘The Artist as Researcher: New Roles for New Realities’, in See It Again, 
Say It Again: The Artist as Researcher, Antennae, 6 (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2011), pp. 79–
102 (p. 93). 
258 Janneke Wesseling, ‘Introduction’, in See It Again, Say It Again: The Artist as Researcher, 
Antennae, 6 (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2011), pp. 9–11. 
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(propositional) knowledge, which is verifiable by evidence and the certainty of 
proof; reason on the other hand is concerned with questions to which there 
might not be clear answers. Reason is motivated by the quest for meaning 
rather than the quest for knowledge, but additionally, it differs from intellect 
through its self-reflexivity. Reason is ‘the pure activity of thinking and the 
simultaneous awareness of this activity while we are thinking.’259 For Arendt 
though, thinking is an activity that is separate to the world, as one has to 
withdraw from the flow of everyday life to do it properly. To concentrate is to be 
‘absent’. This absence is in contrast to works of art, which are usually very 
much a part of the visible, sensory world. Wesseling argues that ‘the work of art 
is the materialisation of thinking; thinking is rendered visible in the work of art.’ 
260 For her, then, the artwork is material manifestation of the ‘absent’ reasoning 
conducted (through practice, praxis, and through other means) by the artist. At 
the point where the work is made public, the audience take over and ‘pick up 
the train of thought as it is embodied in the work of art’.261 
What Wesseling’s argument proposes is that the artwork is the product of 
reasoning that is itself an intelligent, theoretically informed and reflective 
practice, and that this reasoning is accessible in the artwork and may be 
extrapolated. This differs from Scrivener’s approach in that its emphasis is not 
on the transmission of objectively verifiable knowledge. Rather, the reader of 
the work produces meaning that has been directed by the reasoning of the 
artist, reasoning that has itself become reified in the artwork.  
Proposing that artworks are starting points for trains of thought is a 
compelling description of how they might engender a kind of knowing, as the 
viewer speculatively moves forward into their own new extrapolations, and 
backward into a personally-inflected reconstruction of the artist’s own 
reasoning. This double-movement in the act of readership feels in keeping with 
 
259 Wesseling, p. 10. 
260 Wesseling, p. 12. 
261 Wesseling, p. 12. 
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the academic expectation that the artwork produces insight, yet also leaves the 
work’s capacity for multiple readings intact. 
Borgdorff’s broadly phenomenological theoretical perspective contrasts 
with Wesseling’s more interpretivist approach, but both hold a constructionist 
epistemological stance: the artwork is part of the toolkit from which meaning is 
made by the viewer. In Mika Hannula et al’s account, which is characterised by 
a more postmodernist theoretical perspective, the role of the viewer – the ‘self-
evident authority of an outsider’s position’ – is minimised in favour of a dialogic 
understanding of practice as an ‘open-ended, internally conflictual enterprise’.262 
What postmodernist perspectives can bring to the epistemological party is the 
implication of a greater subjectivism. Nelson, Borgdorff and Scrivener allude to 
this when they speak of the role of the experiencing subject in the construction 
of the knowledge, but Hannula et al specifically locate the acts of knowing and 
doing in the artist-researcher. Research for them begins with the kind of play 
that is advocated by Paul Feyerabend, and the mantra of ‘anything goes’ that 
signals methodological abundance must for them be framed by a ‘certain 
specified and historically entrenched framework’.263 This they describe as 
context, and insist that the context for the research is ‘never a priori but is 
always in great need of being articulated, formed, discussed, maintained, and 
renewed’.264 For them, the methodological and epistemological dilemmas 
involved in artistic research are productive as they allow for an ongoing 
exploration and renewal of the context of the practice, which can in turn be 
relatable through textual means. 
It can be seen therefore that there are numerous theoretical positions 
that can persuasively frame artistic practice as a research activity. My own 
practice as a researcher emerges from this field but deploys an approach that is 
specific to my own history of making, skills base, and area of inquiry. The next 
 
262 Mika Hannula, Juha Suoranta, and Tere Vadén, Artistic Research Methodology (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2014), p. 4 <http://mikahannula.com/s/ArtisticResearchWhole.pdf> [accessed 
25 June 2018]. 
263 Feyerabend (2010, p. 178.) quoted in Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén, p. 5. 
264 Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén, p. 5. 
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section of the thesis will relate and analyse the practical research activity that 
has been undertaken during this study, and will begin by clarifying my own 
research approach.  
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5: Practical Research Activity 
My Research Approach 
At a pragmatic level, I see the outputs of artistic research as having the 
capacity to evoke experiences that defamiliarise those modes of engagement 
with the internet that viewers might be more or less oblivious to, inviting viewers 
to consider their relationship with it anew. These reconsiderations can be 
invoked either by making representations of engagements with the technologies 
or systems in question – ‘picturing’ these engagements in new ways 
(corresponding to disclosure in Borgdorff’s terminology) – or through creative 
intervention in the interactions themselves, turning viewers into readers, 
performers or participants (corresponding to Borgdorff’s constructionist stance). 
The production of artworks can also help identify the right questions to ask 
about the experience of these technologies, through the extension of the artist’s 
reasoning as in Wesseling’s approach. This extension of reasoning helps to 
reconfigure the context which frames the next instance of practice. 
My research process has several stages, identified in Fig. 6. as a 
sequential flow of events. I contend that insight has the potential to emerge at 
multiple points during this process.  
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Figure 6: Flow diagram of my research process, 2015 
Establishing the context for practical research is a task akin to the 
literature review in traditional research but with some nuances of difference. 
Working in a tradition of research and a history of making, establishing a 
context means situating the current research effort within a history of artistic 
practice and ideas. This is developed from the interpretation and reflection on 
previous works, as well as through gathering new material from both inside and 
outside of the discipline of art. This enables the identification of a subject 
domain that will inform the production of artworks. 
The study of attention and distraction as it applies to digital media is a 
highly interdisciplinary field of study, and establishing of a context for my 
research practice has involved broad reading in a cross-section of different 
subject domains. The interdisciplinary sources that are gathered are used as a 
resource in the devising and making of artworks: the information gets merged 
and recombined, sometimes becoming incorporated into artworks (through 
quotation or appropriation, for example), sometimes forming a theoretical 
context to which the artwork might refer, sometimes inflecting the decisions 
made during the devising of a work, and sometimes offering steerage toward 
particular interpretations of or reflection on the artwork after it has been made. 
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The encounter with interdisciplinary sources and methods contributes to the 
acquisition of outsider or propositional knowledge that Nelson might term know-
that. 
The processes of devising and making the work overlap and are 
sometimes interchangeable. They also happen concurrently with the acquisition 
of know-that, as reading is a part of the research process that persists 
throughout. The practical art-making methods I use include the production of 
still and moving images in various media, the recording and editing of sound, 
the production of printed matter, coding, and electronics work. While there is no 
typical method that can be applied to the devising of a work within my research 
approach, there are a number of characteristics that crop up with some 
regularity. On many occasions, the work itself consists of the recontextualisation 
(or decontextualisation) of already existing visual or textual elements, and the 
devising process tends to be a consideration of how to creatively handle this 
material in ways that might embody my reasoning about that material. Decisions 
about how to handle material are often made semi-instinctively or 
experimentally, utilising the type of know-what that comes from experience in 
artistic practice. One of the approaches that recurs in my practice is to consider 
the potential for utilitarian computer-generated material to express my 
reasoning if recontextualised as an aesthetic rather than informational 
proposition. This recontextualisation could be seen as a type of speculation on 
the potential of such material to function aesthetically that resonates with the 
description of financialised attentional commodities found earlier in this thesis. 
As Richard Lanham succinctly puts it, ‘art is an act of attention the artist wishes 
to invoke in the beholder’, and this aspect of my approach could be seen as a 
means of directing the attention of the viewer toward particular concepts using 
appropriated visual material that might once have had a more explicit 
informative function.265 At times, the ‘engineering’ of a work is in support of this 
 
265 Richard A. Lanham, The Economics of Attention (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006), p. 43. 
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specific aesthetic approach, as effort is expended to find ways to stage this 
material that remove it from its functional context.  
Once a work has been formulated, it is sometimes but not always staged 
in a public setting. While putting the work in front of an audience can be useful 
as a way of receiving external feedback, my initial Ph.D. research proposal was 
driven by my own retrospective critical readership of my work. In order to 
identify an area for study, I looked at my recent and previous work to locate 
thematic areas that might have the potential for further investigation. This was 
based on an analysis of the ideas the work raised from my own position as a 
practitioner, temporarily stepping outside of that position to occupying the role of 
a viewer or reader of the work. To use Wesseling’s terminology, I followed my 
own line of reasoning backward into the work to identify a set of assumptions 
that needed to be revised because of changes in the context outside of the 
work.  
That the researcher operates as both a reader and producer of the 
artwork is a key methodological point that emerges from the debates outlined in 
the previous chapter. Nelson refers to the importance of reflection by the artist 
throughout his account, while Hannula et al describe the ‘insider/outsider 
alternation’ involved in the act of reflection on one’s own work as positioning 
researchers as ‘both-and, both readers and writers’.266 Scrivener & Chapman 
agree with this positioning:  
Thus we would argue that, in general, the knowledge reified in 
original and novel artefact has to be recovered, through analysis 
and reflection on the relationship between what is known and what 
is to be known. Paradoxically, the creator […] is likely to be in 
exactly the same position as the viewer of the artefact. This is 
because the creative process is one of establishing the conditions 
 
266 Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén, p. 4. 
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for the realisation of what has not been seen before, not one of 
thinking the thing out in advance.267  
Adopting the role of the reader of the work allows for the reasoning in the 
work to be extrapolated into insight that extends the context before the next 
episode of practice. This will find form in the practical work, but can also be 
elucidated through written critical reflection.  
Nelson describes critical reflection as being central to identifying the 
movement of the researcher between different types of knowledge on the 
spectrum between objectivity and subjectivity. For him, ‘the purpose of critical 
reflection in a PaR context is better to understand and articulate […] whatever is 
at stake in the praxis in respect of substantial new insights’.268 Making an 
account of the research enquiry accessible through written critical reflection is a 
fundamental part of every artistic research methodology cited in this thesis. 
Whether the artworks are seen to embody the insight themselves or not, 
Nelson’s idea of praxis mobilises the researcher to forge links between context 
(know-that) and skill (know-how) through the devising and manufacture of 
artworks, and the know-what that emerges is arrived at and expressed through 
critical reflection.  
It follows that the insight generated through this approach is generated 
for both the viewer and the artist-researcher. In those cases where the work is 
not staged publicly, the insight generated for the artist-researcher can be 
articulated in writing and disseminated that way, and it also bears on the 
developing trajectory of the enquiry.  
The ‘both-and’ position of producer and reader of the work is one I adopt 
in the following account of my practical research activity. This account is 
organised thematically, although some artworks extend the understanding of 
more than one thematic area. Each section below begins with commentary on 
 
267 Stephen Scrivener and Peter Chapman, ‘The Practical Implications of Applying a Theory of 
Practice Based Research: A Case Study’, Working Papers in Art and Design, 3.1 (2004), 
p. 11. 
268 Nelson, p. 60. 
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research aims and context, moves on to the process of production, and 
concludes with a discussion about dissemination and the insights drawn from 
the practice, and how these lead forward into the next instance of practical 
enquiry. This structure acknowledges the relevance of Nelson’s ‘clews’ to the 
decision-making processes that take place during my practical research.269 
Nelson describes the usefulness of clues to the research inquiry in the practice 
where it might not be immediately evident to a reader of the work, and by using 
the old version of the word, ‘clew’, which means ‘thread’, he invokes a useful 
metaphor for ‘holding onto the line of research inquiry as it weaves through the 
overall process.’270 
These ‘clews’ follow from some of the questions emerging from the 
preceding theory and practice review chapters, while some emerge from 
practice and have helped form the lines along which the theoretical reading, or 
reflective analysis, has proceeded.  
Starting Points: Landscape and Data Infrastructure 
Landscape was a preoccupation in my prior practice, functioning as a 
restorative visual trope that was posited as a counterpoint to the fast pace of 
digital communications. There is a relationship between landscape imagery and 
technology that extends along a number of axes. Much of the mainstream 
argument against screen-based media contrasts it against the restorative 
experience of nature.271 It has been argued that landscape images are 
sometimes used as a shorthand for oppositions between natural and non-
natural, or perhaps between biological and technical. 272 Screensavers often 
depict mountains or forests, and the soothing escapism of this type of imagery 
remains a relevant area of interest.  
 
269 Nelson, pp. 10–12. 
270 Nelson, p. 10. 
271 Nathan Jurgenson, ‘The Disconnectionists’, The New Inquiry, 2013 
<http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-disconnectionists/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
272 Emily Gaynor, ‘May Waver Interview’, 2014 <http://newhive.com/newhive/may-waver-
interview> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
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However, rather than using images that depict landscape as I had done 
in prior practice, I sought out ways of representing landscape that moved away 
from photographic imaging. I began looking into open repositories of data 
gathered from landscapes that might be developed into artworks. This reflected 
an intention to use the internet reflexively in the production of the work: whereas 
previously I had photographed or filmed landscapes, I now wanted to encounter 
them in an already-mediated, digitised form. I alighted upon the United States 
Geological Service’s archives, and became interested in the data gathered by 
their earthquake alert system. This system is designed to enable an urgent 
emergency response in the event of an earthquake of a significant magnitude, 
but the monitoring system measures even low-magnitude earthquakes and 
provides data on their location and estimated range of impact.273 
I identified that the timescales that were evident in the practice of 
earthquake monitoring were relevant. On the one hand, these monitoring 
systems have been set up to reduce the time between awareness of a 
seismological event and an emergency response, approximating real-time 
monitoring to the extent that the direction of earthquake science in the near 
future will be attempting to predict earthquakes before they happen.274 Contrary 
to this, the timescales over which seismological events build up is (literally) 
geologically slow, and can only be perceived by humans through technological 
processes of perceptual augmentation. Furthermore, the first-hand experience 
of an earthquake is a potentially terrifying and sudden experience in which the 
fixed conditions of bodily movement that are usually ignored, such as the 
horizontal ground, become unstable and therefore are made shockingly 
noticeable.  
The particular data sources I worked with are described as ‘ShakeMaps’, 
and visually represent the intensity of an earthquake and identify its epicentre 
on a map. These maps show a colour-coded scale on which the intensity of the 
 
273 United States Geological Survey, ‘ANSS - Advanced National Seismic System’ 
<https://earthquake.usgs.gov/monitoring/anss/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
274 United States Geological Survey. 
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shaking can be measured, from white (‘not felt’), through blue and green to 
yellow (‘moderate’), and ending with orange and red (‘extreme’). The epicentre 
of the earthquake is shown as a star on the map, with the colour of the star 
having a bearing on the magnitude of the earthquake, although not on the same 
colour scale.  
 
 
Figure 7: ShakeMap, November 2014 
 
 
Figure 8: Page from Epicentres, 2014 
 
The images are organised on the USGS site by region, and I found 
myself drawn to more remote locations, seeking to maintain a continuity with 
previous work that had deployed images of remote wildernesses. I found that an 
amount of very small earthquakes had recently taken place in Alaska.275  
Having established the context for the work (see Figure 6 on p. 93) and 
having been invited to participate in a collaborative publishing project with other 
 
275 The USGS earthquake data site is no longer organised in this way, having since been 
redesigned and now carries metricised ‘Did you feel it?’ counters. 
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postgraduate students, I decided to use cropped versions of ShakeMaps from 
this region to produce a small book of images, titled Epicentres.276 The number 
of images was selected based on a fixed time period dictated by the page count 
of the book. I adopted a conceptualist strategy of appropriation whereby data is 
appropriated and re-presented, with the work operating as merely a ‘pointer to 
what exists’.277 Alongside the necessary colophon and indexing information, the 
book contained a page that listed the coordinates, dates and times of the 
earthquakes depicted. This process corresponds to the devising/making section 
of the methodology diagram shown in Figure 6.  
 
276 Documentation of this project is available at 
<https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/epicentres/> and in the supporting material that 
accompanies this thesis. 
277 Stallabrass, p. 27. 
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Figure 9: Page from Epicentres, 2014. 
 
 
Figure 10: Pages from Epicentres, 2014. 
At a point in my inquiry when I was still considering ‘real’ and ‘online’ 
experiences to be separate, it interested me that these earthquakes might not 
actually have been felt by a human: the only experience of them is as an 
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automated image generated from sensor data, with no guarantee that the image 
itself will receive a human viewing. There is an obvious reading of the work that 
questions the existence of the unperceived earthquake at all, but the devolution 
of the experience of noticing the earthquake to remote sensing equipment 
seemed more significant. The technological data-gathering apparatus pays 
attention to this geological event so we don’t have to; data is gathered, 
quantified, and visualised, and everyday life remains undisturbed by these 
events. It might be said that the sensing apparatus constructs the real through 
an automated mediation of it, by determining what constitutes a seismological 
event to be noticed. Additionally, this data is used in order to develop the 
capacity to predict seismological events. This relationship between a 
technologically-constructed real and the gathering of data for prediction chimes 
with the questions about agency posed by Zuboff.278 This system is angled 
toward seismological data but echoes approaches to personal behavioural data 
taken by social media platforms. The complex agency in such platforms is 
foreshadowed in this work by its foregrounding of a constructed real as the field 
from which action might emerge. 
The utilitarian aesthetic qualities of these images, whose diagrammatic 
form reveals almost nothing about the physically unsettling experience they 
refer to, further distances the event from the realm of the subjective. Collecting 
the images in a book could be seen as an attempt to reclaim some relatable 
materiality, or possibly some subjective humanness, from this automated 
sensing system. The form of the book also invites the type of focused attention 
that many commentators claim is being eroded by digital technologies.279 It also 
commodifies, sequences and fixes images that are otherwise intangibly 
circulating on the web.280 The hand-held form of the book also reflects a desire 
for tactile materiality that can be seen in Roth’s work.281  
 
278 Zuboff. 
279 Notably Nick Carr, discussed on pp. 29–31 of this thesis. 
280 This approach is also a characteristic of The Library of the Printed Web, a project by Paul 
Soulellis. See Soulellis, ‘About: Library of the Printed Web’. 
281 See pp. 61–63 of this thesis. 
  
 
 
 
103 
While the use of cartographical imagery in the work initially came from a 
desire to invoke landscape as data, maps themselves bring a wide range of 
complex contextual references into the work. The idea central to critical 
cartography, that maps are not neutral, emerges in this work and in later works 
that explore infrastructural maps more fully.282 Since the maps used as 
components in these works are not the principal focus of my study, the power 
relations expressed by them will only be discussed in broad overview, except 
where they have an explicit bearing on the potential meaning of the work.  
In this work I adopt a conceptual approach that appropriates existing 
material and re-presents it within the interpretive context of art. Epicentres 
refers to subjective affectual experiences that are only noticed in mediated form 
with the assistance of a complex infrastructural network of sensors. But in terms 
of artistic agency, the piece relies on existing visual material that is re-presented 
in a form that changes the way it is consumed and attended to by a viewer. In 
the earlier discussion on post-internet art, Vierkant described a situation where 
the art is circulated online and is remixed, altered, or reshaped, and each of 
these different forms of the work are considered to be equal.283 In Epicentres, 
this logic is inverted: material found online is converted into art by making it into 
something more material and singular. Producing the books in a limited edition 
acts as an imposition of scarcity on a series of objects that have been created 
from material that is ostensibly free and accessible. This could be seen as an 
enclosure of the commons – quite an unpalatable expropriation and 
commodification of open resources. This approach is evident in Manning’s 100 
Paintings project and in the Library of the Printed Web, where online material is 
shifted from an attention economy into a commodity economy, although in 
Manning’s case the material is not in the public domain to begin with.  
The book was exhibited as part of a larger collection, titled The Editions, 
which first met an audience at the Pages artist book fair at The Tetley in Leeds, 
 
282 Jeremy W. Crampton and John Krygier, ‘An Introduction to Critical Cartography’, ACME: An 
International Journal for Critical Geographies, 4.1 (2005), 11–33. 
283 See pp. 47–50 of this thesis for an explanation of Vierkant’s argument. 
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before subsequently touring to a number of regional and national artist’s book 
fairs. At the time, my primary interest in the work was the way that it presented 
images that signified seismological events that were too insubstantial to be 
bodily perceived, making experiences that were at the thresholds of attention 
more noticeable. Reflecting on this project now at the end of my study, I can 
see how this piece also prefigured the infrastructural aspects of my inquiry. The 
cropping of the images is significant in that it removes information that allows 
them to be decoded as data, instead inviting an aesthetic encounter with them. 
This both decontextualises them as data sources and defamiliarises them. The 
aids to interpretation that are withheld prompt questions about what else might 
be missing, or more precisely, what is not noticed. What is not noticed is the 
complex infrastructural assemblage of data gathering and interpretation that 
allows these images to come into existence in an automated way in the first 
place.  
The compilation of the series of images into a book formed the first 
iteration of the piece, and a smaller selection of them were subsequently 
enlarged and exhibited as part of Northern Lights, an exhibition of photography 
exploring the idea of North.284 The inclusion of these images as part of a 
photography exhibition enabled them to be analysed using the historical context 
of photography as a theoretical framework. It might initially seem quite a stretch 
to consider these images as photographs, but I would argue that the domain of 
photography might include many images created with the assistance of 
technical apparatus, and if we consider photograms, medical images such as 
fMRI, or CCTV, this need not rely on authorial intent or any specifically optical 
apparatus to hold true. Indeed, it has been claimed that photographic images 
captured by smartphones are constructed principally using algorithms, despite 
their superficially optical appearance.285 If these graphical images are to be 
thought of as photographs, then the ever-questionable status of the photograph 
as evidence, or its potential to act as an articulation of power, become relevant 
 
284 The Northern Light exhibition took place at SIA Gallery in Sheffield during July 2016. 
285 Toro and others. 
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poles of discussion. The question of what constitutes a camera is also pertinent, 
invoking a consideration of infrastructure through its absence in a slightly 
different way to that mentioned above.  
The insight generated from this work is a reconsideration of how 
thresholds of perception can be augmented by digital sensing infrastructure. 
The tiny, remote earthquakes that the work focuses on can only be noticed with 
the assistance of the technological infrastructure that senses them. Reflection 
on this work helped identify which questions needed to be approached in the 
practical work that followed, allowing for a re-evaluation of the context for the 
study (Figure 6). I decided at this point to continue developing work that 
addressed infrastructure as a theme by focusing on maps as visual indicators of 
this. Alongside this, I decided to develop a line of practice that began to explore 
the idea of data and bodily experience that was raised by the absence of first-
hand subjective experience of the earthquakes that form the basis of this work. 
These two ‘clews’ ran in parallel for much of the second year of my study. 
Bodily Data (‘Data Sweat’) 
In order to think about how the body generates data, I began gathering 
data about my own levels of productivity through my engagement and 
interaction with my computer. My initial approach was to use a piece of off-the-
shelf software called Rescue Time.286 This commercial software runs as a 
background process on the user’s computer and measures the quantity of time 
spent on particular tasks. While mainly marketed as a tool to help freelancers 
measure the amount of time they might be spending using particular pieces of 
software so they can bill their clients more accurately, it’s also promoted as anti-
distraction software, to help its users focus on work by revealing how productive 
(or otherwise) they might have been during a specified time frame. It situates 
itself as an optimisation tool, and if productivity is seen as a store of our own 
worth, it optimises the capacity for the accrual of human capital. However, the 
information Rescue Time provided about how much time I spent on particular 
 
286 Downloadable from <http://www.rescuetime.com>. 
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tasks informed me about my interaction with the device only in terms of my 
software usage and productivity, and ignored the embodied interaction – the 
clicks, taps, swipes and so on – that are central to the experience of being a 
computer user. 
In order to find out more about these interactions, I used a piece of open 
source software called RUI–Recording User Interface.287 Designed for use by 
interface designers so that they can record interactions with designed interfaces 
for the purposes of software testing, the software consists of a script written in 
the programming language C.  
 
 
Figure 11: Sample RUI Dataset, April 2015. 
 
 
RUI measures mouse or track-pad movement, and records cursor 
position, as well as key strokes and mouse-button presses, time-stamping all of 
these and presenting them in a tab-delimited text file for further processing.  
Having gathered several sessions of this data, I wanted to try and 
defamiliarise this data and therefore my interaction with the computer, hoping 
that this would facilitate more insight into these processes. Taking into account 
Vierkant’s assertion that ‘everything is everything else’, I began to look at ways 
of transcoding and visualising this data.288 My first attempts to work with the 
 
287 For more information, see Frank Ritter, RUI–Recording User Interface, version 2.1, 2012 
<http://acs.ist.psu.edu/projects/RUI/>. 
288 See pp. 47–50 of this thesis. 
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data involved producing a system (using Processing) to simply play back the 
mouse movement from the data in real time as an animation.289,290 
 
 
Figure 12: Screenshot of mouse movement animation, 2015.  
 
On seeing the animation, the first thing I noticed and that was surprising 
was that the movement of the dot looked very organic and human. This 
shouldn’t have been surprising, since I am organic and I generated the 
movement that created the data, but there is something about the process of 
abstracting that movement through numerical data that made me expect it to 
play back less fluidly than it did.  
 In terms of its status as an animation, and aside from its relationship to 
data gathering, the piece deploys the viewer’s attention in particular ways: there 
are moments of action, and moments when the viewer might experience 
 
289 Processing is a programming language, development environment and community. For 
more information, see Processing Foundation, ‘Overview \ Processing.Org’ 
<https://processing.org/overview/> [accessed 16 March 2018]. 
290 Documentation of this project is available at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/dot/> and 
in the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
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suspense or expectation while waiting for the next flurry of activity. In the 
absence of contextual anchors, it also becomes tempting to anthropomorphise 
the movement of the dot, perhaps to see it as a sentient creature running 
around the screen.  
 
 
Figure 13: Three-dimensional visualisation, 2015. 
 
In order to develop the work further, I made a test piece that moved the 
visualisation into three dimensions, adding elements that reveal the mouse 
clicks in the data set.291 I produced two LED signs to indicate the status of the 
left mouse button: the ON sign was programmed to light up when the mouse 
button is pressed, and the OFF sign to light up when the mouse is not pressed. 
The typographical design of the signs was drawn from railway signalling, a 
decision I now read as an unconscious attempt to bring questions of 
infrastructure to the work. I was interested in how the language plays tricks: 
when the mouse button is not clicked, the OFF sign is actually on. A version of 
the mouse movement animation was projected onto the signs. While the piece 
 
291 Documentation of this project is available at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/on-off/> 
and in the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
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does begin to visually address the simultaneity of the layers of interaction that 
are experienced when using a computer, it also contains inconsistencies that 
are problematic in terms of my enquiry. There is a potential reading of the work 
in which online and offline activity could be seen to be different, separate, and 
diametrically opposed experiences. As discussed above, I now feel that online 
and offline experiences are far more blended or interleaved than the piece 
might infer on this reading.  
I decided to try and visualise the key-presses from the data in a more 
physical way. I produced a system that would play them back from the data 
using an Arduino microcontroller and a solenoid.292 For every key press in the 
dataset, the solenoid was triggered. 
 
 
Figure 14: Solenoid system, tentatively titled ‘Tap’, 2015. 
 
Once this system was up and running, I made the instinctive decision to 
position the solenoid in my studio against a metal surface, in this case the 
radiator, so that when activated the motion of the solenoid would sound like the 
 
292 Arduino is an open-source electronics platform based on easy-to-use hardware and 
software. See <http://www.arduino.cc/> for more information. 
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keys of a traditional typewriter. The tapping action on the radiator also 
transmitted the sound through the heating system of the studios, sending a hard 
to locate but very annoying tapping sound around the building.293 
The lack of an overly aestheticised presentation for this piece is also 
significant. It looks like a mini-computer doing something, as LEDs flicker while 
the playback of data runs. The ad-hoc physical form of the piece can be seen 
as an attempt to draw the attention of the viewer to the components of the work 
as instances of computing infrastructure. The piece would perhaps engender 
different meanings if the mini-computers were boxed into Perspex casings or 
were sited in a backstage area outside of the sight of the audience.  
 It seemed relevant that a dataset generated by productive activity was 
being deployed as a distraction to somebody else’s productive activity in 
another part of the building. The sense that the piece both gathered its data 
from the very tip of an infrastructural assemblage yet played it back into a 
different one seemed like the right sort of approach for the work. The tapping 
might be read as that of a prisoner seeking to gain attention and release, but 
sounding more like a typing pool than Morse code. These readings invoke the 
idea that the unbidden arrival of information into the thematic focus of attention 
is uncomfortable, distracting, and potentially overwhelming, and locates this 
discomfort in relation to productive work.  
This piece speaks to the passivity of data gathering by digital systems, 
which takes place as a by-product of other computer-enabled and online 
activities. In this case, the material being gathered is metadata associated with 
the act of using a laptop to write an essay. The passivity of the gathering of this 
metadata – the ‘data sweat’ as Gregg would have it – is what raises the 
question of user agency.294 A user may not be able to actively prevent the 
leakage of data during their everyday online activities, and this leakage might 
 
293 Documentation of this project is available at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/tap/> and 
in the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
294 Melissa Gregg, ‘Inside the Data Spectacle’, Television & New Media, 16.1 (2015), 37–51 (p. 
44). 
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also be not noticed by them. The experience of the piece highlights this sense 
of accidental spillage of data. Before a viewer encounters the artwork visually, 
the sound of the tapping interrupts their audio perception, bringing this 
accidental leakage of data to mind. Once sonified and visualised, the metadata 
that forms the basis of this piece is revealed to be the by-product of human 
physical labour, as the patterns of mouse movement or keyboard tapping retain 
their organic characteristics even when translated into different forms. Even if 
the data itself (what was typed) is obscured, the metadata (the timings of the 
key taps) still retains the unmistakable trace of bodily interaction with the 
keyboard. The quantification of human activity and its translation into movement 
and sound doesn’t quite flatten out the humanness, and this is a reminder that 
in other contexts, the patterning of the passively-gathered data can remain 
personalised even after anonymization.  
While this experimental piece began to produce some insight into 
infrastructure and attentional regimes associated with productive work, it was 
also compromised by its dependence on the use of the keyboard and mouse (or 
trackpad) as primary vectors for the gathering of data. Despite being useful as a 
starting point, I wanted instead to explore these interactions using mobile 
devices. It quickly became evident that mobile operating systems are far less 
accessible to the type of logging that RUI permitted, and this technical 
roadblock put this line of enquiry onto an indefinite hiatus. The findings from this 
experiment were disseminated at the postgraduate conference on method at 
SHU in spring 2015. 
Gesture and Material Interaction 
While trying to work around the problems with mobile device data-
logging, I also started to investigate the point of contact between the user and 
the endpoints of communications infrastructure, and how the materiality of this 
interaction is often below the threshold of attention. At first, this involved visual 
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investigations of the physical characteristics of the mobile phone touchscreen 
surface, using close-up photography.295  
 
Figure 15: Macro photograph of smartphone screen, 2015. 
The intention of these works was to focus on the granular composition of 
the smooth surface of the screen as a way of invoking the complexity of the 
data transmission infrastructure that it masks. Using water droplets to magnify 
the pixels was a first step to making the surface visible in a way that reveals it to 
be a representation rather than the stage for interaction with virtual objects. 
These images remained inconclusive and didn’t distinguish mobile screens 
clearly enough from other types of flat screen, so I quickly moved on from this 
approach.  
I began to gather footage of mobile phones being used, staged in my 
studio, with a view to exploring the physical aspects of these interactions. 
Observing the repetitive hand movements involved in everyday device usage 
led me to reflect on the gestures being used and their consequence. At about 
this time, I read Ilana Gershon’s speculative paper that asks how mediated 
selves might be understood not as performances, but as animations.296 She 
 
295 This project can be viewed at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/screen-droplets/> and in 
the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
296 Ilana Gershon, ‘What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Animation’, Social Media + 
Society, 1.1 (2015), 2056305115578143. 
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asks what work an audience has to do to co-create an animated character, and 
applies this thinking to the fragmentary selves constructed collectively through 
social media profiles. With this at the back of my mind, but also with a desire to 
maintain the utilitarian visual style from Epicentres, I produced some tentative 
rotoscoped animations of hands using smartphones. I found the pinch-to-zoom 
gesture particularly compelling, as it forges a relationship between the user and 
the image that can’t be replicated with a physical material. Zooming is not 
something that the eye can do without help, and the factor of zoom caused by 
the gesture would induce vertigo if not bounded by the tiny edges of the 
smartphone screen.  
 
 
Figure 16: Invisible Layers, screen shots of 
work in progress, 2015. 
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While these experiments were taking place, I was commissioned to 
produce a work for a group exhibition that was funded by the Tinsley Art 
Project. The exhibition was broadly concerned with a particular site close to a 
motorway and tram interchange to the north of Sheffield that was due to be 
redeveloped, including a public art programme, and the particular angle I was 
encouraged to take with my work was to bring infrastructural questions to bear 
on the project. Having already begun to explore the mobile device interface as a 
way of thinking about personal interaction with data infrastructure, I returned to 
mapping as a way of considering the bigger infrastructural picture.  
In the first instance, I searched through databases of LiDAR and Landsat 
images that were freely available from the USGS. This involved learning how to 
use their Earth Explorer interface and then spending a significant amount of 
time converting topographical images into vector images that could be enlarged 
in video editing software without visually deteriorating.297 The files I was working 
with were extremely high resolution and routinely resulted in vector files that 
were 1.5GB and upwards in size. This made the process of rendering the 
footage unwieldy, but also had the positive side effect of allowing a glimpse of 
the detail of this data. Vector image files, such as EPS or PDF, consist of 
mathematical formulas that determine the direction and inflection points of lines, 
and to imagine a 1.5GB text document consisting solely of mathematical 
formulas gave a different texture to the experience of handling the data.  
The initial intention was to use a satellite map of the site in Tinsley as the 
centre of the pinch-to-zoom gesture, but the topographical data that was 
available for the area was visually unspectacular and didn’t have the level of 
visual complexity I was seeking. While browsing the Earth Explorer interface, I 
decided to look at Silicon Valley in California, and discovered that the terrain 
there was more visually interesting. I then decided to audition, and eventually 
use, terrain data from the locations of the head offices of major mobile device 
manufacturers. This offered a more coherent connection with the infrastructural 
 
297 ‘EarthExplorer’ <https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/> [accessed 7 January 2018]. 
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network that the animated hand was at an endpoint of, and also invoked a more 
direct infrastructural reading that angled towards economic, political or social 
understandings of infrastructure, while retaining a sense of the scale and 
complexity of landscape inherited from previous work. 
In discussions with the curator, it was felt that the piece didn’t sit well with 
the other works in the exhibition, which focused more overtly on the transport 
intersections that were associated with the site around which the exhibition was 
themed, and I was encouraged to address this. In response, I began to seek out 
route maps and road maps as a potential alternative to the topographical 
contour data I had already rendered into a finished work.  
I quickly realised that Open Street Map data would be visually 
complementary to the topographical data already rendered into the work. Road 
and rail offered a different level of complexity than the topography and allowed 
the work to remain visually dense at even the highest levels of zoom. The initial 
intention was to exhibit the work as an installation, with the animated hand 
shown on a small monitor and an overlaid projected image of the maps moving 
in sync with the zoom and swipe gestures. The exhibition venue could not be 
made dark enough for this approach to be viable, so the piece was instead 
shown on a single large flat-screen monitor.298  
 
 
298 Documentation of the development of this project and its exhibition can be viewed at 
<https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/invisible-layers/> and in the supporting material that 
accompanies this thesis. 
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Figure 17: Invisible Layers, installation view at The Scottish Queen, Sheffield, August 2015. 
 
 
Figure 18: Invisible Layers, detail, August 2015. 
Combining USGS topographic data with infrastructural mapping from the 
crowd-sourced Open Street Map database placed the results of two very 
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different modes of data-gathering in close visual proximity. The topographical 
elevation map was generated using a complex and inscrutable infrastructure 
through which reflected infra-red light is captured by a sensor on an orbiting 
satellite before being algorithmically processed into a series of digital images.299 
The Open Street Map database, by contrast, is gathered and produced by a 
community of amateur geographers who crowd-source and co-edit each of its 
layers.300 Both modes of data gathering have infrastructural concerns but in the 
final work, this distinction is not as clearly articulated as I might have hoped. In 
addition, the consequences of this overlaying of qualitatively different datasets 
seems hard for the viewer to access.  
Rather than this being a shortcoming of the work, the other elements of 
the piece are instead organised in order to draw attention to the inaccessibility 
of this overly complex assemblage of data. The piece represents the user of the 
smartphone in the same schematic line drawing as the maps, and the pinch-to-
zoom and swipe actions are repeated to infer a lack of sustained attention to the 
imagery, or a lack of satisfaction with it. The animated hands constantly flick 
through the maps, never quite settling on an image. The hands are shown close 
to life-size on the screen, and are depicted as if seen over the shoulder of their 
owner, but at a shallow enough angle that they might allow the viewer to read 
the hands as mediated versions of their own. Additionally, the absence of an 
identifiable protagonist makes it possible for the viewer to ‘project an affective 
connection’ to the protagonist, or occupy that role themselves.301 In the 
relentless dismissal of these complex map images, the ‘swipe’ gesture is 
depicted as a restless, repeated action that inevitably leads to dissatisfaction. 
 As the piece is not interactive, the viewer has no control over the pace of 
the swipes and zooms, they can only look on as the images repetitively shift. 
This might invite feelings of powerlessness or helplessness with regard to a 
 
299 NASA LP DAAC, ‘ASTER DEM Product’ (NASA LP DAAC, 2001). 
300 ‘About OpenStreetMap - OpenStreetMap Wiki’ 
<https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/About_OpenStreetMap> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
301 Gershon, p. 2. 
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viewer’s own interactions with mobile devices, bringing their capacity for agency 
to mind and into consideration. Conversely, the repetitiveness of the imagery 
and the passivity of its reception by the viewer might invoke a more hypnotic 
invocation of the ‘machine zone’ as identified by Dow Schüll.  
Despite the compromises involved in the production of this piece, the 
insight that it generated led to a re-focusing of my enquiry onto the affective 
dimensions of compulsive device usage. I began to consider ways that the 
viewer of an artwork might be invited to consider their own behaviours with 
regard to device usage, and directed my reading more toward compulsion, 
behavioural addiction, and so-called ‘digital detox’ as a potential cure for 
‘internet addiction’.   
Compulsion  
As this thesis has already established, the question of whether ‘internet 
addiction’ is an adequate term for a range of internet or gaming-related 
compulsive behaviours remains under discussion. Regardless of this, as 
Sutcliffe and Sutton argue, the prevalence of the term and the proliferation and 
gradual acceptance of the idea of ‘digital detox’ reflects something in the 
cultural zeitgeist that does see compulsive usage of the internet, mobile 
devices, or computer games, as problematic, and sees withdrawal from these 
as a possible palliative.302 The urge to pathologise compulsion allows a position 
to be taken on personal agency that foregrounds the user as solely responsible 
rather than as a co-producer of their experience of compulsion. While reserving 
judgement about my own position on the plausibility of ‘digital detox’ and its 
positive benefits, I continued to research the phenomena of compulsive device 
usage, internet addiction and ‘digital detoxing’ to inform the next steps in the 
work. 
I began by making literature searches for existing theoretical work on 
internet addiction, and the literature, particularly in the ‘cyber-psychology’ field, 
is extensive. Having already decided at an early stage to limit the influence of 
 
302 Sutcliffe and Sutton. 
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psychology on my study, I wanted to continue to suspend my judgement about 
the existence of the phenomenon of ‘internet addiction’ or its definition. I 
decided that contributing to psychological understandings of the phenomenon 
was likely to be out of scope for my project, and this decision liberated me to 
read the literature as a resource that could inform practice rather than 
assessing its veracity as psychological research. This body of literature seemed 
intensively focused on the production of ways of measuring compulsive usage, 
measures which I deemed to be in the service of the inclusion of ‘internet 
addiction’ in the DSM-5 manual of diagnosable mental health conditions.303 The 
imperative to quantify phenomena that might be experienced qualitatively forms 
a broad contextual backdrop to my study, and I viewed these particular attempts 
to find a plausible way of quantifying compulsion as a means of preparing the 
ground for the control of access to treatment. Quantified measures of the level 
of device addiction in a user allow decisions to be made about whether a user is 
addicted enough to warrant intervention, or to become eligible for a fully DSM-
compliant diagnosis. My disagreement with this was that the threshold for 
pathological diagnosis implied by quantitative measures disregarded the lower-
level compulsions that seemed more widespread though less obviously 
disruptive to the lives of those affected by them.304 While addiction is a serious 
and life-altering diagnosis, the term has also fallen into casual usage that allows 
widespread self-diagnosis of compulsive behaviour of a much lesser order. 
Without wishing to disregard the suffering of those experiencing severe 
addictive symptoms, my interest was less directed toward those gamers whose 
disengagement from social life was studied by Turkle in the 1980s for example, 
and much more directed toward the way that lower-level compulsive behaviours 
 
303 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5®), 5th ed., (Washington: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013). 
304 Jenny Davis argues that the push toward the inclusion of ‘internet addiction’ in the DSM is 
based on problematic assumptions about the similarity between biological and 
behavioural dependence. She outlines her objections to its inclusion in ‘The Problem with 
Internet Addiction - Cyborgology’, 2012 
<https://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/03/20/the-problem-with-internet-
addiction/> [accessed 10 February 2016]. 
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permit the infiltration of digital technology into everyday experience on a much 
wider basis and in subtler ways.305 
Therefore, seeking a less quantitative set of measures, and alert to the 
role that the capacity for attentiveness plays in considerations of personal value, 
I began seeking out self-help and lifestyle blogs which listed symptoms 
characteristic of the need for ‘digital detox’. Taking the blogs as instances of 
discourse, I focused on the types of language that were being used and the 
possible articulations of power or models of personal agency that were enacted 
through them. Broadly speaking, the sense of self-admonishment at the heart of 
the self-diagnosis of ‘internet addiction’ was extremely strong. Compulsive 
usage of the internet was positioned by these texts as being responsible for all 
manner of physical, emotional and social ills, to a ridiculous extent: from bruised 
thumbs to anxiety, from sleeplessness to inattentiveness. What surprised me 
was the proximity between the use of language in the lifestyle blogs and in the 
psychological measures: concerns about lack of sleep, for example, are 
common to many of the blogs and some of the diagnostic measures.306,307 
I first made an experimental web piece that delivered appropriated texts 
from these blogs as pop-up notifications in a browser window. The backdrop to 
the pop-ups was a colour-tinted view of a seascape, an image selected from an 
archive of work produced on an earlier residency, with the intention of invoking 
a sense of reflective or restorative solitude to be punctured by a hectoring 
notification.308  
I had also been experimenting with sound as part of my artistic practice, 
in a way that was initially prompted by earlier research into mouse clicks and 
interaction gestures. While developing the solenoid piece described above, I 
 
305 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1984). 
306 G.-J. Meerkerk and others, ‘The Compulsive Internet Use Scale (CIUS): Some 
Psychometric Properties’, CyberPsychology & Behavior, 12.1 (2009), 1–6. 
307 A list of links to the self-help sites referenced is attached as an appendix. 
308 This experiment is viewable at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/text-popup/> and in the 
supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
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had become aware of the phenomenon of ‘autonomous sensory meridian 
response’, or ASMR, which is described as a pleasurable tingling sensation 
brought about by acoustic triggers such as whispering, or certain types of 
ambient noise, including fingers tapping and in some cases, mouse clicks.309 
This led to a consideration of the role of ambient sound as one type of field from 
which interruptions might distract, analogous to the default mode of brain 
activity outlined by Levitin.310 When a notification arrives on a mobile device, it’s 
often accompanied by an alert sound or vibration, which interrupts the ambient 
soundscape with a type of sound that is often shrill or piercing, yet still friendly 
in tone. This relationship between ambient sound and jarring notification alert 
was deployed in the work by using copyright-free alert sounds over a self-
produced drone-like ambient background sound.311 
 
309 ASMR Fun Factory, ASMR Computer Mouse Using PC Mouse Relaxation Clicks 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idlE_lTRID0> [accessed 7 January 2018]. 
310 Levitin. 
311 This experiment can be viewed at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/artefacts/> and in 
the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
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Figure 19: ‘text-popup’ experiment, screen grab, January 2016. 
 
I had continued looking at mapping software after the work done for 
Invisible Layers, and had begun to try and find a solution to the highly resource-
intensive way that it had been produced. Moving the map data to Adobe After 
Effects for rendering to video, with intermediate stages using Geographical 
Information System (GIS) software, had made the process of producing a short 
video very time consuming. I reasoned that if GIS software can show complex 
map data in real time, there should be ways in which this data could be 
interacted with live or programmatically, rather than rendering output to a video 
file. I initially hoped to recreate Invisible Layers using different technology in 
order to make it easier to exhibit, but subsequently tried merging the new 
mapping approach with the pop-up texts to develop a new piece.  
Part of the method from Invisible Layers was redeployed, with map 
coordinates centring on hubs of tech industry activity, but instead of the 
hyperactive swipe and zoom, a very slow zooming out motion was 
programmatically applied to the map data. The piece uses Open Street Map 
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views of digital industrial hotspots – the ‘Googleplex’, Facebook’s headquarters, 
London’s ‘digital roundabout’ – but in this instance shows them as blocky, retro 
computer-game-like approximations. While clearly referencing the visual 
language of gaming, the work offers less of a sense of control than is common 
in game interaction, instead invoking a feeling of powerless drift. The camera 
slowly zooms out of the scene, offering a gradually widening view of the 
location, before switching to the next scene at a much closer zoom and 
repeating the process. This gives a semi-static background over which the pop-
up texts about device usage appear, but offers more visual interest than the 
seascape on the test piece had done. After trialling the piece with the alert 
sounds from the test piece, they seemed incompatible with the imagery and the 
decision was made to leave the piece silent.312  
 
Figure 20: Screen Time, screen shot, January 2016.  
The piece modulates the attention of the viewer in distinct ways. The 
irregular schedule of the text’s appearance keeps the viewer in suspense, 
waiting for the next one, while the language of the texts is at times hectoring, at 
times admonishing, and at other times simply accusatory. ‘You check your 
 
312 Documentation of the piece can be viewed at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/screen-
time/> and in the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
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phone during intimate partner moments’ for example is a damning criticism of 
the viewer’s compulsive internet usage, whether it is received as a statement of 
fact or as a warning compared with their own experience. Assessing the 
personal relevance of the texts requires introspection on the part of the viewer 
and is assisted by the slow drift of the background imagery, which gradually 
zooms out offering a wider angle and a more elevated vantage point for the 
virtual camera. This suggests a sense of increasing clarity perhaps on the part 
of the viewer, yet the imagery periodically refreshes to a close-up zoomed state 
before the process repeats. To situate the readership of this work in relation to 
the debate opened by Osborne and Benjamin, the work invites a specific type of 
contemplation that modulates the terms of the traditional aesthetic encounter: 
instead of the artwork as the subject of contemplation, this work situates the 
viewer as the subject of contemplation.313 
If the solenoid piece foregrounds practices of data gathering that bypass 
user agency, Screen Time instead invites its viewers to reflect upon their 
agency in relation to digital device usage. The work nags at the viewer in order 
to bring to mind other types of nagging system, and this hectoring tone 
mobilises the viewer’s affect, perhaps generating a sense of uncomfortable 
recognition of the viewer’s own activities. This mobilisation of negative affect 
has an equivalent in the governmentality that foregrounds maximum productivity 
as its unquestioned goal. The piece primarily asks the viewer to consider their 
own distractibility in terms of their human capital. As they potentially identify with 
the negative characteristics that demand they take a ‘digital detox’, they align 
themselves with a narrative of productivity as personal value, and of self-
improvement as an appreciation in human capital. Here, agency is revealed to 
be located within a system of productivity and distraction, within which a rational 
subject seeks to self-improve and develop. Alongside this, the notion of 
addiction is raised through some of the texts, and this foregrounds the 
 
313 See pp. 8–11 of this thesis for a discussion of Osborne and Benjamin’s approach. 
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unresolved tensions between productivity and self-value in the relationship 
between distractibility, compulsion, and work. 
This work was presented at the Research Inside Practice symposium at 
Birkbeck College, London, to a group of practice-based researchers from 
Birkbeck, Middlesex University, and from my own institution. The discussion 
around the work at this symposium helped develop my thinking around the 
piece.  
An important insight that came from the discussion was to do with the 
ontology of the work. The texts in the piece adopt a mode of address that 
directly confronts the viewer with accusatory prompts to question their own 
behaviour, drawing out the viewer’s subjectivity, and inviting them to be self-
reflective. Yet, the piece is also entirely indifferent to the presence of a viewer, 
or even if an audience is there to view the work at all. The question of ontology 
becomes more awkward when the piece’s use of appropriated text is 
considered. At the symposium, viewers of the work were able to discern that the 
differing tones of voice in the texts suggested that the texts were drawn from 
more than one source. This helped assuage my concern that viewers might 
assume that the texts were written by the artist, or that the piece was a work of 
expression rather than one of appropriation perhaps more akin to media 
critique. As it was, viewers were able to get the sense that the texts had a 
number of different authors. The status of the work as a web site, rather than a 
singular video file, adds to the unanchored feeling this work produces.314 It lives 
on a server rather than as an object in the gallery, and is only present through a 
flat-screen that forms the endpoint of its distributed infrastructural form. It’s as if 
the work corrals parsimonious voices from the internet and funnels them toward 
the viewer, while itself remaining unaccountable for their content, either in terms 
of ‘pin-downable’ physical co-presence with the viewer, or by the degree of 
expressive authorship shown by the artist. Through this uncertain material 
 
314 The work relies on an open source mapping service that was closed in early 2018. While it 
should be noted that the intended form of the work is as a website, it is presented as a 
screen-captured video until an alternative mapping service can be found.   
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ontology, I see the piece as having an unexpected symmetry with the ontology 
of social media services, such as Facebook, that host user content yet remain 
legally unaccountable for publishing that content or for the consequences of its 
publication.   
Algorithmic Processing 
Immediately following the production of this work, I began to redirect my 
research focus toward the physical actions involved in compulsive device 
usage, and at around this time I participated in a series of workshops organised 
by the artist Katriona Beales that formed part of her own research into ‘internet 
addiction’. The ground explored through the workshops eventually resulted in 
an exhibition of new work by Beales and publication covering a range of 
approaches to the topic.315 An area of discussion that these workshops allowed 
me to focus on was the way that apps can be designed to increase user 
engagement through strategies such as ‘gamification’, and how these strategies 
might begin to invoke compulsive usage.  
Alongside this, in July 2016, the augmented reality (AR) game Pokémon 
Go was released. This mobile locative game allows players to hunt 3D rendered 
monsters that have been virtually positioned at locations in physical space, and 
to perform the act of capturing them using an interface that blends video of 
physical space with overlaid 3D graphics. Pokémon Go was a breakthrough app 
for AR that received a large amount of press coverage and critical attention at 
the time of its release. My interest in the game was the way that it explored the 
permeable boundary between online and offline experience through a gamified 
interface, and seemed to be a nexus of attentional focus and filtering, data 
gathering, and addictive design strategy. It also had a spatialised aspect that 
linked back to the use of maps in my earlier work, but that also invoked the 
body in a stronger way. I identified AR software and interfaces as holding 
potential for the development of new work.   
 
315 Are We All Addicts Now?: Digital Dependence, ed. by Vanessa Bartlett and Henrietta 
Bowden-Jones (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2017). 
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After looking into what might be possible with open source AR libraries, I 
began to work with a particular library called js-aruco.316 To create the illusion of 
a 3D model existing in the same representational space as the user’s 
surroundings, live video of a scene needs first to be analysed to make sense of 
its spatial characteristics. In some systems, the video will be checked for an AR 
marker – typically a monochrome square similar in appearance to a QR code – 
so that 3D positioning can be calculated from the orientation of this marker. 
While newer proprietary systems such as Apple’s ARKit are able to infer 3D 
orientation from 2D video more fluidly, at the point in time when I was exploring 
this area, it was necessary to use a marker-based system for orientation.317 I 
became interested in the visual qualities of the debugging screen of the js-aruco 
library. This software analyses a frame of live video and calculates two 
alternative best guesses for the orientation of the marker that is sensed, which 
are represented as two planes in 3D space. For each plane, the software gives 
a numerical estimate of the amount of error in its calculation. Since this process 
is repeated on every frame of video, the orientation of the planes sometimes 
changes from frame to frame, resulting in a flickering, restless image that 
reflects the uncertainty of the software’s algorithms. This restless image is 
evidence of the software’s indecision about the position of the marker.  
 
316 Juan Mellado, Js-Aruco - JavaScript Library for Augmented Reality Applications, 2015 
<https://github.com/jcmellado/js-aruco> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
317 ‘ARKit - Apple Developer’ <https://developer.apple.com/arkit/> [accessed 6 January 2018]. 
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Figure 21: Mock Objects, screen grab of work in progress, 2016. The two ‘planes’ can be seen 
in blue and lilac, along with data about their orientation and estimated levels of error. The 
source video is shown at the top of the frame. 
 
There are two mechanisms by which the software can be used to create 
the illusion of an augmented reality: either the camera can be moved around to 
simulate the eye of the viewer, or the marker can be moved within the viewport 
of a static camera. I began testing the software by moving markers rather than 
moving the camera, and eventually alighted on a process whereby a marker 
was attached to my thumb and then sensed while I carried out the sort of 
repeated swipe gestures common to mobile device usage. On reflection, this 
seems like a counterintuitive approach, as the embodiment that AR speaks to is 
that of a mobile eye, rather than a mobile thumb. While it did provide some 
continuity with previous work, it also seems in retrospect that a different 
approach might have yielded a very different type of output from the software. In 
the time-pressured run-up to the group show Testing, Testing at SIA Gallery in 
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Sheffield, this approach was developed into a live animation entitled Mock 
Objects.318 
 
Figure 22: Mock Objects, installation view at SIA Gallery, Sheffield, August 2016. 
 
Figure 23: Mock Objects, detail, August 2016. 
Despite the source video that controls the motion of the planes remaining 
hidden, viewers may still be able to infer that the movement is generated from 
 
318 Documentation of the piece and an account of its production process can be viewed at 
<https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/mock-objects/> and in the supporting material that 
accompanies this thesis. 
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human activity, since even after processing, there is still an identifiably organic 
character to the motion that suggests this. The piece then proposes that human 
activity is being subjected to algorithmic processing but it’s not entirely clear 
what that process is, what its purpose might be. 
The piece was shown on an unframed monitor and installed high on the 
wall of the upper storey of SIA Gallery. The wall chosen is perhaps the least 
compelling wall in the gallery for the exhibition of artwork, since as well as being 
physically behind the viewer as they enter the gallery, it is also the site of a 
large air vent, several metres of cable trunking, the security alarm’s passive 
infra-red sensor and control console, and the entrance door to the space. This 
visual clutter is supposed to be ignored by the viewer as they go about the 
business of attending to artwork in the gallery.  
Positioning Mock Objects on this wall was an instinctive decision in 
response to curatorial constraints, but doing so placed the work at a nexus of 
the play of attention involved in the aesthetic experiences afforded by gallery 
exhibition. Most of the visual clutter on the wall can be considered to be 
infrastructural: it supplies lighting, air or electricity, supports the security of the 
artworks, or provides physical access to the space. John Durham Peters 
suggests that since the prefix infra- means below, the presence of infrastructure 
should prompt the question of what it is intended to be infra- to.319 In this case, 
by its retreat into the background, the ‘invisible’ infrastructure foregrounds the 
white-walled institutional gallery space, with its established structures of 
engagement, expectations of behaviour and attentional norms. The siting of the 
piece in the margins allows the work to oscillate between its status as a focus 
for the viewer’s attention and as potentially ignorable infrastructure. 
The piece’s onscreen image further complicates matters. The flickering 
planes invite the viewer to make a comparison between their two possible 
orientations. The viewer here is installed as an empowered overseer, and is 
given the opportunity to apply conscious scrutiny to the output of a visual 
 
319 John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media 
(United States: University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 36.  
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processing algorithm. This stands in contrast to the power relations enacted by 
user interfaces that invite compulsive usage, in which design tricks are used to 
invoke unthinking, habitual interactions that hijack the user’s agency. The colour 
and orientation of the planes is unmodified from their appearance in the 
debugging view of the original software, but the background has been changed 
from a static colour to a slowly shifting cycle of colour. This allows attention and 
distraction to alternate between the visual elements within the work. If the 
viewer is focusing on the movement of the planes, they might not notice the 
background changing until after the change has taken place. 
The piece was produced with questions about compulsive usage in mind, 
but through its exhibition, prompted additional questions about the veracity of 
computational representations of reality as enacted by software in a broader 
sense. In this piece, the algorithm’s uncertainty is presented as a binary choice 
— this plane or that plane — but computerised modelling of reality is often 
much more sophisticated than this, and the consequences more significant. For 
example, when using social media, multiple data points are passively generated 
and gathered to produce profiles of the user which are then used to push 
precisely targeted, attention-capturing advertising. Facebook identifies almost a 
hundred separate data points to categorise users based on the data they 
generate through their use of the service.320 Algorithms model the viewer, and 
shape the view of reality that they are then presented with. 
In common with Invisible Layers, my own interpretations of the work and 
the questions these interpretations raise might not be straightforward for 
viewers to access. A consequence of ‘exhibition-as-method’ is that it offers the 
producer of the work the dual perspective of both viewer and author, affording a 
different perspective through which to analyse the work. With prior knowledge 
that the piece is made of modified software, and knowing the extent of the 
 
320 Caitlin Dewey, ‘98 Personal Data Points That Facebook Uses to Target Ads to You’, The 
Washington Post, 19 August 2016 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/08/19/98-personal-data-points-that-facebook-uses-to-target-ads-to-
you/?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories-2_intersect-701am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory> 
[accessed 21 August 2016]. 
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modification and its functioning, questions about algorithmic interpretations of 
reality present themselves more readily to viewers. Conversely, by reading the 
image solely on its appearance, a viewer might come up with a very different 
set of interpretations and questions.321 Exhibiting the work in a gallery context 
has revealed that the meaning and the research content of this particular work 
are best uncovered not by asking what it looks like, but by asking what the 
processes are that the work is carrying out. The work makes use of and 
reference to the possibility that algorithmic image processing is taking place, 
and only the results of this analysis are visible to the viewer. The processes 
themselves might not be apprehensible to the viewer, or might be impossible to 
be made accessible through what might be described as an aesthetic 
encounter.  
This raises a further question, one that was hinted at above: if the white-
walled institutional gallery is a highly structured context in which visual 
appearance is normally the first point of encounter with an artwork, is staging 
work in a gallery the best way of exploring computational questions about the 
background processing of data? Might there be other ways of understanding the 
work, more viable contexts for its presentation, or an argument for strategic 
non-presentation?  
A parallel but relevant set of ideas can be found in Louise Amoore’s work 
on the geopolitical consequences of cloud computing.322 Writing about Trevor 
Paglen’s work, which consists of photographs of National Security Agency data 
centres taken with astronomical telescopes from great distances, Amoore 
locates such artistic approaches ‘within and alongside the paradigm of 
observation’.323 She argues that observation alone is an inadequate way of 
understanding the computational cloud, partly because so much algorithmic 
processing takes place at speeds that are beyond the human capacity to 
 
321 One symposium attendee described the work as ‘almost Greenbergian’, noting its visual 
similarity to twentieth century abstract painting. 
322 Louise Amoore, ‘Cloud Geographies Computing, Data, Sovereignty’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 2016, 1–21. 
323 Amoore, p. 10. 
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observe. She instead proposes a distinction between mimetic and analytical 
scientific instruments, and argues that the observable physical characteristics of 
the cloud, such as its territorial location or the buildings used to house it, are 
less important than the cloud’s capacity to analyse and extract patterns from 
data. 
Following this reasoning helps develop a more nuanced understanding of 
Mock Objects. The piece asks to be attended to as art, invoking the established 
forms of attention that the gallery context demands, even though these are 
problematised by the work’s positioning amid ‘invisible’ infrastructure and by the 
behaviour of the onscreen image. Since the gallery context favours the 
observable characteristics of an algorithmic system over its analytical 
capacities, the power dialogues inherent in data modelling remain obscured, 
infra- to the display of work and difficult for the viewer to access. As a research 
activity, ‘exhibition-as-method’ (see Figure 6. on p. 93) therefore framed a new 
set of questions to do with exhibition context and the accessibility of meaning to 
be explored in future work. 
Cloud Services 
The completion of Mock Objects marked an inflection point in the 
development of my practical research and in the emphasis of my enquiry. I 
began to shift my focus, away from exploring how distraction through 
compulsive usage was brought about in an effort to gather personal data, and 
towards how the processing of that data in the cloud happens in ways that are 
likely to be obscured from the producer of that data. The question of agency 
shifts from an emphasis on the viewer or user’s resistance to distraction, and 
instead considers their capacity for agency over the potential use of data 
created by their behaviour. Rather than my initial focus, which was on how 
human attention is captured and manipulated by digital technology, the 
emphasis shifted to how humans are attended to by automatic processes of 
analysis on their behavioural data that are often carried out in the cloud.  
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 The initial practical steps that I took to explore this area were to 
investigate the range of cloud computing application processing interfaces 
(APIs) that were being offered by the major online tech companies. I was 
particularly interested in systems that could process images in the cloud, and 
began to look closely at Google’s Cloud Vision API.324 This is a cloud platform 
that when provided with an image can perform a range of analytical processes, 
including the detection of texts, geographical landmarks and faces; optical 
character recognition; detection of dominant colours; logo and trademark 
detection; and detection of sexually explicit content. The face detection part of 
the API performs basic sentiment analysis (which detects emotion) as well as 
returning information about the location of facial landmarks (such as eye, 
mouth, or nose position), and can even infer the 3D position of these facial 
landmarks from a 2D image. I was surprised at the detailed level of analysis 
made possible by this platform, and could only speculate at the aggregation of 
data that might be carried out behind the scenes and beyond the accessibility of 
the public API endpoints.  
While learning about these APIs and how they might be used, I 
developed a proposal for the Site Gallery Platform residency scheme, through 
which I hoped to reimagine the gallery’s website through the image processing 
systems provided by Google Cloud Vision.325 My intention was to temporarily 
replace the documentation and publicity images on Site’s public-facing website 
with processed versions that revealed the nuance and detail of the data that can 
be extracted from them. My hope was that this would invite viewers to question 
their own relationship to images of themselves that they have placed online by 
presenting algorithmically analysed versions of the gallery’s publicity images. 
Since viewers of the gallery website are reasonably likely to have visited the 
physical gallery, there is a good chance that they might have been 
photographed as part of the gallery’s event documentation, and I had hoped 
 
324 ‘Vision API - Image Content Analysis’, Google Cloud Platform 
<https://cloud.google.com/vision/> [accessed 6 January 2018]. 
325 This proposal can be viewed at <https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/site-platform-
proposal/> and in the supporting material that accompanies this thesis. 
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that their unintended visibility might be highlighted by this intervention. There 
were other related questions emerging from this that were to do with data 
stewardship and ethics: should the gallery be anonymising images of their 
audiences that have been placed online? Or conversely, and somewhat 
cynically, might sentiment analysis of images of event attendees provide insight 
into their emotional responses to the artwork, perhaps to an extent that could be 
instrumentalised as Arts Council evaluation feedback?  
While this piece did not get commissioned, the techniques developed 
were fed into the production of Power Portraits, a series of images produced for 
exhibition at the TALKEX17 exhibition in Rotherham.326 For this piece, a series 
of photographs of board members of major tech companies were passed 
through Google’s Vision API, and the resulting facial landmark datasets were 
printed as a set of posters. The posters were printed on brightly coloured 
backgrounds, to attract attention in the same sense that advertising imagery 
often does. The face landmarks are represented as small circles and the outline 
boundary of the detected face is shown as a rectangle. Each face is shown at a 
similar scale and while the faces are represented in an abstracted way, the 
differences can be worked out by the viewer when the images are shown in a 
series, allowing visual comparison between them. In this work, the actual faces 
of the people who make decisions about the governance of companies that 
develop invasive or compulsive technologies had one of these technologies 
turned on their own images. I intended this to puncture the sense that board 
members of tech companies are themselves invisible and inscrutable, 
appearing only through their mediated image and through the products they are 
responsible for managing.  
 
326 The full set of images produced for this piece are archived at 
<https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/power-portraits/> and in the supporting material that 
accompanies this thesis. 
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Figure 24: Power Portraits, March 2017. 
 
At the same time as this work was being developed, I was approached 
by the artist Penny McCarthy to collaborate on a project that would explore her 
interest in Google’s reverse image search algorithm. McCarthy had been using 
Google’s image search website to locate images on the web that the search 
engine considered to be visually similar to her own drawings, and was 
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interested in developing this process into a form that could be exhibited. This 
seemed to chime with my own research and offered an opportunity to learn 
more about the image processing APIs that I had already been investigating.  
I tested a number of commercial and publicly available APIs and each 
variously had its pros and cons; I eventually decided that Microsoft Cognitive 
Services offered the most accessible and affordable API.327 The process of 
reverse image search initially seemed to have an almost magical quality, 
whereby an image sent to would get a response that both seemed visually 
similar and also uncannily dissimilar. Curiosity about the unexpected resonance 
between source images and search results was what had motivated McCarthy 
to explore this area.  
The collaborative piece that was produced, which McCarthy titled 
Macchia, was staged in Site Gallery as part of the exhibition Material Truths in 
early 2017.328,329 The piece was shown as a wall-mounted screen with a shelf-
mounted mouse to allow viewers to interact with the piece. The screen showed 
two columns of images, the first being a subset of images from McCarthy’s 
archive, which when clicked, enlarged and could be compared with a second 
column of images returned from a Bing reverse image search query with the 
first image as the search term. Viewers could browse the various images 
returned by the search query and compare the range of similar yet different 
responses. It was hoped that this would reveal the production process of the 
McCarthy’s larger drawings in the exhibition, and also invite questions about 
how the search engine returned the images that it did. On my part, the work that 
went into Macchia was predominantly a question of producing a piece that 
would permit live search and visual comparison with the original images, but the 
 
327 ‘Computer Vision – Image Processing and Analytics | Microsoft Azure’ 
<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/services/cognitive-services/computer-vision/> 
[accessed 7 January 2018]. 
328 Kirsty Young, ‘Material Truths’, Site Gallery, 2017 <http://www.sitegallery.org/material-
truths/> [accessed 7 January 2018]. 
329 Documentation of the project can be viewed at 
<https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/macchia/> and in the supporting material that 
accompanies this thesis. 
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questions it prompted led me to embark on further research into how image 
based search engines operated within their own cloud-based ‘black boxes’.  
 
Figure 25: Macchia, screen grab, February 2017. The source image for the search is shown on 
the left, and the image returned by the API on the right. 
After attending a machine learning workshop at the Photographer’s 
Gallery, I began to make sense of how machine learning can be deployed to 
make reverse image search possible.330 Images on the web are indexed by the 
search engine and passed through a convolutional neural network which 
creates a fingerprint of salient visual information specific to each image. This 
fingerprint is sometimes known as a ‘feature vector’. When a search query is 
made, the submitted image is analysed in the same way and images with 
statistically similar feature vectors are returned. It’s in the range of statistical 
similarity that the slippage that creates the magic can be found: feature vectors 
are built up of statistical probabilities that multiple subsections (filters) of the 
 
330 Gene Kogan, ‘Gene Kogan - Machine Learning for Artists (Experimental Photo School)’, The 
Photographers’ Gallery, 2017 
<https://thephotographersgallery.org.uk/civicrm/event/info?reset=1&id=515> [accessed 
24 March 2018]. 
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image share visually salient characteristics. A small area of an image might 
have a high probability of being a bird in flight, for example, and a slightly lower 
probability of being an aeroplane, but in comparing those probabilities, overlaps 
might arise that provide visual matches from very different categories of thing. 
 
 
Figure 26: Macchia, screen grabs, February 2017. 
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While this seems to be quite a distance from the data gathering practices 
that were undertaken at the start of my study, the application of convolutional 
neural networks to produce feature vectors is really just a conflation of data 
gathering and automated processing. What makes it seem magical is the level 
of complexity that the feature vector can contain: levels of visual interpretation 
that are this nuanced are commonly confined to the qualitative realm, and the 
perceptual task that this system carries out is one that until recently could only 
be done by humans. Convolutional neural networks are modelled on the human 
perceptual system, and as such, their image-recognition capacity can be seen 
as attempting to reproduce that found in human vision.331 However, one of the 
curious characteristics of neural networks is the way they can digress from 
human processes of recognition. The way that a convolutional neural network 
processes the salient features of an image will inevitably differ from an aesthetic 
encounter between the same image and a human viewer. The types of 
automated analysis afforded by neural networks see things that human vision 
doesn’t, and it’s in this gap between the capacities of human and machine 
vision to identify and contextualise salience, and in the inscrutability of the 
operation of neural networks, that many of the concerns about these 
technologies reside.  
  
 
331 Gene Kogan, ‘Convolutional Neural Networks’, 2017 <https://ml4a.github.io/ml4a/convnets/> 
[accessed 7 January 2018]. 
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6: Conclusion 
Reflections on the Research Question 
The study set out to explore the relationship between distraction and the 
agency of users of internet-connected devices and services. As the study 
progressed, several prominent themes emerged alongside a range of related 
insights and questions, derived both from practical research activity and from 
the review of contextual material and existing artworks.  
The contribution to knowledge in this thesis is in the production of 
artworks that generate new ways of expressing the relationship between 
distraction, agency and the internet, and that invite the viewer to reflect on their 
own position in regard to this.332 Its originality lies in the application of artistic 
research methodologies to the contextual area under scrutiny and in the 
individual artworks produced. Each of the practical experiments outlined above 
has the potential to make a contribution to this area of research, as 
contextualised through their positioning in a history of existing artistic practice 
relevant to this research question. 
 I have shown how the propensity for users to be distracted, whether this 
is understood as the brain’s ‘vigilance mode’ or as misdirected attention, can be 
mobilised to invoke repetitive behaviours in relation to apps and connected 
services such as social media. Eyal’s ‘hooked’ model and other behaviourist 
understandings of gamified interfaces appear to permit a loss of user agency, 
where attention is ‘captured’ by casual games or addictive services. In Dow 
Schüll’s analysis, this is seen more as co-produced compulsion, initially driven 
by negative affect, such as the desire to relieve the uncertainty of an 
economically precarious existence. Counter-intuitively, entering the ‘machine 
zone’ of compulsion is seen as an enacting of agency rather than a loss of it, as 
 
332 ‘The internet’ is retained as a necessarily broad category through which a range of online 
and digitally mediated practices can be referred to. 
 142 
gamblers choose the relative certainty of win-or-lose in favour of the uncertain 
life outside the game.333  
If this logic is extended using Beller’s account of attention as labour, the 
possibility arises that distraction too is a type of labour. Distraction is seen as a 
bad thing through its framing as an enemy of productivity. I would argue that 
this negative valuation is underpinned by a conception of the neoliberalised self 
whose human capital is diminished by low competitiveness or productivity. So 
on the one hand, there is a governmentality at play that encourages negative 
self-valuation in response to distractibility, yet on the other, distraction can be 
seen as the same sort of attentive labour as attention, directed to other tasks. 
Gamified systems of design that claim to exploit psychological vulnerabilities 
generate so-called ‘addictions’ to distraction, and, as I have shown, activity on 
digitised platforms creates data in ways that are useful to the platforms yet are 
often inapprehensible to the users of those platforms. Distraction therefore can 
be seen as labour conducted on the behalf of those platforms that deliver the 
distractions in the first place, only disguised as entertainment, sociality, identity 
work, and so on.  
Distraction is related to media consumption, whether in the dialectic 
between mainstream media and ‘fake-news’ which compete for ‘eyeballs’ in an 
attention economy, or through the interruptions and updates generated by 
social media. Choosing what to attend to or be persuaded by is the type of 
agency the advertising industry seeks to intervene in by profiling users, and as 
Munster suggests, the intention is to insert technological processes into the pre-
conscious part of our attention.334 Gamified design techniques facilitate this, and 
the data that is produced through everyday interaction with the online world 
allows the profiling of users to a very precise degree. The potential of this 
profiling to target audiences at an extremely granular level has caused concern.  
333 See p. 32 for an explanation of the term ‘machine zone’. 
334 See p. 23. 
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In common with gambling, there has been some back-and-forth in 
advertising legislation to ‘even the odds’ between advertisers and consumers. 
The fear of being unknowingly manipulated by advertising is a long-standing 
concern, and it proposes an idea of agency that it’s useful to explore here. 
Neoliberal economics (as distinct from Brown’s neoliberal rationality) depends 
on a rational, self-interested subject who makes decisions in their own best 
interests. Yet, in advertising, it’s long been understood that consumer decisions 
are made irrationally, often at an unconscious level. The notion of rational self-
interest is brought into question by behaviourist interface design approaches 
that foster levels of compulsive engagement that may be contrary to the user’s 
rational self-interest. On the one hand, users of these systems are 
conceptualised as automata, dumbly reproducing conditioned responses to 
visual cues, while on the other, they are considered as self-interested 
individuals with autonomy over their processes of rational decision-making. 
Davies hints at a resolution to this impasse in a discussion on the importance of 
social obligation to behavioural economics: ‘if one wants to control other human 
beings, it is often far more effective to appeal to their sense of morality and 
social identity than to their self-interest.’335 If platforms are the sites where social 
identity is managed, measured, invested in and maintained, then an 
abandonment of those platforms, however self-interested it may be, might meet 
resistance. 
Under Zuboff’s rubric of surveillance capitalism, the desire to withdraw 
from using these platforms is overwritten by the necessity to use them for the 
continuation of everyday productive life. The invasion of privacy that the 
submission of behavioural data represents is tolerated by users in return for 
services that have become indispensable. The rationally self-interested desire 
for privacy conflicts with the desire for shared sociality on platforms that extract 
personal data. For Zuboff, this produces a ‘psychic numbing that inures people 
to the realities of being tracked, parsed, mined, and modified – or disposes 
 
335 William Davies, The Happiness Industry, p. 184. 
 144 
them to rationalise the situation in resigned cynicism.’336 This cynicism is 
exacerbated by the lack of easily adopted strategies for resistance that are 
available to the non-specialist platform user, although the recent growth of ad-
blockers, obfuscation plug-ins, and private browsers has begun to change this. 
The range of disconnective practices that are already in use suggests that 
cynicism might be overcome if comparatively small steps could be taken to 
empower user agency. 
A distinction should be made here between the agency of users of 
distracting systems and the agency of the artist-researcher who produces 
artworks that might critique these systems. Considering agency as the capacity 
to act independently within limiting structures, the user of a distracting system 
retains sufficient agency to engage in disconnective practices, or to withdraw 
their attentional labour. The agency of an artist-researcher should perhaps be 
considered in more critical terms, and will be discussed shortly as I reflect on 
methodological insights that have emerged from this study. 
By examining existing examples of artistic practice, I have described how 
artist-researchers have variously engaged with or resisted systems that distract, 
or measure engagement metrics. I have also discussed some of the similarities 
and differences between the attentive regime of the gallery and of online display 
contexts. Artists such as Artie Vierkant scrutinise relationships between digital 
and physical contexts for the display and production of art. As the practices 
developed by ‘surf clubs’ migrated to privatised and metricised platforms, the 
accumulation of content around personal profiles moved artistic production and 
display into the mechanics of the online attention economy. The display of art 
on platforms that might invite compulsive engagement means that the agency of 
the viewer of the artwork is no different to the agency of the user of distracting 
systems. Attempts to interrupt online experiences with artistic interventions can 
be interpreted as distractions just like any other: interruptions that impinge on 
336 Zuboff, p. 84. 
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the agency enacted by the viewer in constructing their own browser-based 
online workspace. 
 In some of the practical work produced as part of this study, surveillant 
processes that gather metrics have been redeployed to extend understanding of 
these processes and their contexts, and to allow for their reinterpretation. Tap 
actively creates distraction through the sonification of metadata that has been 
generated as a by-product of productive work. This limits the viewer’s agency 
as they do not have the option of avoiding hearing the work. It reminds of the 
humanness in seemingly objectively gathered data, and of the covert gathering 
of metadata that surveillance capitalism infrastructures enact. Invisible Layers 
speaks more to the scale of those infrastructures and their imperceptibility, 
inviting viewers of the work to vicariously absorb themselves in a play of agency 
and subservience. The intimate scale of the pinch-to-zoom gesture contrasts 
with the overwhelming reach of the infrastructures that are revealed through this 
act of agency, an act that is endlessly, compulsively repeated without 
satisfaction. The repeated imagery in Screen Time instead lulls the viewer, 
while simultaneously positioning them as the subject of the work. The slow 
interrogation that this work subjects the viewer to makes them think of their own 
dependence on communications platforms and the dominant narrative of 
productivity that is a background to distraction. Algorithmic profiling is the chief 
consideration of Mock Objects, presenting indeterminacy as a way of invoking 
the possibility of uncertainty emerging from algorithmic processes that are 
normally perceived to be or treated as objective. The edges of this algorithmic 
uncertainty are further probed in Macchia and Power Portraits, in which cloud 
processes are deployed to highlight their diverting incomprehensibility or their 
potential to be reclaimed as an act of political agency by the artist-researcher. 
Each of these works contributes by revealing and extending a context for 
practice that has been developed as a way of understanding the relationship 
between distraction, agency and the internet. 
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Reflections on Methodology 
A second set of conclusions emerged through practice in a less 
predictable fashion, and these signal a departure from the intended scope of 
the study. They address a type of artistic agency that emerges when the artist-
researcher engages in a conversation with algorithmic processes which may 
have their own semi-autonomous behaviours, or relational infrastructural 
ontologies.  
Each of my projects converses with an algorithm in a slightly different 
capacity. If a distinction between artist—artwork—viewer can hold true, then the 
interaction with algorithms in the works outlined above can be seen to lie in 
proximity to the artist in some works, and to the artwork in others. The 
apprehensibility of the algorithmic influence to the viewer varies from one work 
to another. In works like Epicentres, Screen Time, and Invisible Layers, the 
algorithmic processing of the data that generates the map imagery is not 
foregrounded: the data itself is instead presented as a significant component of 
the work. In Mock Objects and Macchia, the relationship with the algorithm is 
centre-stage and forms the work’s main focus. Despite this, the algorithmic 
process itself remains fairly inscrutable in these works. Power Portraits does a 
better job of inviting the viewer to speculate about the algorithm that forms the 
subject of the work and has generated the visual form of the piece. In terms of 
artistic agency, the method deployed in the production of these works seems 
related to a conceptualist or process-art approach, where a system is put in 
place to generate the work while the artist’s agency recedes. Unlike the wall 
drawings of Sol LeWitt for example, here, the rules that are in place are 
externally imposed by the vectorial class: the commercial developers of the 
algorithms such as Google, Microsoft, and so on. Rather than considering 
authorship as the writing of the rules through which the system produces the 
work, as in much programmatic artwork, here the rules are outsourced. 
Outsourcing is a significant characteristic of neoliberal economics, and the 
globalised nature of these works also needs to be recognised; here though, the 
globalised Big Tech companies are positioned as the structure within which 
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artistic agency can operate. Unlike many post-internet artists, who constrain the 
dissemination of their work within metricised platforms, these projects seem to 
orient the viewer toward the algorithmic processes taking place behind the 
scenes of the major platforms.  
One further point that warrants discussion is how the ‘clews’ unfurled in 
the sequence of development of these works. In retrospect I can identify in my 
process a tendency to retain elements from one experiment to the next in order 
to maintain a sense of artistic consistency. In part, I see this as evidence of an 
experimental methodology where the ingredients that remain on the table at the 
end of one work form the resources from which the next work is made, but there 
is also a sense in which this reach for coherence adheres to a conception of 
human capital as embodied in an artistic persona. The development of an 
artistic style is, as James Elkins argues, something that many MFA 
programmes have among their aims, and the style of an artist can become their 
unique selling point.337 Much of the criticism of post-internet art revolves around 
its distillation into a set of stylistic tropes that comply with art market 
imperatives. There is a tension in my desire to produce a sense of consistency 
in visual style between the function of the works as research and their function 
as artworks intended for an audience, or that circulate within an art world 
(however that might be defined). This tension returns us to the productive 
friction between artistic research and the academy, and between the evaluative 
discourses that separate the academy and the wider art world(s). In this thesis, 
the research content of the work can be arrived at through reflection and 
analysis and expressed in writing, whereas much of the contextual material 
preceding and emerging from the works might remain inaccessible when the 
work meets an art audience. I am happy for these productive tensions to remain 
unresolved. 
 
337 James Elkins, ‘The Three Configurations of Practice-Based PhDs’, Printed Project, 4, 2005, 
7–19. 
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Future Work 
This study has proved to be invaluable in redirecting my practice, and it 
presents a number of possibilities for future work. One of the strongest contexts 
with potential for further exploration is the developing relationship between 
Beller’s ongoing scholarship on the financialisation of images in an attention 
economy and an art world that still leans heavily on the trading of commodities, 
and that considers artworks as a store of value. As artistic commodities are 
stockpiled as investments, and might move from the artist’s studio directly to 
asset storage, they themselves become financialised investments and forego 
their function as generative of aesthetic experiences.338 This phenomenon 
seems like a viable context from which to explore questions about the 
apprehensibility of algorithmic influence that have been raised earlier in this 
thesis. This leads to a second potential line of enquiry suggested by this study: 
a more focused engagement with the mechanics of online advertising, tracking, 
profiling and passive data gathering. These areas of commercial consumer data 
gathering invite more sustained attention than I have been able to do in this 
thesis.  
Contemporary with the close of this study, there is a significant backlash 
taking place against the Silicon Valley tech giants. The vexed question of ‘fake-
news’, combined with questions about the role of services such as YouTube 
and Facebook in making inappropriate content available to minors, has allowed 
a climate to develop that seems considerably more hostile to Big Tech than 
when this study commenced. The possibility of legislation as a solution to the 
perceived problems of distraction seems to be more real than at any time 
previously; in France, for example, following on from ‘right to disconnect’ 
legislation in late 2016, legislation has been passed that will ban smartphones 
 
338 Stefan Heidenreich, ‘Freeportism as Style and Ideology: Post-Internet and Speculative 
Realism, Part I - Journal #71 March 2016 - e-Flux’, 2016 <http://www.e-
flux.com/journal/71/60521/freeportism-as-style-and-ideology-post-internet-and-
speculative-realism-part-i/> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
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in schools from September 2018.339,340 The furore over possible Russian 
influence over the 2016 United States election and Brexit referendum has 
increased the possibility that social media services such as Facebook and 
Twitter will be reclassified as commercial entities that are more like publishers 
than platforms, opening them up to greater regulatory auditing and scrutiny. The 
developing story around Facebook’s sharing of data with Cambridge Analytica, 
and the appearance of various high-profile witnesses at the U.K. Government’s 
Digital Culture Media and Sport committee’s Fake News Enquiry adds to the 
pressure on the ‘attention economy’ business model of social media platforms 
across the board.341,342 The committee’s full report seems likely to recommend 
that the online advertising industry be subject to far greater regulation, 
particularly regarding political advertising.343 
In recent months, information about how apps and devices can be 
designed to be addictive that was only accessible via academic studies at the 
start of my Ph.D. has become general knowledge and published in the 
mainstream press. The technologies that harness our attention and passively 
compile ‘data doubles’ are no more sophisticated than they were at the 
beginning of this study, but public awareness of them seems to have increased 
exponentially in this time. Rather than being part of the ‘not-noticed’ 
infrastructure of the web, tech company transgressions are now much more 
 
339 ‘French Get Right to Avoid Work Emails’, BBC News, 31 December 2016, section Europe 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38479439> [accessed 5 January 2018]. 
340 Kim Willsher, ‘France to Ban Mobile Phones in Schools from September’, The Guardian, 11 
December 2017, section World news 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/france-to-ban-mobile-phones-in-
schools-from-september> [accessed 25 June 2018]. 
341  ‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’, The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files> [accessed 25 
March 2018]. 
342 ‘UK Parliament: Fake News’, UK Parliament, 2018 
<https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-
culture-media-and-sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/fake-news-17-19/> 
[accessed 29 April 2018]. 
343 ‘Disinformation and “Fake News”: Interim Report - Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee - House of Commons’ 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/363/36302.htm> 
[accessed 1 August 2018]. 
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widely reported. This may lead to a mobilisation of user agency that will shift the 
centre of gravity of the debate surrounding platforms in favour of the users of 
those platforms. This greater awareness of the context gives the practical work 
produced during this study a greater currency and impact. 
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Appendix 1: Practical Submission 
The Ph.D. regulations for practice-based submissions permit the 
production of a body of creative work as part of a programme of research, and 
state that the ‘final submission [of the thesis] must be accompanied by some 
permanent record of this body of work’. In my research programme, which has 
involved an exploration of the edge between online and offline exhibition 
contexts, the question of permanence is problematic. Artworks created for the 
web often have comparatively short lifespans compared to those made with 
traditional media, and there is unresolved debate in the museum sector about 
how best to preserve and archive ‘new’ media artworks. Such works exist on a 
sliding scale of permanence that can be impacted on by the availability of an 
internet connection, of the correct browser or plug-in, or even of a specific code 
library that might be maintained and hosted beyond the reach of the artist. The 
nuances of the preservation debate are beyond the scope of this thesis, but I 
take on board Vierkant’s position outlined in the thesis about the questionable 
link between the document and the notional ‘original’ work, while also 
attempting to comply with the institutional demand for permanence. 
Therefore, a pragmatic approach has been taken to the assembly of an 
archive of practical work to accompany this thesis. Since the majority of the 
work exists in digital form first and foremost, the archive is supplied in the form 
of an online repository that can be accessed live on the web and also from a 
local USB storage device submitted with the thesis. Some works will only 
function as intended when hosted on cloud computing platforms, but screen-
captured video of these works in use has also been included in the archive to 
slide them along the scale in the direction of permanence. Some works have 
already expired, and in this case, screen-captures form the principal point of 
contact with the work. Works that exist in physical form, such as books, have 
been presented in the archive in documentation, completing their transition from 
digital to physical and back again.  
  
 
 
 
b 
Links to the relevant sections of the online repository have been included 
as footnotes in Chapter 5 so that the documentation of works can be 
straightforwardly accessed alongside the written commentary in the thesis. The 
structure of the live archive site is identical to that supplied on the USB storage 
device. To access the archive from the supplied USB, double-click the 
index.html file which should open the site in your default web browser. The 
body of work can be accessed at the following live URL: 
<https://www.michaelday.org.uk/phd/>.  
The following pages contain an approximate representation of the 
content of the practice archive. The moving image and digital works have been 
necessarily omitted and should be viewed from the digital archive. 
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Interdisciplinary dialogue is at the centre of my research. Intro to 
my research/practice my own work is concerned with attention and 
distraction, and compulsive internet and device usage (although it’s 
moving) all about the capture of attention attention studies is the 
backbone of the interdisciplinarity in my study UI/UX, stuff from 
design psychology and the study of behaviour, neuroscience also media 
studies, sociology, cultural studies, wellbeing – even transhumanism 
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!
Impossibly broad, impossible to get full expertise in these areas. 
Scientific research: like doing a survey, finding an untouched area, 
drilling for oil 
!
Artistic research: cleaning up an oil spill over a wide area, 
aggregating and recombining knowledge leaked from other disciplines 
This is how interdisciplinary dialogue works for me 
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!
Wrote about compulsive internet usage, online/offline borders, 
gamification in the book so won’t repeat that here Online/offline 
borders led me to use modified Augmented Reality software 
!
Pokemon Go: Augmented Reality consists of live video and digitally 
rendered elements that ‘augment’ the live scene 
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!
The software I have modified uses markers like this to orient the 
scene. 
!
It uses a modified computer vision system to locate markers in a video 
scene, which is playing in the background but, based on these markers, 
it can only make a best guess about the orientation of them, 
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!
leading to a level of indeterminacy or error in its interpretation of 
reality. It wobbles because it’s processing every video frame in 
sequence, and each one comes out a little different results in a 
restless image, flickering, and making visual the uncertainty of the 
computer system 
!
Analysis of form 
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!
Installed on infrastructure wall – everything on that wall is supposed 
to be invisible 
!
As John Durham Peters writes about, infrastructure is supposed to be 
invisible: “The bigger the infrastructure, the more likely it is to 
drift out of awareness.” p36 Their invisibility is not accidental: 
when we consider this, they foreground what they are ‘infra’ to: in 
this case, the white-walled institutional gallery space with all its 
  
 
 
 
pppp 
structures of engagement, expectations of behaviour, attentional norms 
it’s a sign that you’re supposed to ignore is it a status readout? is 
it measuring? What is the subject of the measurement? 
!
Whether they know what they’re comparing or not, making a comparison 
between two images positions the viewer as an active empowered 
overseer unlike compulsively designed interfaces, which reduce agency, 
invoke habit visually, presents the output of a system rather than a 
visual proposal – the output just happens to be visual. Aesthetics are 
almost completely incidental to the work, comparisons with Albers, 
minimalism etc might not yield much. Background slowly shifting to 
emphasise the passage of time and the focus of attention for the 
audience 
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!
My method – tinkering with existing libraries and reflecting on the 
results as if they were artworks – allows something like insight to 
turn up through crossing disciplines, through defamiliarisation . How 
is this understood? One way: What’s emerging here is the uncertainty 
of computational representations of reality. If it can’t decide which 
way up a square is, why defer to it in other contexts? Uncertainty is 
a false binary in this piece – computational modelling of reality is 
much more sophisticated than that multiple data points are used to 
create profiles with which to build things that attempt to grab your 
attention. One way of understanding this: Louse Amoore, Cloud 
Geographies: criticises the ‘observational paradigm’ that is present 
in art, and in fact, all empirical research: argues that the 
appearance, the making visible, isn’t enough when there are invisible 
processes that are creating actionable decisions 
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!
The question here is ‘how does it work’ not ‘what does it look like’. 
What is role of the gallery as a context to talk about computational 
issues ? Next: questions about when UI can’t rely on visual 
interaction alone to invoke compulsion voice interface Alexa, Siri, 
Cortana Eliza – that’s what will go into the next book. 
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I’m an artist working with digital media, typically installation and 
interactive projects 
Currently doing phd about art, attention, distraction, and digital 
media. 
* led onto human vs machine attention, control of attention 
* ubiquity of algorithms and image analysis, phones, number plate 
recognition, etc 
algorithms link to databases, things are below the scope of attention, 
invisible yet actionable. Seen as OBJECTIVE but are totally not 
* infrastructural: ie, not usually visible, and this invisibility 
obscures ideological or political bias 
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* intend to use Site’s archive of documentation images 
* send it through Google Vision API 
* it detects: 
+++ face, plus basic sentiment (joy, sorrow etc) 
+++ landmarks (such as Eiffel Tower etc) 
+++ text (OCR – will return as text strings) 
+++ colour (basic quantity analysis) 
+++ labels (text tags referring to image content) 
* Curious to see what it turns up 
Interested in how utilitarian images have unintended aesthetic 
qualities 
!
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Face recognition points have a sense of the punchcard or invoke the 
physical 
!
Vision API returns inferred 3D points for face landmarks 
!
* Talk about outcomes in each gallery: 
+++ Data as infrastructure = invisible. 
+++ Gallery as an attention infrastructure in itself 
+++ Large gallery, hiding work, making it quite difficult to see: Make 
the work compete for invisibility with gallery infrastructure such as 
plugs etc 
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+++ Through projection, hiding the workAggregation – most populous 
words, colours, etc 
Multiplicity of faces 
Smaller gallery: use for cinematic projection of 3D face animations 
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Appendix 2: Timeline 
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Numbers indicate where works have met a public audience. 
1. Epicentres book, Pages International Contemporary Artist’s Book Fair, The 
Tetley, Leeds, March 2015 
2. Epicentres book, The Hepworth Print Fair, The Hepworth, Wakefield, March 
2015 
3. Method Conference, Sheffield Hallam University, April 2015 
4. Epicentres book, Liverpool Artists Book Fair, Liverpool Central Library, July 
2015 
5. Invisible Layers, Terminus, S1 Artspace, Sheffield, Aug 2015 
6. Epicentres book, London Art Book Fair, Whitechapel Gallery, September 
2015 
7. Epicentres book, Manchester Artists Book Fair, Holden Gallery, October 
2015 
8. Sluice Art Fair images, Oxo Wharf, London, November 2015 
9. Screen Time, Research Inside Practice Symposium, Peltz Gallery, Birkbeck 
College, University of London, January 2016 
10. Epicentres photographs, Northern Light, SIA Gallery, Sheffield, July 2016 
11. Mock Objects, Testing Testing Exhibition, August – September 2016 
12. Mock Objects Symposium Presentation, Testing, Testing Symposium, 
September 2016 
13. Macchia, Material Truths, Site Gallery, January 2017 
14. Power Portraits, TALKEX17, ROAR, Rotherham, March 2017 
15. Screen Time, Affect & Social Media #3 Conference, University of East 
London, May 2017 
16. Creative Spark Poster, Title, formatted in sentence case (Not Title Case and 
NOT ALL CAPS), hints at an interesting issue and/or methodology, 
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doesn’t spill onto a third line (ideally) and isn’t hot pink, Sheffield Institute 
of Arts, June 2018 
 
RF1: Application for Approval of Research Programme. This comprises a 500-
word written piece. 
RF2: Confirmation of PhD. This comprises a public viva presentation and a 
6000-word written piece, as well as other supporting material. 
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Appendix 3: Screen Time Sources 
Booth, Frances, ‘Five Signs You’re Suffering from Digital Distraction (with Tips 
for Finding Balance) | Do What You Love’, 2015 
<https://dowhatyouloveforlife.com/blog/2015/02/five-signs-youre-
suffering-from-digital-distraction-with-tips-for-finding-balance/> [accessed 
21 June 2018]!
CABA, ‘Smartphone Addiction - Do You Need a Digital Detox? | CABA - The 
Charity Supporting Chartered Accountants’ Wellbeing’, 2016 
<https://www.caba.org.uk/help-and-guides/information/smartphone-
addiction-do-you-need-digital-detox> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Cohen, Ed, ‘5 Signs YOU NEED to Enter the DIGITAL DETOX Zone’, 2015 
<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/5-signs-you-need-enter-digital-detox-
zone-ed-cohen> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Crow, Sara Jayne, ‘9 Signs You Need a Digital Detox’, LIVESTRONG.COM, 
2013 <https://www.livestrong.com/slideshow/1011411-8-signs-need-
digital-detox/?page=2> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
David, ‘Stop Wasting Time: Boost Your Social Media Productivity with a Digital 
Detox’, Social Media Consultant | Social Media Agency | Social 
Marketing, 2013 <https://lorirtaylor.com/stop-wasting-time-boost-your-
social-media-productivity-with-a-digital-detox/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Dhaliwal, Alyssa, ‘Do You Need a Digital Detox?’, Shape Singapore, 2016 
<https://www.shape.com.sg/lifestyle/do-you-need-digital-detox/> 
[accessed 21 June 2018] 
Driggs, Amanda, ‘Screen-Attached: Do You Need a Digital Detox?’, Northstar 
Counseling Center, 2015 <http://northstarcounselingcenter.com/screen-
attached-do-you-need-a-digital-detox> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
‘Is Technology Ruining Your Life? 4 Signs You Need A Digital Detox’, 2015 
<http://www.eatliveglow.com/is-technology-ruining-your-life-4-signs-you-
need-a-digital-detox/> [accessed 1 August 2015] 
Keeping, Nick, ‘Signs You May Need A Digital Detox’ 
<http://www.theherotales.com/signs-you-may-need-a-digital-detox/> 
[accessed 16 May 2016] 
Laura, ‘10 Signs You Need a Digital Detox’, Little Bits of Granola, 2016 
<http://www.littlebitsofgranola.com/2016/03/02/10-signs-you-need-digital-
detox/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Lee, Lorraine, ‘Signs You Need A Digital Detox’, 2015 
<http://www.spaceforgrowth.co.uk/signs-you-need-a-digital-detox/> 
[accessed 9 March 2015] 
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Lepore, Meredith, ‘Are You Addicted To Technology? How To Do A Digital 
Detox’, Skillcrush, 2014 <https://skillcrush.com/2014/07/17/digital-detox-
steps/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Mangwengwende, Enos, ‘8 Signs That You Need a Digital Detox’, Kalabash 
Media, 2015 <https://kalabashmedia.com/2015/07/28/8-signs-that-you-
need-a-digital-detox/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
McLeod, Vicki, ‘5 Signs That You Need a Digital Detox, or How to Be Happier, 
Calmer and More Productive by Getting Offline’, 2014 
<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140826231608-18004897-5-signs-
that-you-need-a-digital-detox-or-how-to-be-happier-calmer-and-more-
productive-by-getting-offline> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
McMahon, Tania, ‘10 Signs That It’s Time For A Digital Detox’, Benchmark 
Psychology, 2016 <http://www.benchmarkpsychology.com.au/10-signs-
that-its-time-for-a-digital-detox/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Moore, Sharon, ‘10 Signs You Need a Digital Detox | Therapy Blog – 
NaturalTherapyForAll’, 25 nov 13 
<http://blog.naturaltherapyforall.com/2013/11/25/10-signs-you-need-a-
digital-detox/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Nowak, Kiri, ‘18 Signs The Digital World Is Taking Over Your Life| UK Lifestyle, 
Mental Health, Anxiety & Travel Blogger’, The Content Wolf | UK 
Lifestyle, Mental Health, Anxiety & Travel Blogger, 2015 
<http://www.thecontentwolf.com/life/18-signs-the-digital-world-is-taking-
over-your-life/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Smith, Allie Marie, ‘5 Signs You Need A Digital Detox’, Darling Magazine, 2014 
<https://darlingmagazine.org/five-signs-digital-detox/> [accessed 21 June 
2018] 
Thompson, Louise, ‘6 Signs You Need a Digital Detox…and 3 Quick Tips on 
How to Do It’, Louise Thompson, Life Coach, Wellbeing Writer and 
Speaker, 2014 <https://louisethompson.com/6-signs-you-need-a-digital-
detox-and-3-quick-tips-on-how-to-do-it/> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
Wade, Stephane, ‘7 Signs You Need A Digital Detox’, 2015 
<http://fooddaily.com.au/articles/18520/signs-you-need-a-digital-detox> 
[accessed 26 March 2015] 
Warner, Christine, ‘Signs You Need a Digital Detox - Verily’, 2015 
<https://verilymag.com/2015/03/lifehacks-technology-digital-detox> 
[accessed 21 June 2018] 
White, Cassie, ‘Do You Need a Digital Detox? - Health & Wellbeing’, 2013 
<http://www.abc.net.au/health/thepulse/stories/2013/12/09/3906736.htm
> [accessed 21 June 2018] 
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